



Newton Research Europe

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GEO-POWER-EU

Public Opinion Survey Report:

Foreign Policy Perceptions in the Western Balkans  
and Eastern Partnership

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# GEO-POWER-EU PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

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*expressed are those of the survey Newton/Indago company only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the granting authority or the GeoPower Consortium. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.*

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## INTRODUCTION

Prepared within the Horizon Europe project Empowering the Geopolitical EU in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans (GEO-POWER-EU), this report presents foreign policy perceptions across these two regions. The University of Rijeka commissioned the public opinion survey, with fieldwork by Newton Research Europe d.o.o. and Indago d.o.o.e.l. The findings and analysis presented in the report are sole responsibility of Newtown Research Group and Indago. Focusing on nine countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia – the study offers a timely exploration of how citizens in these two strategic regions view international actors and the direction of their countries' foreign policies. These regions are often seen as geopolitical crossroads of European integration and broader great-power competition, making empirical understanding of public sentiment in them especially important. By examining public attitudes at this critical juncture, the Geo-Power-EU survey contributes valuable insights into the local perspectives shaping international relations in Southeast Europe and the EU's eastern neighbourhood.

Recent global and regional developments underscore the importance of this research. The ripple effects of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine have been felt not only in Eastern Europe but also across the Western Balkans, manifesting in heightened security concerns, energy vulnerabilities, and disinformation challenges. At the same time, the prospect of European Union enlargement in these countries has been accompanied by internal socio-economic strains and intensified engagement by other powers. In this context, public opinion offers an invaluable window into how societies might navigate their foreign policy choices amid competing influences. Understanding what citizens believe – about threats, opportunities, and alliances – is crucial for policymakers attempting to steer these nations through a period of uncertainty and realignment.

The general objective of the study is to assess citizens' perceptions of the roles of five major international actors – the European Union, the United States, Russia, China, and Turkey – as well as to assess the level of trust for them and to identify citizens' expectations regarding their country's foreign policy for each country. Through a series of targeted questions, the survey gauges the level of public trust in

each of these actors and captures expectations about the preferred direction of national foreign policy. In other words, do people envision their country's future aligning more closely with Western institutions (such as the EU and NATO) or gravitating toward alternative global partners?

The Geo-Power-EU Public Opinion Survey reached a total of 9.011 respondents that participated in the survey, with a minimum of 1.000 respondents from each country ensuring national representativeness. The fieldwork was conducted in June of 2025. Computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) method was utilized to accomplish the intended objectives (full description of methodology is available at the end of this report). The questionnaire was originally developed in English and subsequently translated into all relevant local languages (including Russian in Moldova and Ukraine, Romanian, as well in Moldova, and Albanian in Kosovo). It was comprised of thirty core questions alongside a standardized block of five initial questions at the start of the survey and five more demographic questions at the end.

The content of the core questions employed a structured questionnaire encompassing multiple thematic areas (available in Annex 5). Respondents first answered questions about their information sources and media habits, as well as their general satisfaction with domestic conditions, to set the context for understanding their worldviews. The questionnaire then delved into economic perspectives and migration aspirations, recognizing that socio-economic factors can shape outlooks on foreign policy. Next, a section on European integration and security alliances asked about views on EU membership, NATO membership, and the perceived impact of these Western alignments on the country's development. This was followed by detailed inquiries into perceptions of external actors – measuring whether citizens see major powers like the EU, USA, Russia, China, and Turkey as partners or threats to peace and security. Finally, the survey explored domestic political orientations, including attitudes toward potential policy directions and alliances, which helps connect foreign policy preferences with internal political dynamics.

The report is accordingly organized into thematic chapters reflecting these topics from core questions:

- A. Information
- B. Economy/Migration
- C. EU and NATO
- D. External Actors
- E. Political Orientation

These chapters are followed by individual National Overview sections for each country and a set of general conclusions.

## KEY FINDINGS

### A. INFORMATION

This chapter explores how citizens across multiple countries inform themselves about political developments, providing critical insights into the media ecosystems and communication habits shaping public opinion. This is done by examining which sources people use to stay informed about political developments, where respondents could mention up to three sources. The range of media types includes national, regional, local television, radio stations; as well as online news portals, social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, or TikTok; messaging applications like Telegram and WhatsApp; the printed press; and informal communication through discussions with friends, family, or colleagues.

In addition to mapping out where people get their information, the chapter explores the languages in which people consume political news, which specific media outlets or sources they consider most trustworthy, and how satisfied they are with the current state of affairs in their country. It also assesses public perceptions regarding key values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, economic well-being,



employment, social equality, security, and freedom of speech. The analysis further includes citizens' expectations about the country's future and their views on the most pressing issues likely to affect national development in the coming years.

### First-Mention Source of Political Information


When respondents were asked to name up to three sources they use for political information, national television stood out as the most frequent first-mentioned source, cited first by 32% of all participants. It was followed by social media platforms—including Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Threads, X, and YouTube—which were listed first by 24%. Internet portals accounted for 16% of first-mentions, while local television was the first-named source for 9% of respondents. An additional 5% of respondents stated they do not follow political information at all. Other sources that were named first by fewer than 5% of respondents include regional television and messaging apps (Signal, Telegram, Viber, WhatsApp), both at 4%, as well as talks with friends and family at 2%. Sources that received 1% or less of first-mentions were foreign television channels (e.g., BBC, CNN, Russia Today), printed press, radio, and non-specific responses such as “other” or “don’t know.” Among the 38 respondents

who selected “other” as their first-mention, answers included references to drawing from all available sources, using official state institution websites, or naming concrete news channels.

Figure 1. *First-mentioned Source of Political Developments Information by Country*

01. How do you inform yourself of political developments in your country? First-mention

All respondents (N = 9.011); each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Only the first-mention is shown. Results are expressed in share of total %. Values below 3% are written to sustain clarity.



When looking at the data through the lens of roles and relationships between the target countries, several noteworthy elements emerge. In a majority of the surveyed countries, national television channels are the leading first-mentioned source for political developments. Notably, Albania stands out, with 64% of respondents citing national TV as their first source — the highest proportion among all countries surveyed. North Macedonia (39%), Serbia (38%), and Kosovo (37%) also show

national TV as the top first-mentioned source, albeit at lower levels than Albania. These percentages are higher than those in countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina (17%) or Ukraine (18%), highlighting a potential gap in the relevance of national TV across the studied countries.

Montenegro presents an intermediate case. Here, 25% of respondents reflect national TV as their first-mention, while a nearly equal 24% identify internet portals. While national TV remains the single most cited, the gap between TV and online sources is much narrower than in Albania or Serbia. Montenegro also shows notable figures for local TV (14%) within first-mentions, reinforcing the idea of a potentially diverse media environment.

A few countries deviate from this TV-dominant pattern, favoring online media as their leading first-mentioned news source. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, only 17% selected national TV as their first-mention — among the lowest rates in the survey. Instead, internet news portals take the lead, with 27% naming them first — notably higher than Bosnia and Herzegovina's TV figure. This suggests that citizens in Bosnia

and Herzegovina are more inclined to turn to online news platforms over television for political information.

Additionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina records relatively higher first-mentions for local TV (16.4%) and regional TV (9%) than most other countries, pointing to a more fragmented television landscape, where local and regional channels collectively rival national TV. Another striking observation is that 11.6% of respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina stated they are “not informed” — the highest share among all countries surveyed, indicating a notable level of disengagement.

Both Georgia and Moldova display a distinct pattern where social media emerges as the most frequently first-mentioned source for political news. In Georgia, 38.8% of respondents first-mention social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, etc.), surpassing those who mention national TV (28.4%). Moldova shows a similar trend, with 36.9% naming social media first, compared to 24.0% who turn first to national TV.

Ukraine represents a special case. Only 18% of respondents cite national TV as their first-mentioned source. In contrast, 27% — over one-quarter of Ukrainians — firstly recall messaging apps (such as Telegram, Viber, WhatsApp) when considering sources for political information. This is an exceptionally high figure for messaging platforms as a first-mention, far exceeding all other countries, where such platforms typically remain below 1% under first-mentions. This likely reflects Ukraine's unique information environment, in which messaging apps play a central role in real-time news dissemination. Social media (22%) and internet portals (21%) are also common first-mentioned sources for Ukraine, each slightly surpassing national TV. Collectively, digital channels (messaging apps, social media, and internet portals) surpass television as the initially recalled source of political information for Ukrainians — a pattern distinctly different from most other surveyed countries.

Low first-mention rate for print and radio as first-mentioned sources is observed across all countries. Printed newspapers are rarely mentioned first, generally falling between 1% and 3%. Even in Montenegro, which registers the highest figure for print, the rate is only 3%. Similarly, radio — both national and local — barely registers

as a first-mentioned source. In most countries, it remains well under 1%, with only minor outliers like Ukraine or Moldova approaching 1%. Even Moldova's 0.5% for national radio — the highest recorded — is still extremely low and not meaningfully different from other countries, given that all values cluster near zero.

Reliance on personal networks as the first-mentioned source is consistently minimal across the surveyed countries. "Talks with friends and family" are cited by just 1% to 4% of respondents, with Serbia (4%) and North Macedonia (3%) at the upper end of the spectrum. These slightly elevated values suggest a modest reliance on interpersonal communication in those countries. While these percentages are too low to rival mass media, they indicate the presence of informal channels in certain communities.

### Source of Political Developments Information - Full Picture

While a look at the first-mentions that stood out during the surveying process can paint a portrait of which sources first come to mind when respondents engage with the question they are given, this ambition does not exhaust the possibility that some subsequent mentions drew a different picture. To understand the full landscape of

source material that dominates as the root of political information for countries that are at the interest of this report, what has to be examined next is the total frequency for each information in total and per its country of origin.

*Table 1. Frequency and Percentage of Total Mentions for Political Developments Information Sources*

*01. How do you inform yourself of political developments in your country? Multiple mentions*

*All respondents (N = 9.011). Participants could select up to three sources of political information. Figures represent the number of mentions and the corresponding percentage of total participants, expressed in share of total %. Because multiple answers were allowed, percentages do not sum to 100%. Sorted from highest to lowest response counts.*

Information Source	Responses	% of total participants
Social media	4.477	50%
National TV	4.058	45%
Internet portals	3.223	36%
Local TV	1.752	19%
Talks with friends and family	1.590	18%
Regional TV	1.558	17%
Messaging apps	894	10%
Printed press	444	5%
I am not informed	440	5%
Foreign TV / media	300	3%
National Radio stations	264	3%
Local Radio stations	249	3%
Regional Radio stations	126	1%
Other	81	1%
Don't know	73	1%




The multi-response data provides a fuller picture of information sources, since respondents could list all sources they use for political news. Unsurprisingly, the quantities for each category are higher than in the first-mention results, as people tend to use multiple information sources. This section helps identify information sources that, while not always the top first choice, are nonetheless widely used. Key findings include the continued prominence of television and even greater importance of online platforms (social media and news portals) when considering all sources. The reach of social media platforms for political news is even greater when all mentions are counted. About half (50%) of all respondents claim to use social media to get political information, underlining the relevance of Facebook, Twitter (X), YouTube, Instagram, TikTok and similar platforms. National TV reaches nearly half (45%) of all respondents overall. When all mentions are considered, online news portals also emerge as a major source, often rivaling or exceeding national TV. Overall, 36% of respondents use internet portals for political news.

*Figure 2. Political Developments Information Source by Country*

*01. How do you inform yourself of political developments in your country? Multiple mentions*

*All respondents (N = 9.011); each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Respondents could select up to three answers. Results are presented as absolute frequencies. Only values where n > 100 are written to sustain clarity. All mentions.*



In every country, a substantial proportion of people claim to use national TV as a source of political information at least occasionally, even if it wasn't always their first choice. For example, 76% of all Albanian respondents (n = 762) mention using national TV (reflecting Albania's heavy TV orientation), and similarly high levels are seen in North Macedonia (58%, n = 575), Kosovo (56%, n = 561), and Georgia (43%, n

= 433). Even Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had a low first-mention for national TV (17%), shows 31% (n = 306) of all respondents claiming to use it for political information. This indicates that television remains an important part of the political media diet across countries, though the extent varies. Albania's national TV usage for political information is again high, while countries like Ukraine (30%, n = 296) and Moldova (37%, n = 378) have much less prevalent claims for political information consumption on this platform. In addition to national TV, local and regional TV as political information sources also hold a presence: for instance, Bosnia and Herzegovina's total TV reliance is bolstered by 36% claiming to use local TV (n = 361) and 39% regional TV (n = 387) — by far the highest for those categories among all countries. In contrast, Albania has very low claims to the use of local TV (7%, n = 65) or regional TV (15%, n = 148), indicating a more centralized TV market for political information in Albania.

When it comes to the use of internet portals, overall, 36% of respondents claim to use them to gain insight on political developments in their countries. In several countries, this percentage is around half of the population: for example, Serbia (51%,

n = 505), Montenegro (51%, n = 512), and Bosnia (48%, n = 482) have roughly half of respondents citing online internet portals as one of their news sources. These figures are higher than those countries' first-mention numbers, indicating that many people who might turn on the TV first still read news online as well. Montenegro and Serbia in particular show the highest reliance on internet portals (around 50%), which is above countries like Georgia (14%, n = 144) or Moldova (20%, n = 197) where portal usage is much lower. Bosnia and Herzegovina's high portal usage suggests that the people of this country may compensate for less TV use by heavily using internet portals. Even Albania, which leans on TV, has about one-third of their respondents (33%, n = 329) using internet portals as a political information source.

The reach of social media platforms for political news is even greater when all mentions are counted, seeing as about half of all respondents (50%) claim to use social media to get news on political developments in their countries. However, there are some country differences. In Georgia, an overwhelming 66% (n = 657) report using social media for political information – the highest among all surveyed countries. Moldova (59%, n = 595) and Kosovo (58%, n = 583) also hold a very high

spot in this regard. These values suggest that in these countries, social media are nearly universal political information sources, certainly more so than in Bosnia and Herzegovina (36%, n = 361) or Serbia (41%, n = 413). North Macedonia (57%, n = 568) and Montenegro (45%, n = 445) also see large portions using social media. Even the lowest figures, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina's 36% and Albania's 43%, represent over one-third of the respondents. This indicates that social media have become a common news source everywhere, though the saturation is highest in Georgia. When it comes to the use of messaging apps Ukraine stands out with 45% (n = 445) of respondents reporting them as a source of political developments and information. This is far above all other countries, where usage remains mostly under 10%. Word-of-mouth (talking with friends and family) emerges as a notable secondary source, especially in the North Macedonia (25%, n = 251), Albania (23%, n = 230), and Serbia (22%, n = 224) show the highest proclaimed reliance. Print media usage remains low overall (5%), but Montenegro (12%, n = 122) and Serbia (11%, n = 108) still show small but notable readership. Radio is also among the least-used sources, though Moldova (7%, n = 75) for national and Bosnia (12%, n = 124) for local

radio stand out as exception. The data also shows that Bosnia has the highest share of politically uninformed respondents (12%,  $n = 116$ ), suggesting a unique disengaged segment.

### Language of News Consumption Across Countries


Following the part of the survey in which the respondents were asked to select their primary sources of political information, they were also asked to note the languages they receive their political news in. Seeing as language in its own right is an inevitable medium of the political sphere, this information can be of relevance to decipher the different political influences that shape the thought process for the citizens of the countries that this research intended to study. The respondents were asked to state in which language they watch/read/listen to the news, and they could pick up to three options. The languages which were offered were the ones usually used in their countries of origin, as well as some which were presumed to be relevant for the region which was being studied, such as Turkish, English, or Russian. In addition to this, the option "Other" was present (*garnering  $n = 167$  responses*), and some respondents opted for unread options which were "I don't want to answer" ( $n = 12$ ),

and "Don't know" (n = 7). Overall, the data show that while each country's official language is the primary medium for news, many respondents also rely on secondary languages. This creates distinct patterns: some countries are almost monolingual in news usage, whereas others are highly multilingual. In the coming sentences, such forms will be highlighted with the intention of showing the diverse language choices in a coherent whole that can furnish the needs of further explanations.

Figure 3. *Languages of Consumed News Content per Country*

02. In which language do you watch/read/listen to news? Multiple mentions

Respondents (N = 8.498), the samples for the response to this question varied between countries and are expressed in the chart. Respondents could select up to three answers. Results are presented as absolute frequencies. Only values where n > 20 are written to sustain clarity.



In every surveyed country, the primary national language is used by an overwhelming majority for political news. This is unsurprising – people largely



consume news in their native or official state language. For example, nearly all respondents in Albania (about 99% of the sample) report using Albanian for news, and similarly almost everyone in Serbia uses Serbian (99%) as a news language. In Ukraine and Georgia, the dominance of the official language is also clear: roughly 97% of Ukrainians rely on Ukrainian, and 99% of Georgians use Georgian for political news. Even in countries with multiple official or widely spoken languages, one language tends to reach the vast majority. In Moldova, about 87% of respondents use Moldovan/Romanian (the state language) for news, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina around 84% use Bosnian – each the largest single language group in those countries.

That said, several countries have co-dominant languages due to their multiethnic populations. Bosnia and Herzegovina's population, for instance, is linguistically split: while 84% use Bosnian, nearly as many also use Serbian (around 76%) and a large share use Croatian (*around* 69%) when consuming news. This reflects Bosnia's tripartite linguistic makeup (Bosniak, Serb, and Croat communities) and indicates that many Bosnians follow news in more than one of the local languages. Moldova

likewise has two predominant media languages: besides the 87% who use Romanian, a nearly equally large segment (about 78% of respondents) watches or reads news in Russian. This bilingual pattern in Moldova underscores the country's dual linguistic environment. In Montenegro, the audience is divided between Montenegrin (67% use it for news) and Serbian (49%), which are closely related languages both spoken in the country.

Comparing across countries reveals a spectrum from largely monolingual media environments to highly multilingual ones. Albania and Serbia represent one end of the spectrum: they are effectively monolingual for news – virtually everyone sticks to the national language, with very few using any second language (aside from some use of English). Georgia and Ukraine are also dominated by one language (Georgian and Ukrainian, respectively), but to a slightly lesser degree: each has about one-third of people also using Russian as a supplementary news language. In contrast, several countries show truly mixed language consumption. Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out as the most multilingual case – Bosnian respondents mentioned roughly 2–3 different languages for news. This indicates substantial overlap and bilingualism:

many Bosnians consume news in multiple local languages (Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian are mutually intelligible), with some individuals effectively using all three. North Macedonia is another highly bilingual environment: about 94% use Macedonian, yet 26% (supposedly the ethnic Albanian population share) use Albanian for news, and remarkably about 42% of North Macedonians also report using Serbian. This suggests that along with the two official languages (Macedonian and Albanian), Serbian also plays a major role.

Multilingual consumption is also notable in Moldova and Montenegro. In Moldova, as noted, two languages dominate (Romanian and Russian), meaning most people are regularly navigating news in both. Montenegro's population similarly mixes Montenegrin and Serbian news sources; these languages are so closely related that many Montenegrins use both interchangeably, depending on the media outlet. Kosovo shows a somewhat different pattern: it is overwhelmingly Albanian-speaking (94% use Albanian news), but as a new state with minority communities, it has a segment using Serbian (about 7%, corresponding to the Serb minority there) and also an unexpected reliance on a foreign language (more than one-quarter of

Kosovars – 28% – use English for political news, as discussed below). On the whole, countries like Bosnia, North Macedonia, and Moldova display far more linguistic pluralism in news consumption than countries like Albania or Serbia.

*Table 2. Most Prominent News Languages by Country*

*02. In which language do you watch/read/listen to news? Multiple mentions*

*Number of respondents (N = 8.498). Participants could select up to three languages. The table is comprised of top 20 languages ranked by their share of prominence per country sorted from highest to lower.*

Language of Perceived News	%	Country
Serbian	99,4	Serbia
Georgian	98,9	Georgia
Albanian	98,7	Albania
Ukrainian	97,6	Ukraine
Albanian	94,3	Kosovo
Macedonian	94,0	North Macedonia
Moldovan / Romanian	87,3	Moldova
Bosnian	83,8	Bosnia
Russian	78,0	Moldova
Serbian	75,9	Bosnia
Croatian	69,0	Bosnia
Montenegrin	67,3	Montenegro
Serbian	49,0	Montenegro
Serbian	41,6	North Macedonia
Russian	33,5	Georgia
Russian	29,3	Ukraine
English	27,6	Kosovo
English	26,4	Albania
Albanian	26,2	North Macedonia
English	23,5	Georgia

Beyond the primary languages, the survey reveals several surprisingly frequent minority or foreign language mentions that shed light on cultural and geopolitical influences. The most relevant is the prevalence of Russian outside of Russia's borders. In Moldova, Russian is virtually a second principal language for news – about 78% of Moldovan respondents consume political news in Russian, nearly matching the reach of Romanian in that country. Georgia and Ukraine also have substantial Russian-language audiences: roughly one-third of Georgians (33%) and about 29% of Ukrainians use Russian for news. These figures are striking given recent geopolitical tensions; they reflect historical ties and the presence of large Russian-speaking populations or media content. By contrast, in the Western Balkans, Russian plays almost no role – usage is near zero in Albania and Kosovo, and only around 2–3% in Serbia and Montenegro.

Another cross-cutting language is English, which emerges as a widely used news language in several countries. English is not an official language anywhere in the region, yet it is the most commonly cited foreign language for news overall (*about 18% of all respondents* across the nine countries use English sources). Its usage is especially high in certain Western Balkan states: approximately 26% of Albanians

and 28% of Kosovars follow political news in English. Georgia and North Macedonia also have around 23% of respondents consuming news in English, and Serbia about 21%. Even in Bosnia, despite the plethora of local languages, 16% use some English news sources. In contrast, Moldova and Montenegro show more modest English usage (*only 8% and 7% respectively*), and Ukraine around 10%.

Several smaller languages also appear in the data. Turkish is one such example: it is used by about 5.7% of respondents in Kosovo and 3.4% in North Macedonia. Finally, around 2% of respondents overall mentioned “Other” languages not listed in the survey options. The most commonly mentioned language under "Other" choices is Italian, with 50 total mentions, 39 of which are from Albania.

### Trustworthy Sources of Political News

After reconciling the information on which political information sources respondents prefer to and which language is the content on these sources served in, it is appropriate to inquire which concrete media or information channels hold value and legitimacy through trustworthiness in the eyes of their recipients. In many of the surveyed countries, established traditional media outlets – particularly national TV









channels – are the leading sources of trusted political news. For example, in countries like Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Kosovo, large portions of the public name a major television station as their most trustworthy news source. Albania stands out with its two big TV broadcasters, Top Channel (26%) and TV Klan (23%), together capturing a great deal of respondents' trust as top sources in political news. A similar TV-centric trust is seen in North Macedonia (Sitel; 17%) and Serbia (RTS1 and N1; 13%), where one or two national TV channels dominate the trust landscape. Kosovo also has a similar situation with 26% of respondents picking RTK television as the most trustworthy news source. At the same time, Ukraine again represents a *special case*. With 9% of the respondents choosing a messaging app, Telegram channels, as trustworthy news source.

*Table 3. Most trustworthy media or information sources political news per country*

*03. Which specific media or source of information do you consider most trustworthy for political news?*

*Number of respondents per country noted in the table, the ones who chose "Don't know" or "Don't want to answer" in the first question of the survey were excluded. The table is comprised of top 5 options that received the most choices for being trustworthy sources of political news for each country expressed in share of total %.*




Country	Information Source	Trustworthiness %	N
<b>Albania</b> 	Top Channel	26%	980
	TV Klan	23%	
	None	17%	
	News 24	6%	
	Syri Tv	5%	
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b> 	None	45%	881
	I don't want to answer	7%	
	Don't know	6%	
	Other	6%	
	Federalna televizija	4%	
<b>Georgia</b> 	None	27%	895
	Don't know	25%	
	Imedi	17%	
	TV Pirveli	6%	
	Rustavi 2	5%	
<b>Kosovo</b> 	RTK	26%	970
	None	21%	
	Klan Kosova	14%	
	TV21	6%	
	Don't know	5%	
<b>Moldova</b> 	None	22%	942
	Don't know	20%	
	Pro TV	9%	
	Moldova 1	9%	
	TV8	7%	
<b>Montenegro</b> 	None	43%	945
	News	16%	
	Don't know	12%	
	TV CG	8%	
	I don't want to answer	5%	
<b>North Macedonia</b> 	None	23%	968
	Sitel	17%	
	Don't know	8%	
	Kanal 5	7%	
	Alsat	7%	
<b>Serbia</b> 	None	27%	935
	RTS1	13%	
	N1	13%	
	Pink	6%	
	Informer	5%	
<b>Ukraine</b> 	None	27%	982
	Other	23%	
	Don't know	15%	
	Telegram channels	9%	
	YouTube	4%	

A striking finding is the proportion of people who do not trust any political news source enough to name it. The share of these “None” responses is a potentially telling measure of overall media distrust in each society. Bosnia and Herzegovina stood out with roughly 45% of respondents unable to name any trusted news source. Similarly, in Montenegro about 43% say “none” signaling that *nearly half the population* in these two countries *lacks confidence* in any media outlet for trustworthy political information. Most other countries have *lower (though still substantial)* levels of distrust: *around one-quarter* of respondents in Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia, North Macedonia, and Moldova report trusting no media source (these “None” responses range roughly from 23% up to 27% in those cases). Kosovo also holds 21% of the respondents who claimed to not have a trustworthy news source. Albania shows the *lowest distrust*, with about 17% selecting no trustworthy source.

Figure 4. *Share of Respondents Reporting No Trustworthy Political News Source*

03. Which specific media or source of information do you consider most trustworthy for political news?

Respondent count shown in Table 3. Results are presented as share of total % per country that chose the option “none” when asked to name trustworthy political news sources.



In some countries, other ambivalent options when choosing trustworthy news sources also garnered noteworthy acknowledgment. In Georgia, 25% of the respondents stated that they “Don’t know” when asked to name a trustworthy news source. In Moldova, a similar situation is apparent with 20% of respondents also picking this option. The “Don’t know” choice is also present as one of the top five most chosen options in several other countries. This includes Ukraine (15%), Montenegro (12%), North Macedonia (8%), as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina along with Kosovo holding 5%. The option “I don’t want to answer” also appears with 7% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 5% in Montenegro.


## Public Satisfaction with National Direction

Across nine countries surveyed, public sentiment about the direction of the country is broadly pessimistic. Respondents were asked “How satisfied are you with the way things are going in your country?” on a five-point Likert scale ranging from “I’m completely dissatisfied” (1) to “I’m completely satisfied” (5), with a neutral midpoint. The overall results indicate that dissatisfaction outweighs satisfaction in every country, often by a large margin. While there is variation between countries – with mean satisfaction scores ranging roughly from 2.4 to 2.8 out of 5 – no country’s average reaches the neutral score of 3, underscoring a prevailing negative outlook. In general, a majority or plurality in each nation expresses discontent with how things are going, and only a minority express any degree of satisfaction. Only 48 respondents opted for not wanting to answer (the most, 17, from Montenegro), and 124 respondents claimed they “Don’t know”. The largest group of those who “Don’t know” was from Montenegro (29), as well as Georgia and Ukraine (both 32).

*Figure 5. Public Satisfaction with National Direction*

*04. How satisfied are you with the way things are going in your country?*

Number of respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Single answer. Likert Scale Distribution from 1 to 5. Share of total %. Mean scores for each country and the total sample.



The mean satisfaction scores provide a summary of each country's overall mood. These averages cluster in a narrow low range, but important differences emerge at the margins. Moldova and Albania report the highest mean satisfaction (approximately 2.8 on the 5-point scale), suggesting that, relative to other countries, Moldovans and Albanians are the least dissatisfied with their country's direction.

Close behind is North Macedonia, with mean score of 2.7. This indicates that in these countries, while most people are still more dissatisfied than satisfied, the public sentiment is somewhat less negative compared to elsewhere. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine register the lowest mean satisfaction levels (around 2.4 each), reflecting the deepest discontent among the surveyed nations. The remaining countries – Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Georgia – form a middle cluster with means around 2.6. These mid-range scores imply moderately low satisfaction, i.e. a clear tilt toward dissatisfaction, though not in the proportion of Bosnia or Ukraine.

Looking at the distribution of responses reinforces the story told by the averages. In every country, dissatisfied respondents far outnumber satisfied respondents. In fact, not a single country has as many as one-third of its population on the satisfied side of the spectrum. For example, Moldova, the most “optimistic” case, sees roughly one-third of its respondents (33%) saying they are either mostly or completely satisfied. This is the highest share of satisfaction observed, yet it still constitutes a minority. Albania also stands out with about 28% satisfied – the second-highest proportion –

thanks largely to many Albanians being “mostly satisfied” (27%) as opposed to completely satisfied (1%). Most other countries have only about one-fifth or fewer of their citizens expressing any level of satisfaction. At the bottom, Ukraine and Bosnia have the smallest satisfied groups: only on the order of 12% for Ukrainians and 16% Bosnians who report being mostly or completely satisfied, highlighting how rare positive sentiment is in those societies. Such figures are markedly low and signal a near absence of optimism in the national direction among the public in those two cases.


On the other side, dissatisfaction is the prevailing sentiment across the board, often reaching absolute majorities. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, 59% of respondents are dissatisfied to some degree (combining “completely” and “mostly” dissatisfied) – the highest level of overall discontent among the nine countries. Several others also approach or exceed the halfway mark: 47% in Ukraine report being dissatisfied, which is also the case for countries like Kosovo and Serbia. Even in the countries with the lowest discontent, such as Moldova and Montenegro, close to 38% Moldovans and 39% Montenegrins of the public still identify as dissatisfied.

In short, a plurality or majority is unhappy in each country, and nowhere do satisfied citizens outnumber the dissatisfied. These cross-national trends suggest a consistently negative public mood, with some variation in degree: a few countries (Moldova, Albania, Montenegro) are somewhat less unhappy, whereas others (Bosnia, Ukraine) are extremely unhappy by comparison.

*Figure 6. Public Satisfaction with National Direction - Mean Comparison*

*04. How satisfied are you with the way things are going in your country?*

*Number of respondents (N = 8.839). Comparing means, based on Likert Scale Distribution from 1 to 5.*





The data reveal that intense dissatisfaction is far more common than intense satisfaction in every country. In other words, the most emotionally extreme responses are heavily skewed toward the negative. A large share of respondents in most countries chose "I'm completely dissatisfied," the harshest option. The prevalence of this extreme discontent varies by country. It is highest in Ukraine and Georgia, where about 26% of the public are completely dissatisfied with how things are going. Serbia is also very close behind, with roughly 25% completely dissatisfied. The country with the lowest frequency of completely dissatisfied is Albania with 13% such answers.


### Perceived Status of Values in Home Country

With the intention of seeing how the population that is at the interest of this research perceives certain values, the respondents were given eight values to rate their status in their home countries on a Likert scale ranging from "Very Bad" to "Very Good". Those values are: democracy, governance and rule of law, human rights, economic welfare of citizens, employment, social equality, security and freedom of speech.

Figure 7. *Evaluation of Values Total Results*

05. How good or bad, in your view, is the status of the following listed values in your country?

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Based on the 1 to 5 Likert scale ranging from "Very Bad" to "Very Good". Share of total %. Values below 1% were excluded for clarity, as well as all "Refused to answer" choices.



The general results suggest that, across all researched countries, some values are perceived to be in a better or worse position regarding their present status. The value that received the most "Very good" and "Mostly good" responses across the

whole sample is freedom of speech, with 28% of total respondents claiming that the status of this value in their country is "Mostly good", and 14% stating it is "Very good". The second most positively assessed value is security, with 25% of the total population stating that its status is "Mostly good", and 8% seeing it as "Very good". On the other hand, the value that received the lowest overall assessment is economic welfare. A total of 30% of respondents described the status of economic welfare in their country as "Mostly bad", and 26% as "Very bad", while only 3% opted for the "Very good" response. Economic welfare is followed by governance and the rule of law, with 25% of respondents viewing its status as "Mostly bad" and 23% as "Very bad". Other studied values fall somewhere in-between. The two separately measured values — human rights and democracy — garnered very similar results: 17% of respondents claimed their status is "Very bad", 20–22% chose "Mostly bad", 29% viewed them as neutral, 23–24% selected "Mostly good", and 7% opted for "Very good". A similar pattern appears when looking at social equality and employment, where 19% of respondents assessed the value as "Very bad", 23–26% as "Mostly

bad", 29–30% as neutral, and 23–25% selected one of the two optimistic options, saying the value is either "Mostly good" or "Very good".

*Table 4. Evaluation of Values in Home Country*

*05. How good or bad, in your view, is the status of the following listed values in your country?*

*Based on the responses that chose an option ranging from "Very Bad" to "Very Good" to evaluate the status of stated values in their countries. Excluding those who picked "Don't know" or "I don't want to answer". For democracy (N = 8.772), governance and rule of law (N = 8.691), human rights (N = 8.844), economic welfare (N = 8.848), employment (N = 8.751), social equality (N = 8.743), security (N = 8810), freedom of speech (N = 8.827). Mean of each country was calculated and compared in this table. The mean value of countries with the highest and lowest expressed status of value were highlighted.*

Value	Albania	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Kosovo	Montenegro	North Macedonia	Serbia	Ukraine	Moldova	Georgia	Total
Democracy	2,80	2,54	3,26	2,91	2,92	2,69	2,81	2,91	2,72	2,84
Governance and Rule of Law	2,59	2,31	2,68	2,63	2,26	2,53	2,39	2,79	2,60	2,53
Human Rights	2,85	2,52	3,30	2,79	2,85	2,84	2,56	2,88	2,70	2,81
Economic Welfare	2,15	2,10	2,68	2,55	2,11	2,67	2,19	2,45	2,42	2,37
Employment	2,87	2,54	2,75	2,67	2,69	2,81	2,78	2,68	2,48	2,70
Social Equality	2,51	2,32	3,11	2,60	2,50	2,58	2,45	2,86	2,59	2,61
Security	2,95	2,90	3,36	2,83	2,86	2,88	2,44	2,98	2,79	2,89
Freedom of Speech	3,11	2,94	3,81	2,92	3,11	3,07	3,17	3,20	2,88	3,13

Across all countries surveyed, freedom of speech received the highest average rating (mean = 3.13), indicating a generally favorable perception. Kosovo provided

the most positive assessment of freedom of speech (mean = 3.81). Moldova (3.20) and Ukraine (3.17) also rated freedom of speech comparatively positively. The second most positively rated value was security, with an overall mean of 2.89. Kosovo again reported the highest rating for security (3.36), indicating a relatively stronger sense of safety compared to other surveyed countries. Moldova (2.98) and Albania (2.95) followed closely behind.

The lowest-rated value was economic welfare, with an overall mean of just 2.37. Bosnia and Herzegovina recorded the lowest score (2.10), reflecting considerable dissatisfaction. Similarly, North Macedonia (2.11) and Ukraine (2.19) reported very low scores, highlighting widespread economic concerns. Closely following economic welfare was the value of governance and the rule of law (mean = 2.53). Bosnia and Herzegovina (2.31) and North Macedonia (2.26) again reported notably lower satisfaction compared to other countries.

Values such as human rights (mean = 2.81) and democracy (mean = 2.84) received moderately mixed assessments. Kosovo stood out positively on both values,

especially democracy (3.26), while Bosnia and Herzegovina showed lower satisfaction (human rights = 2.52, democracy = 2.54). Employment had a modestly low rating overall (mean = 2.70), with highest satisfaction in Kosovo (2.75) and Serbia (2.81). Social equality also showed varied responses with a mean of 2.61, and Kosovo again emerged as the most positively rating country (3.11), indicating relatively less perceived inequality.

Overall, Kosovo consistently reported the highest satisfaction across six out of eight evaluated values, suggesting greater public confidence in the societal framework these values assume, compared to other examined countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, consistently ranked among the lowest across four values, indicating the highest tone of internal skepticism in regard to the presented options.

### Perceptions of Country Futures


A valuable portion of insight was also garnered by asking the participants to rate how do they see the future of their countries. For the purpose of this question three options were given, one offering that the situation in their country will be better,

another one stating that things will stay the same and one proclaiming that the future will be worse than what is present now. Unread options of "Don't know" or "Don't want to answer" garnered a total of 529 responses showing that 6% of the total respondents avoided opting for the presented choices within this question. The largest number of non-answers was received from Georgia where 145 respondents fall under this category.

*Figure 8. Perceptions of Country Futures*

*07. How do you see the future of your country in general?*

*Respondents (N = 9,011). Each country sample includes N = 1,000, except Moldova (N = 1,011). Share of total %.*



In general, respondents across the nine countries expressed cautious optimism about their countries' future, with a total average of approximately 43% believing conditions will improve.

The highest optimism was recorded in Ukraine, where a remarkable 67% of respondents anticipate a better future. This optimism may reflect expectations for post-conflict recovery and economic revitalization. Similarly, Georgia (61%) and Moldova (56%) also demonstrated strong optimism, possibly reflecting hopes



associated with ongoing political reforms and stronger European integration prospects. Kosovo exhibited substantial positivity (48%), higher compared to its regional neighbors. Serbia follows with 40% choices for believing the future will be better than current situation, indicating a cautiously hopeful stance toward ongoing political and economic developments within the country.

Albania displayed a cautious stance, with only 34% expecting improvement. A large segment of Albanian respondents (45%) anticipate no change, suggesting considerable skepticism about advancements. Similarly, Montenegro (29% optimistic vs. 33% expecting no change) and North Macedonia (28.4% optimistic vs. 36.7% expecting no change) demonstrated pronounced ambivalence. Bosnia and Herzegovina exhibits the most concerning outlook, with just 22.8% expressing optimism for the future and 50% believing the country will remain the same. Moreover, almost 25% believe conditions will deteriorate further, potentially highlighting entrenched frustrations. An elevated rate of uncertainty or reluctance to express opinions was notable in Georgia (14.5%) and Montenegro (9.0%), higher than the regional average of approximately 6%. North Macedonia is one of the few

countries where pessimism slightly outweighs optimism, with only 28% of respondents believing things will get better and a slightly higher 30% expecting the situation to worsen. This negative balance, combined with 37% expecting no change, paints a picture of a population that is largely uncertain or doubtful about near-term improvements. In contrast, while Serbia and Kosovo show higher levels of optimism (40% and 48%, respectively), both countries also report non-negligible shares of respondents fearing deterioration (23% in Serbia and 17% in Kosovo). These numbers suggest that although hope for progress is present, a portion of the population in these nations remains wary about the possibility of backsliding or prolonged stagnation.


## Anticipated Future Issues

The respondents were asked to select up to three biggest issues their country will be facing in the coming five years. Numerous issues were named but the ones that stand out across the whole sample as the most frequent choices are corruption (3.191), skilled workforce leaving the country (2.468), unemployment (1.804), political instability or conflict in the country or region (1.591) and crime (1.429).

*Figure 9. Most Frequently Perceived Issues for Respondents Home Countries (top five)*

08. According to your opinion, what do you think will be the biggest issues facing [country] in the next five years?

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Respondents could select up to three answers. Results are presented as absolute frequencies.












Corruption emerged as the most frequently cited issue across the region, with 35% of all respondents selecting it. It was the top concern in Bosnia and Herzegovina (67%), Albania (55%), and North Macedonia (51%). Similarly, Kosovo (39%), Montenegro (36%), and Serbia (37%) also identified corruption as one of the leading future issues. Even in Ukraine and Moldova, 13% and 19%, respectively, chose corruption as a key issue. In contrast, Georgia registered the lowest concern for corruption (less than 1%), suggesting either relative confidence in institutional integrity or a shift in public priority. The departure of skilled workers was another widely shared concern. It was selected by 27% of total respondents and ranked in the top three across nearly all countries. Notably, North Macedonia (56%) and Kosovo (41%) identified it as their most frequent response. This trend is emblematic of broader regional fears about the erosion of human capital, especially among younger, educated populations. Albania (39%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (44%), and Moldova (16%) also reflected concern. Unemployment was the third most cited issue across the entire sample (20%). It featured prominently in Kosovo (44%) and Montenegro (33%). In contrast, Albania (9%), Georgia (8%) and Ukraine (8%) showed

relatively low concern for unemployment, suggesting either lower perceived urgency or greater emphasis on other structural problems. Political instability or potential conflict was another concern, especially in countries with histories of ethnic tensions or ongoing geopolitical strains. It was chosen by 17.7% of all respondents, with Bosnia and Herzegovina (36%), Ukraine (26%), and Moldova (23%) citing it most frequently. By contrast, North Macedonia (9%), Kosovo (8%) and Albania (6%) reflected less anxiety in this area, suggesting either a temporary stabilization or competing priorities like employment and corruption. Concerns about crime varied between countries. While only 16% of total respondents selected it, Montenegro (38%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (34%) showed high levels of concern. In contrast, Ukraine and Moldova (2%), and Georgia (0.2%) rarely reported crime as an anticipated issue.

*Table 5. Most Anticipated Issues for Each Country (five most frequent)*

*08. According to your opinion, what do you think will be the biggest issues facing your country in the next five years? Respondents could select up to three answers. Share of total %.*

Country	TOP 5 Anticipated Issues	% who perceive the issue
<b>Albania</b> 	corruption	55
	skilled workforce leaving the country	39
	quality of public services (education, healthcare)	30
	immigration	25
	crime	20
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b> 	corruption	67
	skilled workforce leaving the country	44
	political instability or conflict in your country or region	36
	crime	34
	unemployment	27
<b>Georgia</b> 	economy\financial problems	15
	access to the EU	12
	political instability or conflict in your country or region	11
	unemployment	8
	immigration	6
<b>Kosovo</b> 	immigration	38
	unemployment	36
	skilled workforce leaving the country	33
	corruption	30
	quality of public services (education, healthcare)	20
<b>Moldova</b> 	political instability or conflict in your country or region	23
	corruption	19
	unemployment	16
	skilled workforce leaving the country	16
	economy\financial problems	12
<b>Montenegro</b> 	crime	38
	corruption	36
	unemployment	33
	skilled workforce leaving the country	30
	quality of public services (education, healthcare)	20
<b>North Macedonia</b> 	skilled workforce leaving the country	56
	corruption	51
	quality of public services (education, healthcare)	29
	crime	22
	unemployment	22
<b>Serbia</b> 	corruption	37
	political instability or conflict in your country or region	21
	skilled workforce leaving the country	15
	quality of public services (education, healthcare)	15
	unemployment	13
<b>Ukraine</b> 	economy\financial problems	40
	political instability or conflict in your country or region	26
	demographic decline	20
	reconstruction	16
	corruption	13

One thing that is relevant to notice when looking at the most frequently named issued per country is the appearance of some new issues to consider. Immigration is one such issue, taking the spotlight for Kosovo where it holds the spot of the most frequently mentioned issue in total (38% of respondents from Kosovo noted immigration as a future issue). Other countries that mention immigration also include Albania with 25% respondents opting for this issue and Georgia (6%). Quality of public services (such as education and healthcare) is another present issue which didn't reach the light of the five most frequent ones in the total sample. This issue is present in five different countries when looking at individual countries top five results and this underlines its relevance for further explanation. The most concern regarding quality of public services appears to be present in Albania with 30% and North Macedonia (29%) of the sampled population expressing this issue. Other than this 20% of examined citizens of Montenegro and Kosovo also picked this issue to be of relevance. Finally, 15% Serbians also named the quality of public services as an anticipated issue within the five-year span future of their country.



Another issue that emerges as the most cited option for Ukraine (40%) and Georgia (15%) that wasn't present in the initial top five issues for the total population, is economy\financial problems. It is also present in Moldova with 12% of the respondents there opting for this choice of issue. There are also two country-specific issues that emerge in the top five for Ukraine and those are reconstruction (16%) and demographic decline (20%). Unsurprisingly, these issues appear in Ukraine and can be seen as the result of the ongoing conflict with Russia. Georgians also express one country-specific issue within its top five most mentioned issues and that is access to the EU (12%).

## B. ECONOMY/MIGRATION

This chapter explores how economic pressures, perceptions of opportunity, and socio-political conditions influence people's decisions to consider emigration. It provides insight into the migration potential across multiple countries by examining whether citizens are thinking about moving abroad within the next two years, and the motivations underlying such considerations. Respondents were asked whether

they are actively planning or contemplating emigration, offering a snapshot of potential mobility trends and their prevalence across populations.

For those who indicated an intention to emigrate—either with or without concrete plans—the chapter delves into the primary reasons driving their desire to leave. These include economic factors such as employment and income, but also a range of other considerations like education, healthcare, political instability, corruption, environmental concerns, and broader dissatisfaction with the status quo.

The chapter also explores what might persuade individuals to stay in their home country. Respondents could name up to three motivating factors for remaining, including better job opportunities, functioning public services, political stability, cleaner environments, support for young families, and the ability to work remotely for foreign employers. This dual perspective on both emigration drivers and retention incentives allows for a more nuanced understanding of what shapes migration intent and how it can be mitigated through domestic reforms.


## Considerations for moving abroad

To initiate the intention of investigating the sphere of economy/migration, the initial question that the respondents received served the purpose of answering a question of whether they intend to move abroad in the coming two years. A broad assessment of responses highlights that, expectedly, most citizens do not consider moving abroad in the next two years (around 78%). However, a large number of them did claim that they are either actively working on it with concrete plans and arrangements (7%), while 12% claimed they have such plans but no arrangements yet. Additionally, 2% said they "don't know" and 1% didn't answer.

*Figure 10. Considerations for Moving Abroad*

*09. Are you considering moving abroad in the next 2 years?*

*Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). A share of total %.*



In countries such as Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Kosovo, the desire to move abroad is especially pronounced. Montenegro registers the highest overall movement intent: 10% of respondents stated that they have concrete plans or arrangements to move abroad—more than in any other country—while an additional 16% stating they are considering it, albeit without specific arrangements. Together, these figures indicate that more than a quarter of Montenegro's population (26%) are seriously contemplating emigration. At the same time, only 64% reported no interest in leaving.

A similar pattern emerges in North Macedonia, where 7% of respondents indicated concrete plans to move abroad and a striking 21% said they plan to move but without a concrete plan at this point, which is the highest rate for this category. This brings

total migration intention to 28%, the highest among all countries surveyed. In Kosovo, 9.0% have specific plans to leave and another 12% want to move but without concrete plans yes, resulting in a total of 21% expressing some level of migration intent.

In contrast to these high-mobility contexts, Albania and Georgia show more moderate emigration pressure. In Albania, 9% of respondents report having concrete plans to move abroad and another 10% are considering it. This total of 19% reflects a substantial part of the population also seeking to move. Georgia, on the other hand, presents a slightly more rooted population: 6% of respondents have plans to emigrate and 11% are considering it without plans, resulting in a total of 17%. With 81% of Georgians expressing no interest in moving abroad, the country appears relatively stable in this regard. Countries such as Serbia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina register the lowest levels of expressed migration intent. In Serbia, only 4% of respondents indicated they have plans to emigrate, and 10% said they intend it but without active plans, leading to a total of 14%. With 85% of respondents declaring no interest in moving abroad, Serbia shows one of the

highest levels of perceived domestic stability among the surveyed countries. The sample that was surveyed in Ukraine also presents a similarly rooted picture, despite the backdrop of war and displacement. Just 4% of Ukrainians report concrete plans to emigrate, and 12% are considering it—16% in total. In Moldova 6.0% of respondents plan to leave in the coming two years and 8% desire it without active plans, resulting in a total of 14%. Finally, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 6% of respondents have concrete plans to move abroad and 11% are contemplating it, amounting to around 16-17% total migration intention. With 78% indicating they do not plan to emigrate. Beyond the clear distinctions in emigration intent, it is also important to consider notable levels of non-response. Montenegro stands out again with the highest shares of both “I don’t know” (6%) and “No answer” (4%), which might add to the concerning factor that it already is the country with the highest migration intent.

### First-mentioned Reasons for Moving Abroad


Among the population of respondents who claimed to have the intention to move abroad (N = 1.709), a further question was asked of what their reasons for such

mobility would be. They could choose up to three answers each explaining what their main reasons for intending to move abroad are.

Figure 11. First-mentioned Reasons for Moving Abroad, top five

10. What are the main reasons for considering moving abroad? First-mention

Respondents who said they wish to move abroad in the preceding question (N = 1.709). Albania (n = 188); Bosnia and Herzegovina (n = 164); Kosovo (n = 213); Montenegro (n = 264); North Macedonia (n = 276); Serbia (n = 135); Ukraine (n = 156); Moldova (n = 144); Georgia (n = 169); Only the first-mention is shown. Share of total %. Five most frequently mentioned reasons are shown.



When looking exclusively at the first-mentioned responses, across the surveyed respondents, economic motivations overwhelmingly dominate as the most salient reason for considering emigration. Over half of all respondents (54%) identified economic reasons—such as employment and income as their first-mentioned motivation for leaving their country. This finding points to a shared experience of economic precarity, with consistently high rates of economic first-mentions across



nearly all surveyed states. Kosovo leads with 69%, followed closely by Georgia (64%), Moldova (60%), North Macedonia (59%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (54%). Even in countries where this figure is comparatively lower, such as Ukraine (29%), economic drivers still represent a commonly cited reason. For Ukraine, 43% of the people stated security reasons (which are not listed in the plot due to their non-existent character among other countries). The cause of this is the ongoing war with Russia, which renders security a far more relevant push-factor than economic reasons.

Although far less prevalent than economic motives, aspirations related to education also surfaced as meaningful first-mention reasons. With Albania (12%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (12%), and Montenegro (10%) reporting the highest rates. This contrasts sharply with Ukraine (1%), Serbia (6%), and Kosovo (4%), where education is far less commonly cited. A further emotional and future-oriented dimension appears in the form of concern for children's prospects. The motive "a better future for my children" consistently appeared as the third most frequent first response, particularly in Moldova (12%) and Serbia (10%). In contrast, this reason was cited much less in Kosovo (2%) and Georgia (3%), where economic or pragmatic

considerations seem to take precedence. “Better healthcare” ranks as the fourth most frequently mentioned first-response reason for considering moving abroad across the board. While not as dominant as economic or educational motives it still holds a firm presence, particularly in countries like Montenegro (11%) and Kosovo (7%). The lack of opportunities to succeed based on merit (nepotism) was particularly prominent in North Macedonia (11%), Albania (8%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (7%), but was completely absent in Kosovo, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.

Other reasons, that lay outside the grasp of the top five first-mentioned ones include corruption was cited most notably in Serbia (10%) and Montenegro (6%). Issues of lack of respect for citizen rights and political instability appeared with notable frequency in Ukraine (8% and 11%), Georgia (4% and 5%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (3% and 5%). Some reasons, though rarely mentioned as first responses, hold symbolic significance in the broader migration discourse. Environmental concerns were flagged by a modest 3–3.5% of respondents in Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Kosovo, but were virtually absent elsewhere.

Similarly, family reunification was cited most in Kosovo (7%) and Moldova (5%), both countries with substantial diasporas and long-standing migration networks.


### All Reasons for Moving Abroad

To get the full grip on which reasons are deemed to be seen as relevant it is necessary to look at all the responses that were provided to the question. Unlike the earlier dataset, which focused exclusively on the first response each participant provided, this analysis draws on all responses for the question concerning reasons for wishes to move abroad. As it was established, economic reasons did hold a firm primacy with the firstly mentioned reasons but what remains to be seen is which other reasons will emerge to further shed light on the matter of interest. When pointing out the five most frequently cited reasons for intending to move abroad, identical reasons persist in the ranking of the first-mentioned ones and the full picture, however, in a different order.

Figure 12. *Reasons for Moving Abroad, top five*

10. What are the main reasons for considering moving abroad?

Respondents who said they wish to move abroad in the preceding question (N = 1.709). Albania (n = 188); Bosnia and Herzegovina (n = 164); Kosovo (n = 213); Montenegro (n = 264); North Macedonia (n = 276); Serbia (n = 135); Ukraine (n = 156); Moldova (n = 144); Georgia (n = 169); Respondents could choose up to three options. Share of total %. Five most frequently mentioned reasons are shown.



Across all countries, 70% of respondents included economic reasons (e.g. employment, income) in their answer set while setting forth the reasons that motivated their intention to move abroad. This follows the pattern recognized in first-mentions where 54% picked this same option as their first answer, and even when taking into account all responses, this tendency emerges as a near-universal reason for desiring mobility across the countries which are being investigated. In

Kosovo, 85% of respondents named the economy as a key factor. Similarly, high levels appear in Georgia (76%), Albania (76%), North Macedonia (73%), and Moldova (72%). Even in countries where the percentage is somewhat lower, such as Ukraine (42%) and Serbia (62%), the economy remains the top response.










The second most commonly cited reason for emigration is a better future for my children, selected by 23% of all respondents, after establishing 7% among first-mentions. The reason is particularly acute in Albania (28%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (26%), and North Macedonia (34%), where more than a quarter of those planning to leave name their children's future as a decisive factor. Even in Serbia (30%) and Kosovo (22%), this sentiment resonates strongly, with Ukraine (12%) and Georgia (5%) reporting lower results. The third major motivation—lack of opportunities to succeed based on merit (nepotism)—reflects a more systemic critique. Mentioned by 21% of respondents overall (after 4% in first-mentions), this reason points to public frustration with perceived nepotism. Its prevalence is most pronounced in Bosnia and Herzegovina (38%), North Macedonia (37%), and Albania (32%). By contrast, countries like Moldova and Georgia report almost no concern in this

domain (less than 1%), while Ukraine doesn't have a single reported case of this reason for moving abroad. A fourth crucial category, better healthcare, has risen in visibility when compared to first-mention data. Now cited by 20% of respondents overall (with 7% during first-mentions), it plays a substantial role in countries like Kosovo (50%), Albania (23%), North Macedonia (22%) and Montenegro (21%). Better education opportunities round out the top five reasons, mentioned by around 20% of respondents (with 7% of total responses held in first-mentions). This motive is more prevalent in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (25%), Albania (23%), and Kosovo (27%). Meanwhile, Ukraine (5%) and Georgia (14%) show comparatively lower mention rates.

*Table 6. Five Most Frequent Reasons for Moving Abroad by Country*

*10. What are the main reasons for considering moving abroad?*

*Only respondents who picked that they intend to move abroad in the next two years were offered this question (N = 1.709), sample for every country is noted in the table. Respondents could select up to three answers. Share of total %. Five most frequently mentioned reasons. Category "Other" was excluded for clarity.*

Country	TOP 5 Reasons for Moving Abroad	% who state the reason	N
 <b>Albania</b>	Economic reasons (e.g. employment, income)	76	188
	Lack of opportunities to succeed based on merit (nepotism)	32	
	Better future for my children	28	
	Better education opportunities	23	
	Better healthcare	23	
 <b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	Economic reasons (e.g. employment, income)	75	164
	Lack of opportunities to succeed based on merit (nepotism)	38	
	Political instability	32	
	Lack of respect of my rights in the country	27	
	Better future for my children	26	
 <b>Georgia</b>	Economic reasons (e.g. employment, income)	76	169
	Better education opportunities	14	
	Political instability	12	
	Lack of respect of my rights in the country	12	
	Better healthcare	7	
 <b>Kosovo</b>	Economic reasons (e.g. employment, income)	85	213
	Better healthcare	50	
	Better education opportunities	27	
	Better future for my children	22	
	Lack of opportunities to succeed based on merit (nepotism)	18	
 <b>Moldova</b>	Economic reasons (e.g. employment, income)	72	144
	Better future for my children	22	
	Better education opportunities	15	
	Political instability	11	
	Better healthcare	8	
 <b>Montenegro</b>	Economic reasons (e.g. employment, income)	60	264
	Better education opportunities	25	
	Lack of opportunities to succeed based on merit (nepotism)	25	
	Better future for my children	22	
	Better healthcare	21	
 <b>North Macedonia</b>	Economic reasons (e.g. employment, income)	73	276
	Lack of opportunities to succeed based on merit (nepotism)	37	
	Better future for my children	34	
	Better healthcare	22	
	Better education opportunities	20	
 <b>Serbia</b>	Economic reasons (e.g. employment, income)	62	135
	Better future for my children	30	
	Corruption	23	
	Lack of respect of my rights in the country	18	
	Lack of opportunities to succeed based on merit (nepotism)	17	
 <b>Ukraine</b>	Security	43	156
	Economic reasons (e.g. employment, income)	42	
	Political instability	23	
	Lack of respect of my rights in the country	14	
	Better future for my children	12	

When looking at the countries individually and their most represented reasons for seeking to move abroad, some new themes and reasons emerge. One of those

reasons is political instability, most notably present in Bosnia and Herzegovina (32%), but also in Ukraine (23%) followed by Georgia (12%), Serbia (12%) and Moldova (11%). The lack of respect of my rights in the country is also an apparent reason and it is also present primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina (27%), but also high in Serbia (18%), Ukraine (14%) and Georgia (12%). Interestingly, there is a convergence of “Political instability” and “Lack of respect for my rights” as frequently mentioned reasons for seeking to move abroad in the same countries—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia which could be a motivator for further investigations. Corruption is also a heavily mentioned reason, in spite of it somehow escaping the grasp between the ranks of most frequently cited reasons for moving. Bosnia and Herzegovina holds the highest frequency of corruption as a mentioned reason for leaving the country with 24% mentions. Serbia is also close by with 23% citing corruption as one of their reasons for leaving. 17% from North Macedonia and 14% from Kosovo also mention corruption a relevant reason. The only country which doesn’t have economic reasons as a primary motivator of moving abroad is Ukraine, with 43% of the people recalling security, quite certainly caused by the ongoing war



with Russia. Other reasons included being "simply fed up" (Serbia held the peak for this response choice with 14%), family reunification (highest in Kosovo with 9%) and environmental concerns (low overall, but highest in Montenegro, 9%). Additionally, it is necessary to mention that Ukraine had 21% "Other" responses, which were excluded from the table for clarity of precise options. While looking deeper into the data, it is apparent that those responses also appear to be referencing the ongoing conflict as the motivating factor for leaving the country. The manual responses are primarily associated with attributes such as "war", "danger" and other related conceptions.

### First-mentioned Motivations for Staying


After examining the reasons of those who said they intend to move abroad it is also necessary to address the matter in a more optimistic tone and examine which improvements would motivate them to stay. Among the population of respondents who claimed to have the intention to move abroad (N = 1.709), another question was asked of what would motivate them to stay in their home country. They could choose

up to three answers each explaining what their main motivating factors for staying could be.

Figure 13. *First-mentioned Motivators for Staying, top five*

11. *What would motivate you to stay? First-mention*

Respondents who said they wish to move abroad in question 9 (N = 1.709). Albania (n = 188); Bosnia and Herzegovina (n = 164); Kosovo (n = 213); Montenegro (n = 264); North Macedonia (n = 276); Serbia (n = 135); Ukraine (n = 156); Moldova (n = 144); Georgia (n = 169); Only the first-mention is shown. Share of total %. Five most frequently mentioned motivators are shown. Category "Other" omitted for clarity.



Across the nine countries surveyed, one theme emerges with unmistakable prominence in the first responses given to the question: What would motivate you to stay? Namely, better job opportunities and higher salaries. Representing around 50% of all first-mentions, this factor appears as a dominant sentiment among potential emigrants. Unsurprising if it is taken into account that economic reasons (54% on first responses, 70% on total) were also cited as the primary reason when

respondents were asked why they intend to leave. This economic motive that would lead the respondents to consider staying in their home country, leads in virtually every country, but its intensity varies. In Kosovo, for instance, as many as 70% of respondents chose this as their top reason to remain, followed closely by Moldova (56%) and Albania (55%). In North Macedonia (54%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (52%), the pattern remains strong. By contrast, Ukraine stands out as an exception, with only 24% of first responses naming jobs and pay—though even there, this option still ranks highest among all. Ukraine is a particular case once again, seeing as the option "Other" holds 33% and the greatest amount of manual responses within it again emphasize the difficult situation due to the active conflict with Russia. Second in frequency, though far less dominant, are mentions of better education opportunities, appearing in 7% of first responses. Montenegro stands out with 17% of its respondents naming education first—a rate much higher than elsewhere, where most countries report between 3% and 7%. Political stability ranks third, cited in 5% of first responses. Bosnia and Herzegovina (10%) and Georgia (8%) display a higher level of concern in this regard, while countries like North Macedonia and

Albania have it at 2% of first-mentions. Responses citing better healthcare (5%) and support for young families (4%) suggest that a portion of respondents are focused on quality-of-life issues. Kosovo surfaces with 9% of respondents there naming healthcare first. Montenegro (8%) is also relatively high, while Ukraine reports no first responses in this category. In terms of family support services (e.g., childcare, housing), Albania (10%) emerges as the highest. By contrast, Georgia shows no responses on this metric, though, again, we must recognize that these data do not preclude strong feelings on the topic—they simply indicate that it wasn't the first thing respondents named.

### All Motivations for Staying


While the previous section explored only the first responses offered by potential emigrants, this next part of the report draws on all available answers—including second and third mentions—to develop a more nuanced and comprehensive view of what might motivate individuals to remain in their home countries. By moving beyond the immediacy of first-thought grievances, this broader dataset allows us to better understand the multi-dimensional nature of respondents' concerns and

aspirations. The only change when looking at the five most frequent motivators is that the motive of less corruption (22% in total) replaced support for young families (14% in total) which was the fifth most frequent when looking at first-mentions and is now seventh, behind respect of rights (16%).

Figure 14. *Motivators to Stay in the Home Country, top five*

11. What would motivate you to stay?

Respondents who said they wish to move abroad in the preceding question (N = 1.709). Albania (n = 188); Bosnia and Herzegovina (n = 164); Kosovo (n = 213); Montenegro (n = 264); North Macedonia (n = 276); Serbia (n = 135); Ukraine (n = 156); Moldova (n = 144); Georgia (n = 169); Respondents could choose up to three options. Share of total %. Five most frequently mentioned reasons are shown.












Even when respondents were invited to provide multiple reasons, one motive remained dominant across all countries: better job opportunities and higher salaries. This option was selected by an overwhelming 64% of all respondents,

making it by far the most frequently cited retention factor. In Kosovo, 87% of those surveyed listed it, as did 74% in both Albania and 73% in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even in Georgia (51%) and Ukraine (33%), where economic concerns appeared less dominant in earlier rounds of the analysis, the figures remain substantial. One of the more striking changes as opposed to first-mentions is the high frequency of less corruption as a motivating factor. Chosen by 22% of respondents, it now ranks as the second most cited reason for staying. Its presence across countries varies, from 36% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 34% in Serbia, to nearly zero in Georgia.

*Table 7. Five Most Frequent Motivators for Staying per Country*

*11. What would motivate you to stay?*

*Only respondents who picked that they intend to move abroad in the next two years were offered this question (N = 1.709), sample for every country is noted in the table. Respondents could select up to three answers. Share of total %. Five most frequently mentioned reasons. Category "Other" was excluded for clarity.*

Country	TOP 5 motivators for staying	% who picked this motivator	N
<b>Albania</b> 	Better job opportunities / Higher salaries	74	188
	Less corruption	26	
	Support for young families (e.g. childcare, housing)	26	
	Better healthcare	24	
	Functioning institutions	20	
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b> 	Better job opportunities / Higher salaries	73	164
	Political stability	43	
	Less corruption	36	
	Support for young families (e.g. childcare, housing)	27	
	Respect of rights	27	
<b>Georgia</b> 	Better job opportunities / Higher salaries	51	169
	Better economic situation (lower prices, bigger pensions, else)	17	
	Political stability	15	
	Respect of rights	8	
	Better education opportunities	8	
<b>Kosovo</b> 	Better job opportunities / Higher salaries	87	213
	Better healthcare	55	
	Less corruption	27	
	Better education opportunities	25	
	Political stability	21	
<b>Moldova</b> 	Better job opportunities / Higher salaries	60	144
	Better education opportunities	15	
	Political stability	11	
	Family, relatives, friends	10	
	Better healthcare	10	
<b>Montenegro</b> 	Better job opportunities / Higher salaries	56	264
	Better education opportunities	32	
	Less corruption	25	
	Better healthcare	21	
	Political stability	17	
<b>North Macedonia</b> 	Better job opportunities / Higher salaries	72	276
	Less corruption	31	
	Functioning institutions	28	
	Respect of rights	24	
	Support for young families (e.g. childcare, housing)	23	
<b>Serbia</b> 	Better job opportunities / Higher salaries	54	135
	Less corruption	34	
	Better education opportunities	20	
	Political stability	19	
	Respect of rights	19	
<b>Ukraine</b> 	End of the war	40	156
	Better job opportunities / Higher salaries	33	
	Respect of rights	12	
	Political stability	10	
	Change of government	6	

One motivation, once again, stood apart in both magnitude and geopolitical specificity: the end of war. With a rate 40% Ukrainians choosing this as the option



that garnered most support as the motivating factor. In addition to this Ukraine had 42% responses under "Other" category and those responses also mostly surround the motivating factor that would be brought about by the end of the war, further highlighting the relevance of this for Ukraine.

Support for young families emerged as a prominent motivation, particularly pronounced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 27% of respondents identified this factor as one of their key reasons to stay. Albania follows closely at 26%, with North Macedonia also recording a high interest (23%). Another relevant motivator is the respect of rights. It appears among the five most frequently mentioned motivating factors across several countries. These countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina (27%), North Macedonia (24%), Serbia (19%), Ukraine (12%) and Georgia (8%). Respondents from Albania (28%) and North Macedonia (20%) also hold institutional functionality to be a relevant motivator when considering which situations would motivate them to stay.

### C. EU AND NATO

This chapter explores how citizens across nine countries perceive their nation's current and future alignment with the European Union and NATO. It provides insight into the political orientations and foreign policy preferences of respondents by examining levels of support for EU and NATO membership, perceived benefits of EU accession, alternative strategic visions, and the perceived threats shaping national security perspectives. Respondents were first asked whether they support their country joining the European Union and how they evaluate the potential consequences of EU membership for national development. For those who oppose EU accession, a follow-up question investigates whether they see credible alternatives to EU integration, such as partnerships with non-EU countries or strategic neutrality.

In addition to EU-related questions, the chapter examines attitudes toward NATO membership. Respondents were asked whether they support NATO as a security framework, and who they believe should be their country's most important security partners. This section provides insight into whether public support for NATO is

underpinned by broader trust in transatlantic security guarantees or whether other actors, including Russia, China, Turkey, or regional cooperation frameworks, are seen as viable or preferable alternatives. The chapter also includes an open-ended question asking respondents to name which country they perceive as the greatest threat to their national security.


### Support or Opposition for Joining the EU

This section of the report examines public opinion on the prospect of European Union membership across the nine studied countries. Respondents were asked whether they support their country's accession to the EU. While the simplicity of the question invites a clear expression of preference, the results reflect a diverse and context-sensitive range of attitudes toward the EU—rooted in national experience, geopolitical alignment, and public trust in the European project.

*Figure 15. Favors or Oppositions Towards Joining the European Union*

*12. Are you in favor of our country joining the European Union?*

*Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Share of total %.*



Across the full sample, support for EU membership remains highly pronounced, with 75% of respondents in favor of joining the European Union. However, this topline number masks considerable variation between countries—both in the degree of enthusiasm and in the strength of opposition or ambivalence. The highest levels of support are observed in Albania (94%) and Kosovo (94%), where backing for EU membership is near unanimous. The negligible levels of opposition in these contexts (just 5% in Albania and in Kosovo) reinforce the sense of a broad political and social consensus behind the EU path. Support is also robust in Ukraine (84%), where it is likely influenced by both the immediate context of war and a longstanding ambition to align more closely with Western political and security structures. That only 12% of

Ukrainian respondents expressed opposition—and fewer than 5% expressed uncertainty or non-response—indicates that EU membership is viewed as desirable. In Georgia (78%) and North Macedonia (76.0%), EU support remains strong, though a slightly larger share of the population in both countries expresses skepticism or indecision. For instance, in Georgia, 13% oppose membership and an additional 9% report they "Don't know".

A more ambivalent picture emerges in Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where support for EU membership remains a majority position but is paired with more substantial opposition. In Moldova, 69% express support—still a strong majority—but 25% are opposed. Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, support stands at 72%, with 21% expressing opposition and an additional 7% refusing to answer or opting for "Don't know".

The most pronounced departure from the general pattern is found in Serbia, where 40% of respondents support EU membership—a minority position in contrast to every other country surveyed. 49% of Serbian respondents oppose joining the EU,

and an additional 11% are either uncertain or unwilling to answer. Nonetheless, the fact that support remains near 40% suggests that the population is not monolithic in its views.


### Alternatives to Joining the EU

The respondents who chose the option for being against their country joining the EU (N = 1.540) were additionally asked do they believe that their country has an alternative to joining the EU, terms of its foreign orientation.

Figure 16. *Alternatives to joining the EU*

14. In terms of its foreign orientation, do you believe that your country has an alternative to joining the EU?

Respondents who said they wish to move abroad in the preceding question (N = 1.540). Albania (n = 52); Bosnia and Herzegovina (n = 211); Kosovo (n = 51); Montenegro (n = 102); North Macedonia (n = 151); Serbia (n = 490); Ukraine (n = 122); Moldova (n = 254); Georgia (n = 127). Share of total %.



Across the full regional sample, the most frequently chosen alternative to EU accession is pursuing neutrality, with 51% of respondents identifying it as their preferred orientation. This suggests that for many, distancing from the EU is not about choosing a different bloc, but about refraining from alignment altogether. This sentiment is strongest in Georgia, where an overwhelming 75% of EU-skeptical respondents favor neutrality. Similarly, high levels of support for neutrality appear in Moldova (58%), North Macedonia (54%), and Serbia (51%), suggesting that in these contexts, foreign policy independence is an appealing idea. Even in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where support for cooperation with non-EU countries is strong (at 42%), desire for neutrality still dominates with 45% of those skeptical of accessing EU.

While neutrality is the dominant choice overall, 24% of EU skeptical respondents across the region prefer cooperation with non-EU countries. This view is especially prevalent in Albania, where 58% of those opposed to EU membership suggest this pathway. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, this form of strategic outreach is also strong, with 42% of EU skeptics opting for cooperation beyond the Union. Elsewhere,

however, enthusiasm for this option is more modest. In Serbia, only 30% of EU skeptics favor cooperation with non-EU powers. This may suggest that for many Serbian respondents, distancing from the EU is not automatically tied to embracing other blocs once again highlighting the appeal of nonalignment. In Ukraine (11%), Kosovo (10%), Moldova (11%), and especially Georgia (5%), few respondents among the EU skeptical minority envision cooperation with non-EU countries as a viable substitute.

While the majority of EU skeptics articulate a clear preference for either neutrality or alternative partnerships, a notable portion of respondents limited their expressions. Across the total sample of those who think their countries should not set forth on a path for EU, 13% chose “Don’t know” and 5% chose “I don’t answer”. These figures are especially high in Kosovo, where 37% of those opposed to EU accession declined to answer, and 18% said they don’t know. Other countries show more moderate but still present levels of non-response. Montenegro reports the highest “Don’t know” rate with 24% of respondents opting for this choice. The highest proportion of “Other” responses is found in Ukraine (21%), when looking at them more closely



what shows is a series of responses mostly saying "no" and some mentioning Poland, UK, Canada and Germany.

### Greatest Threats to National Security


To further examine the geopolitical perceptions of the examined audience, a question was presented which gave respondents the open-ended opportunity to name which countries they regard as the greatest threat to their national security. Some choices stand out but there is also a great deal of responses stating that there are no threats to their national security (10% of total respondents claim this), most in Albania with 21% such answers. 24% of the respondents stated that they "Don't know", the greatest share from North Macedonia (39%). Additionally, 6% of the responses fell under the guise of "I don't want to answer", most such responses from Bosnia and Herzegovina (13%).

Figure 17. *Greatest Perceived Threats to National Security - top five*

15. Which country do you regard as the greatest threat to your country's national security? Open ended

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Share of total %.

The none, don't know and I don't want to answer categories excluded for clarity.



Across the studied region, the country most frequently named as a threat is Russia, with an overall average of 27% of respondents identifying it as the principal threat. However, this regional average conceals expected disparities in perception between countries. The most dramatic case is Ukraine, where 92% of respondents name Russia as the greatest threat. Given the ongoing war, this result is not only expected but deeply reflective of the lived experience of national security. In Moldova (47%) and Georgia (56%), where past or ongoing tensions with Russia are also relevant. Elsewhere, the picture is more complex. In Albania (20%) and Montenegro (13%),

Russia is still identified as a threat, albeit to a lesser degree. Conversely, in countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina (7%), Kosovo (4%), and North Macedonia (2%), Russia is named less frequently—possibly reflecting the dominance of other concerns in the national imagination. In Serbia, only 3.1% of respondents name Russia as a threat.

The second most frequently named threat overall is Serbia, cited by 13% of respondents of the studied countries. However, this figure is highly concentrated. The most striking finding comes from Kosovo, where 75% of respondents identify Serbia as the greatest threat. Similarly, in Albania, 29% view Serbia as the greatest threat, highlighting the resonance of ethnic and regional solidarity with Kosovo. Perhaps the most surprisingly, around 4% of Serbians consider Serbia to be their capital threat to national security. This could reference the local self-recognized destructive tendencies, but it certainly calls for further investigation.

Although the United States is not a neighboring country, it appears in the top five perceived threats when the total picture is considered, with an overall mention rate of 5%. The highest percentages come from Bosnia and Herzegovina (10%), Serbia










(12%), and Montenegro (6%). In contrast, in countries like Ukraine (2%) and Kosovo (less than 1%), the U.S. is less frequently named as a threat. Some responses point to nearby countries as perceived threats. For instance, Bulgaria and Albania appear among the top five in a few countries. Bulgaria is cited by 24% of respondents in North Macedonia. Albania, on the other hand, is named by 4% of respondents in Montenegro and 9% in Serbia, but nowhere else.

*Table 8. Perceived National Security Threats for Each Country - top five*

*15. Which country do you regard as the greatest threat to your country's national security? Open ended*

*Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Share of total %.*

*The none, don't know and I don't want to answer categories excluded for clarity.*

Country	TOP 5 Threats	% who picked this threat
<b>Albania</b> 	Serbia	29
	Russia	20
	Iran	10
	Greece	4
	Israel	1
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b> 	America/USA	10
	Russia	7
	Serbia	7
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3
	All countries	2
<b>Georgia</b> 	Russia	56
	America/USA	5
	All countries	3
	Turkey	2
	Europe / European Union / The West	2
<b>Kosovo</b> 	Serbia	75
	Russia	4
	Albania	1
	America/USA	1
	Iran	<1%
<b>Moldova</b> 	Russia	47
	Ukraine	4
	America/USA	3
	Europe / European Union / The West	3
	Moldova	2
<b>Montenegro</b> 	Russia	13
	America/USA	6
	Serbia	5
	Albania	4
	NATO	2
<b>North Macedonia</b> 	Bulgaria	24
	Albania	7
	Kosovo	5
	America/USA	3
	Greece	3
<b>Serbia</b> 	America/USA	12
	Albania	9
	England	8
	Croatia	6
	Germany	5
<b>Ukraine</b> 	Russia	92
	America/USA	2
	no response	-
	no response	-
	no response	-

Around 10% of Albanians consider Iran a noteworthy threat to their national security. Iran also makes an appearance in the results for Kosovo, but this appearance is slight with less than 1% reporting Iran as a perceived threat. Another country which makes a brief appearance within these results is Greece. Albania (4%) and North Macedonia (3%) report Greece as being a perceived threat to their national security, to the point of it reaching the top five of their total results. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia go as far as to recognize all countries as their potential threats, with around 2% of citizens from Bosnia and 3% from Georgia citing this type of threat. Turkey also makes a brief appearance, having 2% within top five threats that were noted on behalf of respondents from Georgia. There are also 2% respondents from Georgia and 3% from Moldova who see Europe/European Union/West as a threat to their national security. Serbia has several unique threats perceived and those are Croatia (6%) and Germany (5%). Ukraine is again a peculiar case, due to the ongoing conflict, with the vast majority of respondents picking Russia (92%) as the obvious threat to national security.


## Support or Opposition for Joining NATO

This section of the report examines public opinion on the prospect of NATO membership across the nine studied countries. Respondents were asked whether they support their country's accession to the NATO, and the general picture shows a great degree of variation between countries.

Figure 18. *Favors or Oppositions Towards Joining NATO*

16. Are you in favor of our country's membership in NATO?

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Share of total %.



The data show that support for NATO membership is present (with 63% respondents expressing a desire for their country to be a NATO member) but the results are not uniform across all studied countries. Among the nine countries surveyed, the

strongest endorsement of NATO membership comes from Albania, where an overwhelming 99% of respondents express support. Similarly, Kosovo shows high levels of support, with 93% of the population favoring NATO membership. In Ukraine, 80% of respondents support NATO membership. The remaining public opinion—divided between 15.4% opposed and 5% undecided or nonresponsive.

A second tier of countries shows majority but less overwhelming support for NATO. In North Macedonia, 74% are in favor, while Montenegro registers 52% support for NATO membership. In Montenegro, 33% of respondents oppose membership, and nearly 15% are either undecided or declined to respond. In North Macedonia, opposition to NATO membership is lower (16%), but the percentage of undecided respondents (10% combined) points to a segment of the population that remains cautious or disengaged from the issue. Georgia, records 65% support for NATO membership. The 23% who oppose and the 12% who are undecided or unresponsive suggest that despite majority support, the issue is still open to contestation. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, public opinion on NATO is more evenly split. 54% support membership, while 39% oppose it. Moldova presents one of the most complex



cases. Here, public opinion is nearly evenly divided, with 42% in favor and 46% opposed. The remaining 12% are either undecided or refused to answer. The most pronounced skepticism to NATO is found in Serbia, where only 9% support membership and 85% are opposed to NATO membership.

### First-mentioned Desired Partnerships for National Security


Respondents were asked to name with which partner should your country engage more for its national security, besides NATO. Firstly, what can be examined are the first-mentioned responses which indicate which potential partner firstly comes to mind when considering options.

*Figure 19. First-Mentioned Desired Partnerships for National Security (excluding NATO)*

*17. Other than NATO, with which partner should your country engage more for its national security? First-mention*

*Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Share of total %.*

*Values within the "Other" Category, "I don't know " and refusals to answer were excluded for clarity.*



Among the nine countries surveyed, one clear pattern stands out: the European Union and its members are most frequently mentioned as a desirable non-NATO security partner within the scope of first-mentions. With a total average of 33% across the region, the EU appears to occupy an important and functionally reassuring position in the collective security imagination of these populations. The highest first-mention support for the EU is observed in Albania (49%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (48%), Montenegro (42%) and North Macedonia (41%), where nearly half of respondents instinctively identify the EU as their preferred security partner outside NATO. Kosovo (32%), Moldova (24%) and Ukraine (27%) also show a large endorsement of the EU in their first-mentions. Yet even as a leading partner, the EU

does not uniformly dominate the top of mind across all countries. In Serbia (14%) and Georgia (19%), the share of respondents citing the EU first is lower.

The United States also features prominently in the first-mention responses, averaging 15% across the examined countries, though with apparent national variation. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in Kosovo, where an overwhelming 51% of respondents named the U.S. first. This result underscores the deeply embedded strategic and emotional ties stemming from past American involvement in Kosovo's path to independence. In Albania (32%), the U.S. also emerges as the top-of-mind choice for many, reaffirming its place in the country's security identity. In contrast, Georgia (16%) and Ukraine (11%) show more moderate levels of first-mention support. Elsewhere, the U.S. is a more marginal first-mention. In Montenegro (2%), Serbia (3%), and Moldova (3%), it appears less as the initial choice. Several countries' respondents prioritized regional cooperation in their first-mentions, with particularly strong figures in Serbia (17%), North Macedonia (15%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (15%). The presence of Russia in the first-mention results offers a window into complex national narratives. Across the region, Russia

is mentioned first by 10% of respondents, but its support is highly concentrated. In Serbia, fully 31% of respondents chose Russia as their first preference, the highest single-country figure for any non-NATO partner besides the EU. Bosnia and Herzegovina (13%), Montenegro (12%), and Moldova (13%) also reflect meaningful first-mention support for Russia. Conversely, Ukraine and Albania record negligible first-mention responses for Russia with less than 1%. China plays a relatively minor role in first-mention results, with a regional average of just 2%. Its higher-than-average presence in Serbia (5%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (4%).


## Desired Partnerships for National Security

To get the full grasp of all potential partnerships that respondents see as viable options for their countries the full data has to be considered. Numerous potential partnerships have been named and we will focus on the ones that received larger frequencies of responses. Responses such as "I don't answer" (2% of respondents picked it) and Don't know (11%), received some attention but most respondents went on to pick actual partner options.

*Figure 20. Desired Partnerships for National Security (excluding NATO) - top five*

*17. Other than NATO, with which partner should your country engage more for its national security?*

*Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Respondents could choose up to three options. Share of total %. Five most frequently mentioned reasons are shown.*



With half of all respondents across the region (50%) mentioning the European Union and its members as a preferred partner, the EU clearly represents a desirable associate for sustaining national security. This figure rises dramatically in some contexts: 77% in Albania, 77% in Kosovo, 66% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 62% in North Macedonia. This trust in the EU, however, is not uniformly distributed. In Serbia (21%), Moldova (34%), and Georgia (28%), the numbers are lower, but still not low. The United States also occupies a central position, being selected by 31% of total respondents. Once again, there is remarkable variation across countries. In Kosovo (89%) and Albania (69%), the U.S. emerges as a dominant candidate for partnership, outpacing even the EU in some cases. North Macedonia (37%), Ukraine (21%), and Georgia (24%) also show appreciation for the U.S. for the role of potential partnership. However, in countries like Serbia (8%), Moldova (9%), and Montenegro (11%), mentions of the United States are much more modest. An important insight from the full dataset is the high frequency of mentions for regional cooperation with 26% of respondents citing neighboring partnerships as a desirable strategy. This sentiment is especially strong in Bosnia and Herzegovina (63%), Serbia (32%), North

Macedonia (42%). However, the appeal of regionalism is not universal. This is demonstrated by Ukraine (3%) and Georgia (6%). Russia is mentioned by 14% of total respondents. For Serbia (35%), Russia remains the top choice for partnership. Additionally, in Montenegro (17%), Bosnia (25%), and Moldova (16%), a segment of the population still regards Russia as a viable security partner.










*Table 9. Desired Partnerships for National Security - top five per country*

*17. Other than NATO, with which partner should your country engage more for its national security?*

*Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Share of total %.*

*Excluded the none, other, don't know and I don't want to answer categories for clarity. Respondents could pick up to three choices for partners.*



Country	TOP 5 partners	% who picked the national security partner
<b>Albania</b> 	EU and its members	77
	United States	69
	Regional Cooperation	29
	Turkiye	19
	United Kingdom / Great Britain	15
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b> 	EU and its members	66
	Regional Cooperation (between neighbouring countries)	63
	Through international organisations (e.g. OSCE)	33
	Russia	25
	Turkiye	21
<b>Georgia</b> 	EU and its members	28
	United States	24
	Russia	8
	Turkiye	6
	Regional Cooperation	6
<b>Kosovo</b> 	United States	89
	EU and its members	77
	Regional Cooperation	27
	United Kingdom / Great Britain	24
	Turkiye	13
<b>Moldova</b> 	EU and its members	34
	Regional Cooperation	18
	Russia	16
	Full neutrality and Non-Alignment	13
	Romania	11
<b>Montenegro</b> 	EU and its members	46
	Regional Cooperation	19
	Russia	17
	Full neutrality and Non-Alignment	13
	United States	11
<b>North Macedonia</b> 	EU and its members	62
	Regional Cooperation	42
	United States	37
	Russia	20
	Turkiye	14
<b>Serbia</b> 	Russia	35
	Regional Cooperation	32
	China	26
	EU and its members	21
	Full neutrality and Non-Alignment	14
<b>Ukraine</b> 	EU and its members	43
	United Kingdom / Great Britain	22
	United States	21
	China	7
	Turkiye	6

Other potential security partners which lie outside the grasp of the five most frequently mentioned ones in the total picture also need to be examined. By looking at individual country preferences for potential partners, Turkey stands out as an occasionally mentioned choice. In total 10% of the respondents mentioned Turkey as a potential partner, and looking across the top five picks per country shows that a number of six out of nine examined countries consider Turkey as a relevant choice for potential partnership. Those are Bosnia and Herzegovina (21%), Albania (19%), North Macedonia (14%), Kosovo (13%), and Ukraine and Georgia (6%). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, international organizations (such as OSCE) managed to receive 33% respondents picks when considered as a potential partner in the task of securing Bosnian national security. No other country comes close to this level of reliance, the next one being Serbia with 9% respondents opting for this option of a potential security partner.

Three countries mentioned the option of full neutrality and non-alignment. Within this sphere a portion of respondents from Serbia (14%), Montenegro (13%) and

Moldova (13%) hope to secure their future through a future of neutrality. North Macedonia is also close-by with 10% of respondents opting for this choice.

China also appeared twice under the top five potential partners for each country. Those appearances are associated with Serbia (26% opting for China as a strategic partner) and Ukraine (7%). It is also relevant to mention here that some other countries hold a higher percentage of respondents who picked China (Bosnia and Herzegovina with 21%, and Montenegro and North Macedonia with 10%). Another surprising factor that must be mentioned is the 38% of Georgian respondents under the option of "don't know". Had this option been included in the ranking, it would be their pioneering response. This can suggest that respondents from Georgia still have stakes to consider before daring to opt for a future partner and it certainly serves to motivate further research to explain this anomaly.

#### D. EXTERNAL ACTORS

This chapter investigates how citizens across nine countries perceive the shifting landscape of international politics, focusing on their views of global powers, external threats, strategic partnerships, and the implications of ongoing geopolitical

tensions. The chapter begins by examining perceived threats to peace and stability in Europe. Respondents were asked whether they consider major global powers: China, Russia, the United States, and Turkey, as potential threats to European security. This question provides a baseline for understanding how citizens situate these countries within a framework of geopolitical risk and reassurance.

In addition to assessing threat perceptions, the chapter explores emotional and anticipatory responses to conflict. Respondents were asked whether they fear the outbreak of a new war in Europe, and whether they believe their own country could become directly involved in such a conflict. Beyond threat perception, the chapter delves into how respondents understand the current trajectory of international relations. Participants were asked to reflect on a series of statements about the changing world order—whether the era of Western dominance is ending, whether new global rivalries are forcing countries to choose sides, and whether middle powers are emerging as influential actors in the multipolar system. A portion of the chapter is also devoted to questions of value alignment and cooperation. Respondents were asked which country or international actor they feel closest to in

terms of values and ideas, as well as which actor their country should collaborate with more extensively, both in the political-security realm and in pursuit of economic development. The latter part of the chapter focuses specifically on the war in Ukraine. Respondents were asked to state what position their country should take in the conflict, how the war affects their national security, and—where applicable—how they evaluate the policies of the Trump administration in relation to the war. Ukrainian respondents were also asked about their expectations for support from other countries, including economic, humanitarian, military, and diplomatic forms of aid.


### Countries Which are Perceived as a Threat for Peace and Security in Europe

The initial question of the part of the survey that intends to deal with examining the perceptions of external actors asked the respondents to rate four countries: China, Russia, USA and Turkey, in accordance with whether they are perceived as a threat to peace and security in Europe or not. Firstly, it is worth looking at the general picture to see the broad judgement that these four countries received.

*Figure 21. Countries Seen as a Threat to Peace and Security in Europe*

18. Do you believe that the following countries represent a threat to peace and security in Europe?

Respondents (N = 9.011). Single grade per country. Share of total %.




The prevailing theme of Russia being a threat to European peace and security also persists in these general results. Russia is the only country that was more frequently considered as a threat (54%) than considered not a threat (37%). The perception of China as a threat to peace and security in Europe presents a complex and nuanced picture across the surveyed countries. According to the data, 28% of respondents across the studies countries identify China as a threat, with 59% claiming that China poses no threat to peace and security in Europe. USA was considered a threat for peace and security by 25% of respondents, while 64% claimed it is not a threat.

Turkey received the most positive assessment with only 13% opting for labeling them a threat to European peace and security, and 75% claiming that they are no threat. However, the insight of this data is limited, a further look into how the sampled countries differentiate between their choices can provide the much needed deeper insight into which studied countries think who is a threat to peace and security.

Figure 22. *China as a Threat to Peace and Security in Europe*

18. Do you believe that the following countries represent a threat to peace and security in Europe? Case of China

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.



Across the full sample, 28.2% of respondents believe that China represents a threat to peace and security in Europe. However, this average masks substantial national


variation. At one end of the spectrum lies Bosnia and Herzegovina, where only 9% of respondents see China as a threat. Similarly, Montenegro (18%), North Macedonia (14%), and Serbia (16%) also report relatively low levels of concern. In contrast, perceptions in Kosovo and Ukraine are markedly different. In Kosovo, nearly half of all respondents (48%) identify China as a threat, while in Ukraine, the figure rises to 55%. Georgia (38%) and Albania (33%) also register high levels of concern. Moldova (24%) and North Macedonia (14%) fall closer to the general average or below it, indicating more moderate perceptions.



Figure 23. *Russia as a Threat to Peace and Security in Europe*

18. Do you believe that the following countries represent a threat to peace and security in Europe? Case of Russia

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.




At the aggregate level, 54.4% of respondents across the region affirm that they view Russia as a threat. The most acute perception of Russia as a threat is observed in Ukraine, where 95% of respondents affirm this view. Kosovo and Albania follow closely behind, with 75% and 73% of respondents respectively identifying Russia as a threat. Georgia also registers high concern, with 67% of respondents affirming Russia as a threat to security and peace in Europe. Moldova, at 55%, also shows that the respondents saw Russia as a threat. In contrast, perceptions diverge sharply in some other countries. Serbia, in particular, stands out with only 20% of respondents

identifying Russia as a threat, while 73% explicitly reject that notion. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are more evenly split. In Bosnia, just 35% view Russia as a threat, while 59% do not. Montenegro shows a more balanced distribution: 40% see Russia as a threat, while 50% do not. North Macedonia, too, exhibits a peculiar situation: only 30% view Russia as a threat, compared to 56% who do not.

Figure 24. *USA as a Threat to Peace and Security in Europe*

18. Do you believe that the following countries represent a threat to peace and security in Europe? Case of USA

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.




Based on the data collected across nine countries, the perception of the United States as a threat to peace and security in Europe reveals a complex and layered picture. While the United States remains a key ally and a cornerstone of NATO, a minority of respondents across the region—25% of the total sample—identify it as a source of potential threat. The national breakdown demonstrates that this perception is far from uniform. In Albania and Kosovo, only 7% of respondents, respectively, perceive the United States as a threat. At the opposite end of the spectrum stands Serbia, where nearly half of respondents—46%—regard the United

States as a threat. Intermediate levels of perceived threat are found in countries like Montenegro (31%), North Macedonia (28%), Moldova (28%), Georgia (26%), and Ukraine (26%). Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out for having 24% of respondents view the U.S. as a threat. It is also important to note the “Don’t know/No answer” category, which ranges from 3.4% in Kosovo to 20.2% in Georgia. High levels of nonresponse or uncertainty may suggest either a lack of strong opinion or a reluctance to engage with politically sensitive topics.

Figure 25. Turkey as a Threat to Peace and Security in Europe

18. Do you believe that the following countries represent a threat to peace and security in Europe? Case of Turkey

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.



Based on the survey data collected across nine countries, perceptions of Turkey as a threat to peace and security in Europe present a relatively subdued but not irrelevant profile. On average, only 13% of respondents across the total sample identify Turkey as a threat. Only 8% of Kosovar respondents, 9% of Albanians, and 9% of Bosnians identify Turkey as a threat. Montenegro (14%) and North Macedonia (14%) exhibit moderate levels of concern. In Moldova (11%) and Ukraine (10%), Turkey's role appears similarly ambivalent. Serbia and Georgia stand out at the upper end of the

threat perception spectrum. In Serbia, 21% of respondents view Turkey as a threat. In Georgia, the number is even higher, with 25% perceiving Turkey as a threat.


### Perception of Anticipated Wars in Europe

Another important segment worth questioning while examining how the respondents perceive the interplay of external actors is the question of whether respondents fear another war breaking out in Europe. This question was asked and the respondents were expected to rate this potential occurrence on a scale with four options (completely disagree, tend to disagree, tend to agree, completely agree).

Figure 26. *Fear of a New War Breaking out in Europe*

19. To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements? Are you afraid that another war can break out in Europe?

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total % with expressed mean values.



Across the full sample, the most common response was a moderate one "Tend to agree"—with 32% of respondents indicating that they harbor some level of fear about another war in Europe. This is closely followed by 29% who "Tend to disagree". Notably, 11% of respondents fully agree with the proposition that another war is

likely, while nearly one in five (20%) completely disagree. At the national level, the differences are telling. Albania stands out as the country with the highest levels of concern, with 46% “Tending to agree” and another 8% “Completely agreeing” producing a combined affirmation of over 53%. Conversely, in Serbia, while concern exists (31% “Tend to agree” and 9% “Completely agree”), there is a relatively strong cluster of skepticism as well—22% “Completely disagree” and 35% “Tend to disagree”.

Ukraine, currently engaged in an active conflict, exhibits a distinctive profile. 41% “Tend to agree” and 14% “Completely agree” that another war in Europe is possible. However, the fact that 11% “Completely disagree” and 30% “Tend to disagree” is notable. In Moldova, while the moderate agreement rate is 30%, the “Completely agree” segment is relatively high at 24%. This suggests that a sizable portion of the population is strongly convinced that European peace is under threat. The figures for Georgia reveal a similar ambivalence: while 26% “Tend to agree,” and 17% “Completely agree,” a substantial 28% “Completely disagree”.




Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a case of skepticism and caution coexisting. It has one of the highest rates of complete disagreement (30%), yet a considerable number also “Tend to agree” (22%) and “Completely agree” (7%). Kosovo also exhibits a relatively high level of concern, with a share of 29% moderately agreeing and 8% fully agreeing with the proposition of expecting a renewed European conflict. With only 8% responding “Don’t know/No answer”.

The respondents who opted for the response of expecting another war in Europe (N = 3.899) were additionally asked do they think that their country could be involved in this war.

*Figure 27. Fear of Home Country being Involved in a Future European Conflict*

*19.2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements? Are you afraid that our country may be involved in such a war?*

*Respondents (N = 3.899). Respondents per countries: Albania (n = 534), Bosnia and Herzegovina (n = 287), Kosovo (n = 377), Montenegro (n = 352), North Macedonia (n = 440), Serbia (n = 394), Ukraine (n = 548), Moldova (n = 540), Georgia (n = 427). Share of total % with expressed mean values*



Nearly three-quarters of respondents who foresaw war in Europe expressed either agreement or strong agreement that their country could be drawn into it. Specifically, 49% indicated that they “tend to agree,” while 25% “completely agree” with the idea that their country may become involved. Only a small minority—around 7%—completely rejected this notion, while 16% leaned toward disagreement. The rest (3%) opted not to answer or were uncertain.

Country-level data enrich this understanding by revealing some heterogeneity. In Albania, for instance, an overwhelming 70% of respondents “tend to agree” that their

country might be involved in a future war, while only 9% “completely agree.” This asymmetry between moderate and strong agreement implies that Albanians are concerned but not fatalistic. Similar patterns appear in Kosovo (60% “tend to agree,” 25% “completely agree”) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (57% and 19%, respectively). Ukraine presents a more layered case. Despite the fact that the country is currently engaged in war, 43% of Ukrainian respondents “tend to agree” that their nation may be involved in a broader European conflict, while 34% “completely agree.” This higher rate of complete agreement suggests an acute awareness of ongoing danger, as well as the possibility that war may escalate beyond national borders.

Moldova emerges as one of the most concerned nations, with 47% of its respondents saying they “completely agree” that their country could be drawn into a new European war. In contrast, countries like Serbia and Georgia display more varied sentiment. In Serbia, 44% “tend to agree,” and only 20% “completely agree,” with a notable 27% expressing a tendency to disagree. Georgia, similarly, shows a fragmented picture: only 26% “tend to agree,” and 23% “completely agree,” while a full 26% “completely disagree”. Montenegro and North Macedonia show more


consensus than divergence. In Montenegro, 47% “tend to agree” and 26% “completely agree,” reflecting a relatively high aggregate concern. In North Macedonia, 64% “tend to agree” while 15% “completely agree”.

### Perceived State of the World

Respondents were additionally asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with certain propositions about the current state of the world. These findings can help resonate as to what the perception of current world affairs are and if the actual state corresponds to what people believe to be the case. The initial proposition we will look into states “We are entering an era of “my country first” and everyone is looking out for themselves”.

Figure 28. *Are we Entering an Era of "My Country First"*

20. To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements? We are entering an era of "my country first" and everyone is looking out for themselves. Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %, with shown mean values.



The idea that global affairs are shifting toward a logic of self-preservation and national prioritization resonates deeply across the countries surveyed. Overall, a majority of respondents—more than two-thirds—express agreement with the notion that we are entering an era marked by national self-interest, with 33% stating

they “tend to agree” and another 34% “completely agree.” Taken together, this 67% majority suggests a widespread perception that multilateral cooperation is weakening, replaced by a more fragmented and self-focused world order.


This sentiment is particularly strong in several countries. Georgia stands out most notably, with nearly half of its respondents (46%) indicating complete agreement and another 21% tending to agree. Moldova also reflects strong alignment with this view: 34% of its population completely agrees, and an additional 27% tend to agree. Kosovo and Albania, also show high levels of agreement. In Kosovo, over 78% of respondents agree either completely or to some extent, while Albania registers a similarly high total of 74%.

At the same time, the survey reveals a non-negligible degree of doubt or caution. For example, 15% of all respondents say they “tend to disagree” with the statement, while 9% “completely disagree.” These views are more pronounced in countries like Serbia and Ukraine. In Serbia, 16% completely disagree and another 19% tend to disagree, while in Ukraine, the combined share of disagreement reaches nearly 35%.

Importantly, the proportion of respondents who selected “Don’t know” or did not answer is relatively small (8%), suggesting that most individuals have formed clear opinions on the topic. However, the slightly higher rates of uncertainty in countries like Albania (15%) and Georgia (15%) may signal segments of the population that are ambivalent or still navigating their position in a rapidly changing international environment.

*Figure 29. Is Russia Emerging as a New Leader of the Countries Outside the West*

*20. To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements? Russia is emerging as a new leader of the countries outside the West. Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Results are expressed in share of total % with expressed mean values.*



Across the surveyed countries, the notion that Russia is emerging as a leader among nations outside the Western political and economic order produces a diverse and, at times, sharply polarized set of opinions. At the aggregate level, perceptions are notably divided. Approximately 49% of respondents across all countries express some level of agreement with the proposition that Russia is becoming a leader of the global non-West—28% tend to agree and 21% completely agree. On the other hand, 40% of respondents reject this notion—21% completely disagree and 19% tend to disagree. An additional 11% express no opinion or are unsure. Differences




across countries are especially revealing. In Serbia, more than 65% of respondents express agreement (29% tend to agree, 37% completely agree), placing it among the most affirming publics. Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, agreement is high, with over 55% expressing support for the notion. Kosovo presents a more ambivalent picture: while 36% tend to agree and 13% completely agree, a substantial portion—16% completely disagree and 22% tend to disagree. Albania stands out with the most skeptical stance: only 3% completely disagree and 17% tend to disagree, while a combined 76% affirm some degree of agreement. These figures are surprising at first glance, especially given Albania's firm pro-Western orientation and NATO membership. However, they may reflect recognition of Russia's geopolitical visibility more than endorsement of its leadership qualities. Ukraine presents the starkest contrast: 62% of respondents completely reject the idea that Russia is an emerging leader outside the West, and only 10% agree to any extent. Other countries show more nuanced distributions. In Georgia, over 34% of respondents completely disagree, but 25% also indicate some agreement. In Moldova, a similar split is visible: 24% completely disagree, but approximately 45% tend to agree or fully agree.

Montenegro and North Macedonia exhibit more centrist views. While both have moderate rates of agreement (32% and 37% tend to agree, respectively).

Figure 30. *Is China Emerging as a New Leader of the Countries Outside the West*

20. To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements? Russia is emerging as a new leader of the countries outside the West.

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total % with expressed mean values.



When asking the question of whether China is an emerging as a new leader of the countries outside the West, overall, 56% of respondents across the total sample tend

to agree (33%) or completely agree (22%) with the idea that China is becoming a leader of the non-Western world.

Albania (63%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (65%) show high agreement levels, with particularly strong representation in the “tend to agree” category. Interestingly, these countries also show low levels of outright disagreement (3% in Albania and 8% in Bosnia).


Kosovo presents a more nuanced case. Although 42% of respondents agree (35% tend to agree, 7% completely agree), a notable 16% completely disagree, and 19% select Don't know/Not answering. Serbia emerges as an outlier with particularly high levels of affirmation. More than two-thirds of Serbian respondents (67%) agree that China is emerging as a leader, including 36% who “completely agree”, the highest figure in this category among all surveyed countries. Ukraine, in contrast, registers more cautious views. Just 17% of respondents completely agree with the statement, and a further 39% tend to agree. While these are not negligible figures, they are balanced by 15% who completely disagree and 24% who tend to disagree Moldova

and Georgia both show moderately high agreement, with 58% and 43%, respectively, agreeing that China is rising as a leader outside the West. However, both countries also record a substantial number of respondents who selected “don’t know or no answer”—17% in Moldova and 24% in Georgia. This may indicate a degree of distance from the topic, less media saturation with China-related news, or general uncertainty about what China's rise actually entails for their national interests. North Macedonia presents a high level of agreement, with 58% of respondents affirming the statement and only 7% completely disagreeing.

*Figure 31. Are Middle Powers (Turkey, Iran and UAE) Emerging as New Leaders*

*20. To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements? Middle powers (such as Turkey, Iran and UAE) are emerging as new centres of power*

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total % with expressed mean values.



In the evolving structure of international relations, the concept of “middle powers” has gained increasing analytical relevance. Countries such as Turkey, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates—once seen primarily through regional lenses—are now viewed by many as having the capacity to influence broader geopolitical dynamics. On a total sample level, there is a clear tendency to agree with the statement that middle powers are becoming new centers of power. Nearly 44% of respondents across all surveyed countries either “tend to agree” (29%) or “completely agree” (15%) with the assertion. Disagreement also remains present, with over 41% either

“completely disagreeing” (16%) or “tending to disagree” (25%), indicating a diversity of views.

A closer look at country-level data provides a clearer understanding of how local contexts shape global perceptions. In Albania, belief in the rise of middle powers is exceptionally high: 45% “tend to agree” and 32% “completely agree,” resulting in a striking 76% overall agreement. Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina shows strong agreement, with more than half (53%) expressing either partial or full concurrence. Kosovo and Montenegro display more divided sentiment. In Kosovo, 25% “tend to agree” and 7% “completely agree,” while 26% “tend to disagree” and 19% “completely disagree,” indicating a balanced but uncertain view. Montenegro mirrors this ambiguity, where disagreement (38%) outweighs agreement (45%). In contrast, Ukraine exhibits relatively low levels of agreement. Only 28% “tend to agree” and a modest 6% “completely agree,” while a substantial 56% express varying degrees of disagreement. Serbia, interestingly, records both high disagreement (56%) and a notable proportion of partial agreement (23%), illustrating a polarized perspective. In Moldova and Georgia, the responses again illustrate ambivalence. Moldovan

respondents are split, with 40% in agreement and 39% in disagreement, while Georgia reports lower agreement (32%) and high levels of both uncertainty and disagreement.

Across all countries, the share of “don’t know” or non-committal responses is relatively high (15% overall), with even higher uncertainty in countries like Georgia (27%) and Kosovo (22%).


### Value-based Orientations

To further analyze the respondents perception of external political actors a question was asked which actor/country do they feel the closest regarding values and ideas. While the findings do not determine political allegiance or predict foreign policy preferences, they do provide a valuable mirror of public sentiment regarding shared identity, ideological comfort, and normative affinity.

Figure 32. *Closest Country/Actor in regard to Values*

21. To which actor/country do you feel closer regarding values and ideas?

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %. Only the results of the offered answers are shown to assure clarity of visualization. Single answer.



Across the full sample, the most frequently chosen answer was the European Union, selected by 35% of respondents. This trend is particularly pronounced in Albania (56%), Moldova (43%), and Ukraine (53%), where the EU was not only the most selected but also outpaced all other options by a wide margin. North Macedonia (29%), Georgia (39%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (32%) also show strong affinity for the EU.



The second most cited actor in the total sample was Russia, with 13% of respondents selecting it. Here, national contexts vary sharply. In Serbia, 36% of respondents indicated Russia as the actor they felt closest to in terms of values, by far the highest figure recorded for Russia in the dataset. Bosnia and Herzegovina (16%) and Montenegro (15%) also returned above-average levels of value affinity with Russia. In contrast, in Ukraine, which is currently in an active state of conflict with Russia, the figure was, expectedly, 0.

The United States was selected by 12% of total respondents. Kosovo presents an exceptionally high figure at 40%. Albania also reflects above-average alignment (18%), while most other countries, including Ukraine (7%) and Georgia (12%), express more modest levels of value-based affinity. In Serbia, only 2% of respondents chose the United States.

China, on the other hand, was cited by 2% of total respondents. Although this represents a minority view, some countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina (4%) and Serbia (7%) registered slightly higher levels. Turkey was selected by 6% of

respondents. Bosnia and Herzegovina (12%) and North Macedonia (11%) lead in this regard, possibly reflecting religious, historical, or regional dynamics. In other countries like Serbia (2%) and Moldova (1%), however, the affinity with Turkey is minimal.

There are also several options which were left out from the visualization due to their low total frequency of appearance but they deserve a noteworthy mention. Albania was chosen 159 times, 146 of which came from Kosovo, reflecting a cultural connection between the two nations. Serbia was mentioned 104 times (77 of which are from North Macedonia). Romania also received 79 mentions, and 75 of those were from Moldova.

### Reduction of Economic Dependence on Global Actors


In an era of complex global interdependence, the question of economic sovereignty has become increasingly salient. The question that will be addressed here probes public opinion on whether their country should reduce its economic reliance on key international actors: the United States, the European Union, Russia, China and

Turkey. This section presents the findings, offering insight into prevailing public attitudes toward strategic economic alignment and perceived geopolitical risks.

*Figure 33. Reduction of Economic Dependence Towards Certain Countries/Actors*

25. Should our country reduce its economic dependence on the following actors?

Respondents (N = 9.011). Single answers. Share of total %.



The total results reveal that Russia is the actor from which most respondents would prefer to see their countries economically disengage. Across the full regional sample, 54% of respondents said their country should reduce economic dependence

on Russia, compared to around 35% who disagreed, and 10% who either didn't know or declined to answer. China, often framed as a rising global power and a central economic actor, receives a more nuanced reception. A total of 42% of respondents indicated support for reducing economic dependence on China, while 47% disagreed, and 11% remained undecided or did not respond. The United States, despite being a traditional ally and partner for many of the countries surveyed, is not immune from scrutiny. A considerable 41% of respondents expressed support for reducing economic dependence on the U.S., while 51% opposed such a move, and 9% provided no opinion. In contrast, the European Union elicits the least support for economic decoupling. Only 33% of respondents favored reducing economic dependence on the EU, compared to a clear 59% who opposed the idea, and 8% who were unsure or did not respond. This result suggests that, overall, the EU retains its status as a trusted economic partner across the countries surveyed. For Turkey, 36% of respondents support reducing economic dependence towards them, while 54% oppose such a move. An additional 10% remain undecided or declined to answer.

*Figure 34. Reducing Economic Dependence on Russia*

25. Should our country reduce its economic dependence on the following actors? Case of Russia

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.




The question of whether to reduce economic dependence on Russia reveals a highly polarized and geopolitically sensitive dimension of public opinion across the nine surveyed countries. With a total of 54% of respondents across the sample favoring a reduction in dependence, the issue is clearly not marginal. Perhaps most notable is the overwhelming support for economic decoupling from Russia in Ukraine, where 87% of respondents expressed the view that their country should reduce its economic reliance on Russia. This result is unsurprising given the ongoing war and the widespread perception of Russia not merely as an unreliable partner but as a

direct aggressor. A similar majority support for reducing economic ties with Russia can be found in Kosovo (71%) and Albania (63%), both of which reflect consistent pro-Western orientations. In contrast, Serbia shows the lowest level of support for economic disengagement, with only 31% in favor of reducing dependence on Russia. 65% believe that economic ties should be preserved. North Macedonia (34%) and Montenegro (35%) also show relatively low levels of support for reducing dependence on Russia. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia lie closer to the total sample result, with 55% and 58% respectively supporting economic distancing. Moldova also falls near the total result, with 54% of respondents supporting economic decoupling and 35% opposing it.

*Figure 35. Reducing Economic Dependence on China*

*25. Should our country reduce its economic dependence on the following actors? Case of China*

*Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.*



A total of 42% of respondents across the full sample favor reducing economic dependence on China. However, this figure is slightly outweighed by those who do not support such a move, with 47% indicating that they oppose reducing economic reliance. When disaggregated by country, the data reveals substantial variation. Ukraine stands out, with 66% of respondents supporting a reduction in economic dependence on China. Ukraine's notably low level of "No" responses (29%) indicates a broadly skeptical stance toward economic entanglements with non-Western powers. Kosovo follows closely, with 52% of respondents advocating for reduced dependence. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania also display relatively strong leanings toward reducing economic reliance on China, with 46% and 42% respectively agreeing with the proposition. In Georgia (43%) and Moldova (35%),


affirmative responses are close to the total result. Serbia and North Macedonia provide a marked contrast. Only 34% of Serbian respondents support reducing economic ties with China, while a clear majority, 62%, oppose such a move. North Macedonia shows a similar trend, with only 28% in favor and 59% opposed. Montenegro emerges as the most hesitant of the nine countries, with only 29% supporting reduced dependence and a remarkably high 25% of respondents saying they don't know or refusing to answer.



Figure 36. Reducing Economic Dependence on USA

25. Should our country reduce its economic dependence on the following actors? Case of USA

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.



Across the full sample, 41% of respondents believe their country should reduce its economic dependence on the United States. By contrast, a slightly higher share—51%—disagree with that proposition, indicating a preference to maintain or potentially deepen existing levels of economic interdependence with the U.S. A residual 8.7% either did not know or chose not to respond. Notably, there is considerable cross-national variation. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 61% of


respondents believe their country should reduce economic ties with the U.S., a result that stands out as the highest affirmative response rate across the sample. This view contrasts sharply with sentiment in neighboring Albania, where only 25% support such a reduction, and 69% oppose it, the highest share of pro-dependence sentiment observed in the dataset. Kosovo similarly exhibits strong opposition to reducing ties with the U.S., with just 31% in favor of reduction and 67% against. In Ukraine, a majority of respondents (57%) favor reducing economic dependence on the United States, while 39% oppose this idea. Moldova's results are more evenly split: 40% support reducing dependence and 48% do not, indicating a closely balanced perspective on this issue. Similarly, Montenegro exhibits a fairly even division (39% yes vs. 37% no), though a notable 24% chose not to answer. Georgia displays the highest level of opposition to reducing dependence on the U.S., with 63% of respondents rejecting the idea and only 27% supporting it. This suggests that in Georgia, as in Albania and Kosovo, the United States is widely perceived as a vital economic partner whose engagement should not be curtailed. Serbia provides a particularly complex case. While 49% of respondents agree that economic

dependence on the U.S. should be reduced, 47% disagree, a nearly even split. North Macedonia shows a similar balancing act, with 37% in favor of reduction and 53% opposed.

*Figure 37. Reducing Economic Dependence on EU*

25. Should our country reduce its economic dependence on the following actors? Case of EU

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.




Across the full regional sample, 33% of respondents stated that their country should reduce its economic dependence on the EU, while 59% consider the economic relations should remain. Serbia and Ukraine exhibit the highest proportions of respondents advocating for reduced economic dependence on the EU, with 42% and 43% respectively. Moldova also follows closely at 40%, which suggests that in these

countries, there is a comparatively stronger segment of the population that is skeptical of economic alignment with the EU. Conversely, in Albania (23%) and Montenegro (25%), the desire to reduce economic dependence on the EU is much lower. Bosnia and Herzegovina (38%) and North Macedonia (29%) occupy more moderate positions. Kosovo's share of 28% who are in favor of reducing economic dependence on the EU is slightly below the total sample results and likely signals continued optimism about deepening ties with the European Union. Georgia (28%) falls into a similar category. Importantly, the share of respondents who do not support reducing dependence is higher at 59% across the region. In every single country surveyed, a majority of respondents rejected the idea that their nation should limit its economic ties with the European Union. Albania stands out with the highest level of support for continued economic integration (73%), followed closely by Kosovo (68%) and North Macedonia (61%).

Figure 38. *Reducing Economic Dependence on Turkey*

25. Should our country reduce its economic dependence on the following actors? Case of Turkey

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.



Across the full regional sample, 36% of respondents support reducing economic dependence on Turkey, while 54% oppose such a move. An additional 10% remain undecided or declined to answer. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 47% of respondents support reducing economic dependence on Turkey. This figure stands in stark contrast to 46% who oppose such a reduction, resulting in a nearly even split. Ukraine also displays a relatively high level of concern, with 53% in favor of reducing economic dependence. Moldova follows closely, with 36% in favor, suggesting a degree of skepticism regarding the strategic benefits of deeper economic ties with

Turkey. Georgia and Serbia present similar attitudes, with 35% and 38% respectively supporting a reduction in dependence. In both cases, however, opposition to this idea is substantially higher, with 56% of Georgians and 56% of Serbians preferring to maintain existing economic ties. Montenegro (29%) and North Macedonia (26%) report lower support for reducing economic dependence, and large majorities, 46% and 64%, respectively, oppose such a policy shift. Kosovo and Albania register the lowest levels of support for reducing dependence, at 32% and 27%, respectively. In both countries, over 60% of respondents oppose any such reduction. The proportion of respondents who selected “Don’t know” or declined to answer remains relatively low across all countries, with the exception of Montenegro (24%) and Moldova (15%).


## Stances on Trump Administration's Policies

This chapter investigates public perceptions of the Trump administration's policies for the nine respondent countries that are being investigated within this project. The survey question asked participants to assess whether they viewed the impact of the Trump administration's actions on their country as mostly positive or mostly negative, some of them also opting for neither, don't know or not wanting to answer.

Figure 39. *Stance on Trump Administration's Policies*

26. How would you evaluate the impact of the Trump administration's policies on your country?

Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.



Across the nine countries surveyed—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia—the total

results reveal a complex but unmistakable trend. When asked to evaluate the impact of the Trump administration's policies on their own country, 37% of respondents judged the impact to be mostly negative. This is the dominant response across the studied group of countries and suggests that skepticism or dissatisfaction with the U.S. administration's international role was the prevailing sentiment. In contrast, 25% of participants said the policies had a mostly positive impact, which points to a narrower base of approval. At the same time, 24.1% of respondents opted for the neutral "Neither" response, suggesting that a portion of the population neither endorsed nor rejected the Trump administration's policies.

In Albania, a clear plurality of respondents 42% chose Neither, suggesting ambivalence or cautious detachment. Still, 39% believed the Trump administration's impact was Mostly positive, indicating a substantial level of support. Only 14% viewed the policies as Mostly negative. This leans towards a net-positive outlook, buffered by neutrality. Kosovo mirrors this pattern even more distinctly. With 40% expressing a Mostly positive view, and 35% Mostly negative, the split underscores polarization, yet the positive evaluations hold a slight lead. Notably, 18% indicated



Neither, reflecting a more decisive population overall compared to other countries. Georgia, by contrast, presents a more complex picture. While 38% responded Mostly positive—a relatively high figure, the Don't know rate stood at 32%, suggesting high levels of uncertainty or disconnection from U.S. policy impacts. Only 20% saw the effects as Mostly negative, and a mere 8% said Neither. Moldova offers a striking contrast. The dominant perception is negative, with 47% evaluating the Trump administration's influence as Mostly negative, compared to 23% who saw it as Mostly positive. Meanwhile, 15% took a Neither stance, and 13% did not know. This trend points toward a generally critical view. Ukraine delivered the most resolute rejection: a sweeping 78% considered the Trump administration's policies Mostly negative. Only 13% expressed positivity, with 4% selecting Neither and 5% uncertain. In Serbia, the views are more divided. 35% judged the administration negatively, while 12% leaned positive. Interestingly, 45% chose Neither. North Macedonia also reflects mixed sentiment: 37% held negative views, 24% positive, and 20% neutral. A notable 16% claimed Don't know. Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out as deeply critical. 43% responded Mostly negative—the second highest rate after Ukraine—while only 12%

leaned positive. A relatively high 35% indicated Neither, and 8% were unsure, further reinforcing a general trend of skepticism. Finally, Montenegro demonstrated more fragmentation than outright polarity: 28% were negative, 20% positive, and a sizable 29% claimed the response was neither. However, an unusually high 16% selected Don't know, and 7% didn't want to answer.

### Stances on National Position in Regard to the War in Ukraine

This chapter explores how citizens across eight countries among the examined nine (excluding Ukraine) perceive their nation's appropriate stance in the ongoing war in Ukraine. As one of the most consequential geopolitical conflicts in recent European history, the war has not only reshaped regional security and diplomacy, but also prompted intense public debate over national allegiances, neutrality, and the path toward resolution.


Respondents were asked to choose among four predefined positions: whether their country should support Ukraine until it wins the war, remain neutral, support diplomatic efforts to end the war, or support Russia until it wins the war. The survey

also captured non-responses, such as indecision and refusal to answer, which themselves may reflect deeper social ambivalence or political sensitivities.

Figure 40. Preferred National Position in Regard to the War in Ukraine

27. What position should your country take in the war in Ukraine?

Respondents (N = 8.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.



Across the region, the most widely supported position is that countries should support diplomatic efforts to end the war, with 41% of respondents choosing this option. This position commands majority support in Albania (57%), and a plurality in Bosnia and Herzegovina (42%), Kosovo (47%), and Serbia (44%). Even in countries where other stances are more strongly represented, such as Moldova (25%) and Georgia (36%), diplomatic resolution remains a very present theme.

The second most commonly selected stance is neutrality, present in 32% across countries. It dominates public opinion in Moldova (43%), Georgia (35%), North

Macedonia (39%), and Serbia (38%). In each of these cases, neutrality outpaces support for either side in the conflict, positioning these publics as cautious or even skeptical of deeper involvement in the geopolitical clash.

Support for Ukraine until it wins the war is, the third most frequent position across the studied countries, with 15% of all respondents choosing it. However, this sentiment varies drastically by country, appearing strongest in Kosovo (26%), Albania (25%), Moldova (26%), and Georgia (22%). In stark contrast, countries such as Serbia (2%), North Macedonia (6%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (7%) express very limited support for a definitive Ukrainian victory.

Explicit support for Russia's victory remains a minority position, but it is not absent. Around 5% of respondents across the studied countries chose this stance. The highest levels were found in Montenegro (10%), Serbia (10%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (8%). In contrast, Albania (less than 1%), Kosovo (4%), and Georgia (less than 1%) reported low levels of support for Russia.

### Stances on Trump's policy toward the war in Ukraine


While the details of Trump's position have been the subject of ongoing political debate and interpretation, this question aimed to capture general sentiment toward his approach, probing whether citizens in the region agree, disagree, or remain uncertain about his stance.

Respondents were asked directly whether they agree with Trump's policy, with only three possible responses: Yes, No, or Don't know/Refuse to answer. Although deliberately broad in formulation, this question offers valuable insight into how Trump's international posture—and the political messages it conveys—is received across diverse national contexts in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

*Figure 41. Stances on Trump's policy toward the war in Ukraine*

*27a. Do you agree with Trump's policy toward the war in Ukraine?*

*Respondents (N = 8,011). Each country N = 1,000, except Moldova with N = 1,011. Share of total %.*



Looking at the total sample across all countries, 27% of respondents said they agree with Trump's policy on Ukraine, while a higher 46% stated they do not agree. A further 27% chose not to answer or indicated uncertainty. Among individual countries, Albania stands out with the highest level of support for Trump's Ukraine policy, 42% of Albanians expressed agreement, while only 37% disagreed. Georgia also displays a relatively high share of agreement at 35%, with disagreement at a similar level (33%) and 32% of respondents opting not to answer. In North Macedonia, 31% agree with Trump's policy, slightly less than the 35% who disagree. Notably, 34% of respondents expressed uncertainty or withheld their opinion, among the highest non-response rates among the studied countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina shows the most decisive rejection of Trump's Ukraine policy. An

overwhelming 59% of respondents said they disagree, with only 19% expressing agreement. The remaining 22% opted not to answer. Moldova reflects a similar dynamic, with 55% of respondents stating they disagree with Trump's policy and only 23% expressing support. In Serbia, 53% disagree with Trump's stance, while only 18% support it, with 29% expressed no opinion. A common pattern across nearly all countries is the high rate of "Don't know / Refuse to answer" responses, ranging from 17% in Kosovo to a remarkable 42% in Montenegro. This ambiguity may stem from several factors.

### Effect of the War in Ukraine on Home Country Security

Further questioning of citizens across eight countries aimed to see the perceived impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine on the security of their own countries. As the conflict continues to reshape geopolitical alliances, economic conditions, and defense postures across the globe. Respondents were asked to evaluate whether the continuation of the war has had a positive, negative, or neutral impact on their country's security situation. The structure of the question allows for a nuanced




spectrum of sentiment, ranging from “completely negative” to “completely positive,” as well as a neutral midpoint and the possibility to withhold opinion.

Figure 42. *Perceived Effect of the War in Ukraine on Home Country Security*

Q28 How does the continuation of war in Ukraine affect the security situation in your country?

Respondents (N = 8.011). Each country N = 1.000, except Moldova with N = 1.011. Share of total %.



Looking at the aggregate data, 55% of all respondents view the war’s continuation as having a negative effect on their country's security — 20% describe the impact as completely negative and 35% as mostly negative. By contrast, only 4% of respondents perceive any form of positive effect (3% mostly positive, 1% completely

positive). A substantial 35% remain neutral, indicating that a portion of the population either perceives limited direct impact or is uncertain about how to assess the war's influence.

Of all the countries surveyed, Moldova exhibits the highest level of concern. A striking 44% of Moldovan respondents describe the war's impact as completely negative, while a further 23% believe it is mostly negative, amounting to 66% overall who sense some form of threat. Only 18% chose the neutral option, while a modest 9% perceive a positive impact. Georgia also shows a pronounced degree of concern, though slightly more balanced than Moldova. 29% describe the impact as completely negative, and 35% as mostly negative, totaling 64% who feel the war undermines their national security. With 17% responding neutrally and 5% expressing a positive view, Georgia emerges as another case of high alarm.

In sharp contrast, Albania exhibits the lowest level of extreme perceived threat to national security. Only 10% view the war as completely negative, however 55% believe it has a mostly negative impact, producing a total of 65% negative sentiment.

The remaining 33% of Albanians say the war has neither positive nor negative effects on their security, and a small 1% perceive slight benefits. Kosovo reports the third-highest level of “completely negative” views at 27%, accompanied by 37% who describe the impact as mostly negative. The combined 64% negative sentiment underscores a prevailing feeling of insecurity related to the war in Ukraine. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, only 8% rate the security impact as completely negative, with another 36% choosing mostly negative. Yet the most notable figure is the 54% who selected the neutral option, the highest neutral share among all countries. Montenegro and North Macedonia reflect a relatively moderate response pattern. In Montenegro, 12% view the war’s impact as completely negative, and 26% as mostly negative, amounting to 38% negative sentiment. The remaining majority either perceive no strong impact (42% neutral) or express minor positivity (4% combined positive). Similarly, in North Macedonia, 11% selected completely negative and \*36% mostly negative, for a total of 48% negative views. However, 46% again opt for neutrality. In Serbia, the responses reflect a comparatively muted view of danger. Only 16% describe the impact as completely negative, and 33% as mostly

negative, a combined 50%, much lower than in Moldova, Georgia, or Kosovo. A substantial 38% selected neutral, while 4% perceived the war as having positive security implications.


### Ukraine's Expectations from Other Countries Regarding the War

This chapter focuses on how citizens of Ukraine perceive and prioritize the forms of support they expect from other countries amidst the ongoing war. Based exclusively on responses from within Ukraine, this section captures the immediate and strategic needs as articulated by the population living through the conflict. The question invited respondents to name up to three preferred types of assistance, ranging from economic and military support to humanitarian aid, diplomatic engagement, or neutrality.

Figure 43. *First-mentioned Ukrainian Expectations from Other Countries Regarding the War*

29. What are your expectations from other countries regarding the war?

Respondents (N = 1.000). Share of total %. First-mentioned responses only.




While respondents were allowed to name up to three expectations, this initial part of analysis focuses exclusively on their first-named priorities—what came to mind most immediately when asked how other countries should respond to Ukraine’s situation. The most prominent result is the overwhelming emphasis on military support, cited by 48% of respondents as their primary expectation. The next most

frequently cited first response was economic support, chosen by 18% of respondents. At a greater distance, diplomatic support emerged as the third most mentioned expectation, with 5% naming it first. Notably, 6% of respondents responded with “It is difficult to say”, an answer that, though non-specific, carries interpretive weight. Similarly, categories like “Other” (2%), “None” (2%), and “I do not want to answer” (less than 1%), also received some presence. Beyond these primary categories, a range of smaller but symbolically important responses also emerged. 3% of respondents named “More pressure on Russia” as their first expectation, others named “Any support, as long as it is there” (3%) or “Peaceful settlement” (3%), suggesting a pragmatic openness to varied forms of assistance or a focus on ending the conflict through negotiation. Among the more symbolically charged answers, “A stronger and clearer position on the war” was chosen first by 3%.

Figure 44. *Ukrainian Expectations from Other Countries Regarding the War*

29. What are your expectations from other countries regarding the war? All responses

Respondents (N = 1.000). Share of total %. Up to three mentions per respondents.



The data confirms that military support remains the dominant and most frequently cited expectation, now reaching 67% of respondents across all mentions. This figure not only maintains but strengthens the insight from the first-mention results (48%). Closely following is economic support, selected by 47% of respondents. This marks

an increase compared to the 18% who listed it as their top concern in the previous dataset. Beyond military and financial help, several other forms of support gain prominence in the expanded data. Diplomatic support was cited by 12% of respondents—more than double its earlier first-mention share of 5%. Humanitarian support was chosen by 9%, highlighting concern for civilian well-being: shelter, food, medical assistance, and care for displaced populations. Meanwhile, 7% of respondents emphasized the need for more pressure on Russia. Beyond these dominant categories, a variety of subtler but important answers appear in the full-response dataset. Political assistance (4%), a stronger and clearer position on the war (4%), and peaceful settlement (4%) indicate continued interest in international messaging, legitimacy, and diplomacy. While less frequent, certain responses provide insights into post-war thinking and symbolic needs. “Support in rebuilding Ukraine after the war” (1%) and “security guarantees” (2%) appear modestly in the overall mentions. contemplating the long path to recovery and deterrence. Other answers like “moral support” (1%), “legal support” (1%), and “neutrality” (1%) round out the list.



## E. ELECTIONS/POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

This chapter examines the current political landscape across the studies countries by analyzing respondents' voting intentions in hypothetical parliamentary elections.

The question asked citizens in nine countries: *"Please imagine that parliamentary elections are happening next Sunday, which party or coalition would you vote for?"*

Each respondent was presented with a country-specific list of political parties and coalitions, allowing for an accurate reflection of their national political contexts.

The results can offer a valuable snapshot of contemporary political orientation and engagement at a time of shifting regional dynamics. Beyond simple party preference, the data provides insight into levels of political mobilization, the strength of electoral loyalty, and the scale of political disaffection. In addition to tracking support for specific parties or blocs, the chapter also highlights the proportion of respondents who express unwillingness to vote, who are undecided, or who prefer not to disclose their political leanings

By comparing results across countries, this chapter sheds light on broader patterns in political trust, ideological alignment, and voter fatigue.












*Table 10. Expressed Support for Parliamentary Parties, top five*

*Q30 Please imagine that parliamentary elections are happening next Sunday, which party or coalition would you vote for?*

*Respondents (N = 9.011). Each country sample includes N = 1.000, except Moldova (N = 1.011). Share of total %.*

*Excluded the I would not vote / Would abstain, I don't want to answer, Don't know, Other. TOP Five parties are named.*

Country	TOP 5 Parties	% who picked the party
 <b>Albania</b>	Partinë Socialiste	38
	Partinë Demokratike	22
	Partinë Mundësia	6
	Nismën Thurje / Lëvizjen Shqipëria Bëhet	5
	Levizjen Bashkë	2
 <b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	Stranka demokratske akcije Bakir Izetbegović	8
	Hrvatska demokratska zajednica BiH Dragan Čović	6
	Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata Milorad Dodik	5
	Partija demokratskog progressa Draško Stanivuković	4
	Narod i pravda Elmedin Konaković	4
 <b>Georgia</b>	Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia	20
	Coalition Unity – National Movement, Strategy Aghmashenebeli, European Georgia	5
	Coalition for Change – Akhali, Girchi, Droa	4
	Coalition Strong Georgia – Lelo, for People, for Liberty	4
	Gakharia for Georgia	2
 <b>Kosovo</b>	Lëvizja Vetëvendosje – LVV )	23
	Partia Demokratike e Kosovës – PDK	14
	Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës – LDK	12
	Lista Serbe/Srpska Lista	4
	Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës – AAK	3
 <b>Moldova</b>	Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) (Maia Sandu, Igor Grosu)	36
	« Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova » (Igor Dodon)	7
	Electoral bloc «Alternativa» (Ion Ceban, Ion Chicu, Alexandru Stoianoglo)	4
	« Our Party » (« Renato Usat?i »)	3
	« Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova » (Vladimir Voronin)	2
 <b>Montenegro</b>	Democratic Party of Socialists – Danijel Živković	16
	Europe Now Movement- Miloško Spajić	14
	New Serb Democracy- Andrija Mandić	7
	Bosniak Party – Ervin Ibrahimović	5
	Democratic Montenegro (Democrats) – Aleksa Bečić	5
 <b>North Macedonia</b>	VMRO-DPMNE	24
	SDSM	11
	DUI	7
	Levica	4
	VLEN	3
 <b>Serbia</b>	Lista koju predlažu "Studenti u blokadi" (Studentska lista)	26
	Srpska napredna stranka (SNS) (Aleksandar Vučić)	22
	„Biramo borbu" (BB), koalicija: Demokratska stranka (DS, Srđan Milivojević), Pokret slobodnih građana	2
	Socijalistička partija Srbije (SPS) (Ivica Dačić)	1
	Nacionalno demokratska alternativa (NADA), koalicija: Nova demokratska stranka Srbije (NDSS, Miloš Jovanović)	1
 <b>Ukraine</b>	Servant of the People political party (V. Zelensky, O. Shuly)	16
	Political party "European Solidarity" (P. Poroshenko)	8
	Valeriy Zaluzhny's Party	4
	Political party "All-Ukrainian Union 'Fatherland'" (Y. Tymosh)	2
	Political party "All-Ukrainian Union 'Svoboda'" (O. Tyagnibo)	1

In Albania, the Partinë Socialiste continues to assert electoral primacy, attracting 38.3% of respondents—demonstrating its sustained influence in the political landscape. The opposition Partinë Demokratike trails with 22.0%, reflecting the enduring two-party competition that characterizes Albanian politics. Third and fourth-ranked options, Partinë Mundësia (5.6%) and Nismën Thurje / Lëvizjen Shqipëria Bëhet (4.6%), show limited but noteworthy support, potentially pointing to emergent reformist or civic-oriented alternatives. Lëvizjen Bashkë, with 1.9%, rounds out the top five.

The electoral landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains ethnically segmented. The Stranka demokratske akcije – Bakir Izetbegović leads with 7.6%, followed closely by the Hrvatska demokratska zajednica BiH – Dragan Čović (5.9%) and Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata – Milorad Dodik (5.0%), each with strong roots in specific ethnic communities (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb, respectively). Other contenders like the Partija demokratskog progresa – Draško Stanivuković (4.2%) and Narod i pravda – Elmedin Konaković (3.6%) capture more modest shares.

Georgia's political scene is dominated by two principal forces. The ruling Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia commands 19.8% support, while the opposition Coalition Unity – National Movement, Strategy Aghmashenebeli, Girchi – More Freedom follows with 5.4%. These are complemented by options such as the Coalition for Change – Akhali, Girchi, Droa (4.3%), Coalition Strong Georgia – Lelo, For People, For Justice (3.6%), and Gakharia for Georgia (1.6%).

In Kosovo, Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV) enjoys a dominant lead with 22.9%—the highest percentage for any single party in the country's dataset. The Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (PDK) follows with 13.6%, and Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK) is close behind at 11.7%. These figures reinforce the LVV's ascendancy, underpinned by its anti-establishment and reformist appeal. Lista Serbe/Srpska Lista (4.4%) and Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës (AAK) (2.5%) maintain niche but crucial bases.

In Moldova, the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) maintains a solid lead with 35.6% support. The Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) trails at 7.3%. The newly formed Electoral bloc “Alternativa” captures 4.1%, while Our Party (“Partidul Nostru”) receives 2.9%. Also notable is the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova, securing 2.3%.

In Montenegro, the political landscape remains fragmented, with no single party commanding broad public support. The Democratic Party of Socialists – Danijel Živković leads with 15.5%, indicating a weakening of the formerly dominant force, yet still maintaining a slight edge. The Europe Now Movement – Milojko Spajić follows closely at 13.5%. Support for the New Serb Democracy – Andrija Mandić stands at 6.5%, while the Bosniak Party – Ervin Ibrahimović secures 5.3%. Democratic Montenegro (Democrats) – Aleksa Bečić rounds out the top five with 5.0%.

In North Macedonia, the political field is clearly dominated by VMRO-DPMNE, which leads with 23.8% of respondent support—more than double that of its main rival. The governing SDSM trails at 10.5%. Among ethnic Albanian voters, DUI maintains a solid presence with 7.1%, while the VLEN coalition follows with 3.3%. Meanwhile, Levica, captures 3.8%

In Serbia, the most notable finding is the surprising lead of the "Studenti u blokadi" (Studentska lista), which garners 25.5% support—surpassing even the long-dominant Srpska napredna stranka (SNS) of Aleksandar Vučić, which records 22.2%. Traditional opposition forces remain marginal, as seen in the "Biram borbu" (BB) coalition, led by the Demokratska stranka (DS) and Pokret slobodnih građana, receiving just 1.8%. Similarly, established parties like the Socijalistička partija Srbije (SPS) and the right-wing Nacionalno demokratska alternativa (NADA) both register only 1.2%.

In Ukraine, electoral preferences are led by the Servant of the People political party (V. Zelensky, O. Shuly), which commands 16,1% support. The European Solidarity



party follows with 7,9%. Notably, Valeriy Zaluzhny's party attracts 3,6%. Support for older political fixtures like “Fatherland” (Yulia Tymoshenko) and “Svoboda” (Oleh Tyahnybok) stands at 1,7% and 1% respectively.

## NATIONAL OVERVIEW

### ALBANIA

#### Information - Albania

Albania stands out for its heavy reliance on television as the primary source of political information. National TV is cited as the first source by roughly 64% of Albanian respondents, by far the highest proportion among the surveyed countries.

This TV dominance is further demonstrated when all responses are considered, with 74% of all surveyed Albanians claiming to use TV for political information. Internet-based media play a secondary yet important role: around one-third of Albanians use online news portals, and social media platforms are also common for political updates (43%). In contrast, traditional print newspapers and radio have only marginal reach for political content in Albania, mentioned by very few respondents.

The Albanian news sphere is notably monolingual. Virtually the entire sample consumes news in the Albanian language (99%), reflecting the linguistic homogeneity of the audience. Only a small segment uses a second language for news, for example, a modest share of the public follows some news in English (28%).

In terms of trust, Albanians tend to coalesce around a handful of major outlets. Two

national TV channels, Top Channel (26%) and TV Klan (23%) stand out in this regard. Correspondingly, Albania has one of the lowest levels of media distrust recorded: only about 17% of Albanians say that no information source is trustworthy for political news, a smaller fraction than in other surveyed countries.

Public satisfaction in Albania regarding the country's overall direction is relatively higher than in most of the studied countries. Albanians are generally more optimistic or less dissatisfied compared to their counterparts elsewhere in Southeast Europe. The average satisfaction score in Albania is around 2.8 on a five-point scale, the highest mean in the survey (tied with Moldova), indicating that, while discontent prevails, it is not as deep as in other countries. In practice, only about 28% of Albanians describe themselves as satisfied (mostly or completely) with how things are going in their country. This is the second-highest such share among the surveyed nations and well above the roughly one-fifth or less observed in many neighbors. Meanwhile, a majority in Albania still express some degree of dissatisfaction, but the intensity of pessimism is muted. Notably, just 13% of Albanians say they are "completely dissatisfied".

### Economy/Migration - Albania

One area of concern reflected in the data is the pressure to emigrate. A segment of Albania's population is considering life abroad in the near future. Approximately 19% of Albanian respondents report that they are actively planning or seriously contemplating moving to another country within the next two years. The motivations behind this prospective out-migration are primarily economic (76% of Albanian respondents stating this as a primary motive). Conversely, the survey also probed what might convince those eyeing emigration to remain in their home country. Albanian respondents were clear that economic change at home would be the strongest incentive to stay. Improved job opportunities and higher salaries top the list by a wide margin: when asked what would motivate them to stay, about 74% of Albanians considering emigration say that better employment prospects in Albania would keep them from leaving.

### EU and NATO - Albania

Albania exhibits a remarkable consensus in favor of Euro-Atlantic integration. Support for joining the European Union is nearly unanimous among the Albanian

public. Approximately 94% of respondents say they are in favor of Albania's EU membership, the highest level of pro-EU sentiment recorded in the entire survey (matched only by Kosovo). Opposition to EU accession is minimal (on the order of just 5% against), suggesting virtually no constituency arguing against the European path. This overwhelming enthusiasm underscores that EU integration is seen as a vital national goal across virtually all segments of Albanian society, backed by a broad political and social consensus. The depth of this consensus is further highlighted by the views of the very few who do oppose EU membership. Those Albanians who are skeptical of joining the EU tend to envision alternative alignments rather than isolation. When this small subgroup was asked about their preferred foreign orientation, a majority of them (around 58% of Albanian EU-skeptics) favored the idea of closer cooperation with non-EU powers as an alternative. When asked about the greatest perceived threats 29% of Albanian respondents named Serbia as the primary threat to their national security, with Russia following at 20%.

Public commitment to the NATO alliance is equally robust in Albania. An overwhelming 99% of Albanian respondents express support for their country being

part of NATO. This is the highest pro-NATO result among all nine countries surveyed. Additionally, when asked to name desired partnerships for national security (besides NATO), 77% of Albanian respondents named EU and its members, followed by 69% who chose United States.

### External Actors - Albania

The high level of Albanians' Western alignment is further evident in their attitudes on current international issues. Albanians express the greatest concern of any surveyed public about the general security environment in Europe. When asked if they fear another war could erupt on the continent, a majority of Albanians agree. Over 50% of respondents in Albania said they *agree* to some extent that a new war in Europe is a real possibility – with about 46% “tending to agree” and an additional 8% “completely” agreeing. This combined level of concern (roughly half the population) is the highest among all nine countries, suggesting that Albanians are particularly mindful of the fragility of peace in light of ongoing conflicts. Furthermore, those Albanians who do fear a wider war tend to believe their own country could become involved. Among the respondents who anticipate a new

European war, an overwhelming share – about 70% of them – think that Albania might be drawn into such a conflict. Most express this in moderate terms (“tend to agree” rather than an absolute certainty), indicating concern without fatalism. Regarding the war in Ukraine, a strong majority (57%) of Albanian respondents believe their country should support diplomatic efforts to end the war as soon as possible. This is the most widely supported position in Albania – higher than in any other surveyed country – highlighting a public desire for a peaceful resolution consistent with international law and stability. At the same time, Albanians are not indifferent to the principles at stake: a notable 25% say Albania should support Ukraine until it achieves victory, one of the higher pro-Ukraine stances in the region. Virtually none of the Albanian respondents advocate siding with Russia in that conflict.

Finally, Albanian opinions on global power shifts and dependencies also reinforce the pro-Western tilt. An interesting insight is that Albanians are highly attuned to the idea of emerging powers on the world stage. Three-quarters of the Albanian public (about 76%) agree that “middle power” countries – such as Turkey, Iran, or the Gulf

states – are becoming new leaders outside the traditional Western-led order. This is an exceptionally high level of agreement (the highest in the survey), suggesting Albanians recognize a multipolar trend in global affairs. However, recognizing this trend does not diminish their Western alignment. When it comes to economic security and partnerships, few Albanians wish to distance themselves from the West. For instance, only about 23% of respondents in Albania think the country should reduce its economic dependence on the European Union.

#### Political Orientation - Albania

The survey's snapshot of Albania's domestic political orientation confirms the predominance of the two traditional parties and only limited inroads by smaller alternatives. If parliamentary elections were held immediately, the Partia Socialiste would retain its position as the strongest political force (receiving 38% of the votes). The main center-right opposition, the Partia Demokratike, is the second choice with about 22% of respondents. Several smaller parties and movements do register in the poll, though none approaches the dominance of the top two. The largest among the minor groups is Partia Mundësia, a newer political entrant which garners roughly 5–



6% support. Following closely is an electoral list combining two initiatives – Nisma Thurje and Lëvizja “Shqipëria Bëhet”, which together attract about 4.5% of respondents. Another recently formed movement, Lëvizja Bashkë, is farther behind, with under 2% support.

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

### Information - Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina exhibits a more diversified media landscape for political information compared to many of its neighbors. Television remains a relevant news source but not to the dominant extent seen elsewhere: roughly 31% of Bosnian respondents say they use national TV for political news, a relatively low share. Instead, online media play a leading role. Nearly half of Bosnians (about 48%) report using internet news portals – one of the highest such rates in the survey – suggesting that digital outlets fill much of the information space. Social media is also an important medium, used by around 36% of the public for political updates (even this lowest figure among the countries still represents over one-third of respondents).

Traditional print newspapers and radio are largely marginal in reach. One small exception is local radio, which about 12% of Bosnians use – a higher-than-average figure but still only a minor portion of the population. Notably, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a segment of citizens disengaged from news altogether: roughly 12% of respondents described themselves as not informed about political developments, the highest such share recorded and indicative of a group that is tuning out of politics entirely.

The country's news sphere is strikingly multilingual. While a majority of people consume news in the Bosnian language (around 84%), nearly as many also use Serbian (approximately 76%), and a large portion reads or watches news in Croatian (about 69%). This reflects Bosnia's multiethnic makeup and means that many individuals follow political information in two or even all three of the major local languages. In fact, Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out as the most linguistically pluralistic media environment among the surveyed countries. A notable minority (around 16%) also accesses news in English, a figure higher than in most other countries except a few. When it comes to trust in media, Bosnia and Herzegovina

faces a pronounced credibility gap. Almost half of respondents (roughly 45%) could not name any source they consider trustworthy for political news, by far one of the highest levels of media distrust recorded (comparable only to Montenegro).

Public satisfaction with the country's overall direction is among the lowest among the studied countries. Bosnians were asked to rate how things are going in their country, and the average response was around 2.4 on a 1-to-5 scale, tied with Ukraine as the most negative mean score of all nine countries surveyed. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, pessimism is widespread: only about 16% of people describe themselves as mostly or completely satisfied with the way things are going, a very small minority (by comparison, even the next "least satisfied" countries have slightly higher shares). This indicates that positive sentiment is extremely rare. At the other end, a strong majority express discontent. Roughly 59% of Bosnian respondents say they are mostly or completely dissatisfied with the country's direction – the highest level of overall dissatisfaction in the survey. In no other surveyed nation does the proportion of unhappy citizens reach this level. Furthermore, Bosnia has a notably large share of people who take the most extreme negative stance: nearly one-third

“completely disagree” that things are going well in the country, reflecting a hardened core of deeply frustrated citizens.

### Economy/Migration – Bosnia and Herzegovina

Approximately one in six people (around 16–17% of respondents) report that they are actively planning or seriously considering moving to another country within the next two years. Though a majority (roughly 78%) say they intend to stay. The primary driver behind these migration plans is economic opportunity, as in most surveyed countries, people cite lack of jobs, low incomes, and difficult economic conditions at home as the main push factors. Bosnians, however, also uniquely emphasize political and governance issues in their reasons for wanting to leave. A considerable share (about 32%) of those considering emigration mention political instability in the country as a key reason, the highest incidence of this reason recorded in the region. Likewise, more than a quarter (around 27%) cite a lack of respect for their rights and a similar proportion point to corruption (24%) as motivators for. On a more hopeful note, the survey also asked those inclined to emigrate what changes might convince them to remain in Bosnia. The answers overwhelmingly point to improvements at

home, especially economic improvements. Better employment opportunities and higher salaries are by far the most powerful incentive to stay: over half of Bosnians who are weighing emigration (and likely much more when considering all responses) said that having good jobs and pay in Bosnia would persuade them not to leave. In addition, a number of respondents indicated that improvements in governance and public services would make a difference. For instance, around 36% said a reduction in corruption in Bosnia would encourage them to stay, one of the highest responses for that option.

### EU and NATO - Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina maintains a solid but not overwhelming majority in favor of European Union integration. When asked about EU membership, about 72% of Bosnian respondents said they would support joining the EU. This is a clear majority, yet it is a notably more tempered level of enthusiasm than in some neighboring states where support runs in the 90-percent range. Bosnia also has a sizable minority opposed to the EU path: roughly 21% of the public say they are against Bosnia's EU membership, a higher degree of opposition than seen in most other surveyed

countries (outside of Serbia). Among the Bosnians who do oppose joining the EU, the survey probed what alternative they envision for the country's foreign orientation. The responses show these EU-skeptics in Bosnia are divided between two main ideas: a slight majority of them (around 45%) would prefer Bosnia and Herzegovina to adopt a neutral stance internationally – neither aligned with the EU nor any rival bloc, while about 42% favor pursuing closer cooperation with non-EU powers as an alternative.

Public opinion on NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina is similarly split and ambivalent. Just over half of Bosnians (approximately 54%) say they support their country being a member of NATO, while a substantial 39% are against NATO membership. This nearly even division contrasts sharply with the consensus in some other countries (for example, NATO membership is almost unanimously supported in Albania). In the survey, citizens were also asked, aside from NATO itself, which partners Bosnia and Herzegovina should cooperate with more on national security. The responses here were diverse, more so than in countries with a clear geopolitical orientation. A portion of Bosnians (about 63%) favor strengthening security cooperation with

regional neighbors, the highest support for a regional approach among all countries polled. This suggests that many Bosnians put faith in fostering stability through better relations and partnerships within the immediate Western Balkans region. Additionally, Bosnia is unique in the high importance it places on international organizations: one-third of respondents (around 33%) mentioned international institutions (such as the OSCE, or similar) as key security partners. Western great powers are also in the mix, but not dominant: roughly one-quarter of Bosnians would like deeper security engagement with the United States, and a similar proportion (in separate responses) mention closer ties with the European Union and its member states. At the same time, a considerable minority of the public looks towards powers like Russia and Turkey. About 25% of Bosnian respondents still consider Russia a desirable security partner for their country, a noteworthy segment, though it coexists with the majority that is pro-EU and the half that is pro-NATO. Turkey, which has historical and cultural connections with Bosnia, is cited by roughly 21% of respondents as a preferred security partner.

## External Actors – Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnians' views on broader international issues and global powers reveal a cautious and sometimes divided perspective. Compared to several other nations in Southeast Europe, people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are generally less fearful that war will spread across the continent. When asked if they worry that a new large-scale conflict could break out in Europe, Bosnian respondents were among the most skeptical of this notion. Only around 29% of Bosnians tend to agree or completely agree that another war in Europe is a real possibility in the near future – a considerably lower level of concern than, for example, in Albania, where over half see such a risk. In fact, Bosnia has one of the highest rates of people who flatly reject the idea of a new European war: roughly 30% of Bosnian respondents said they “completely disagree” that war is on the horizon, indicating a sizable group that is relatively confident peace will hold. Among the subset of respondents who envision another European war, a large majority believe Bosnia and Herzegovina could be drawn into the conflict. About 57% of these war-concerned Bosnians “tend to agree” that Bosnia might



become involved and a further 19% “completely agree” – summing to roughly three-quarters of that group.

Regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s public opinion favors a diplomatic and neutral approach over overt alignment with either side. The plurality of Bosnian respondents (42%) believe that Bosnia’s stance should be to support international diplomatic efforts to end the war as soon as possible. By contrast, very few Bosnians support taking an active pro-Ukraine stance that extends “until Ukraine wins the war” – only around 7% of respondents advocate that Bosnia should back Ukraine to victory, one of the lowest levels of pro-Ukraine endorsement in the studied region. Notably, Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the only places where the share of people favoring a pro-Russia position slightly exceeds those favoring the pro-Ukraine side. Approximately 8% of Bosnians say their country should support Russia until it wins.

When it comes to economic orientations, Bosnia shows a mix of leanings. A minority of Bosnians are skeptical of deepening economic integration with the West: about

38% of respondents think Bosnia should reduce its economic dependence on the European Union. While a majority (around 59%) disagree. Likewise, Bosnians are split almost evenly on economic ties with Turkey: 47% support cutting down dependence on Turkey, while 46% oppose doing so.

### Political Orientation - Bosnia and Herzegovina

The internal political landscape of Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly fragmented and continues to follow ethnic lines, with no single party commanding broad support nationwide. When asked how they would vote if parliamentary elections were held immediately, respondents' preferences were split among numerous parties, each largely drawing backing from one of the country's constituent communities. The leading party in the survey – the conservative Bosniak-based Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA, led by Bakir Izetbegović) – is supported by only about 7.6% of respondents overall. Close behind, at 5.9%, is the main Croat party Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica BiH (HDZ-BiH, led by Dragan Čović). The primary Serb party in government, Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata (SNSD, led by Milorad Dodik), garners roughly 5.0%. These three parties top the poll, each essentially reflecting the

largest political force within their respective ethnic constituency (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb). Other parties register smaller yet notable levels of support: for instance, the Serb opposition party Partija Demokratskog Progresa (PDP, associated with Draško Stanivuković) is chosen by about 4.2% of respondents, and a newer Bosniak-centric party Narod i Pravda (NiP, led by Elmedin Konaković) has around 3.6%. It is important to note that these percentages exclude undecided voters and those who refused to answer.

## KOSOVO

### Information - Kosovo

Kosovo's media landscape blends traditional and digital channels for political information. National television remains widely used, a little over half of Kosovars say they get political news from domestic TV (56%), but social media platforms have a comparable reach (around 58% of respondents use social media for news). In contrast, print newspapers and radio attract only minimal audiences for political content, mentioned by a very small fraction of respondents.

News consumption in Kosovo is predominantly in the Albanian language (about 94% of the public uses Albanian-language news). Reflecting Kosovo's multiethnic context, a small share of respondents (roughly 7%) also consume news in Serbian, and an unusually large segment follows some news in English (around 28%). In terms of trusted media, a major national broadcaster leads: 26% of Kosovars name the public TV channel RTK as their most trustworthy source for political news. General media trust is mixed, about one in five Kosovars (21%) say that no information source is trustworthy for political news, indicating a moderate level of media skepticism (though this distrust is less pronounced than in other countries, except Albania).

Public sentiment in Kosovo regarding the country's overall direction is negative, though not as extreme as in the most discontented states of the region. The average satisfaction score in Kosovo is around 2.6 on a five-point scale, reflecting a clear lean toward dissatisfaction. In practice, only roughly one-fifth of Kosovars describe themselves as mostly or completely satisfied with how things are going in the country, while close to half express some degree of dissatisfaction. Nowhere do the

satisfied outnumber the dissatisfied, confirming a prevailing pessimism about national conditions.

### Economy and Migration - Kosovo

One area of concern reflected in the data is the pressure to emigrate. A portion of Kosovo's population is considering life abroad in the near future. Approximately 21% of Kosovar respondents report that they are actively planning or seriously contemplating moving to another country within the next two years. The motivations behind this prospective migration are primarily economic, about 85% of those in Kosovo who intend to emigrate cite economic factors (such as jobs and income) among their main reasons. Conversely, the survey also explored what might convince those eyeing emigration to remain in their home country. Improved opportunities at home clearly emerge as the key: 87% of Kosovars considering emigration say that better job prospects and higher pay in Kosovo would persuade them to stay rather than leave.

## EU and NATO – Kosovo

Kosovo exhibits an almost unanimous public consensus in favor of Euro-Atlantic integration. Support for joining the European Union is exceedingly high among the Kosovar public. Approximately 94% of respondents say they are in favor of Kosovo's EU membership, a level of pro-EU sentiment matched only by Albania and the highest recorded in the survey. Opposition to EU accession is negligible (on the order of just 5% against), underscoring that there is virtually no large domestic constituency arguing against the European path. This overwhelming enthusiasm indicates a broad national commitment to EU integration across practically all segments of society.

Public commitment to the NATO alliance is similarly robust in Kosovo. An overwhelming 93% of Kosovar respondents express support for their country being part of NATO, reflecting a deep trust in transatlantic security ties. Additionally, when asked to name preferred security partners other than NATO, Kosovars overwhelmingly point to Western allies. About 77% of respondents name the EU and its member states as partners Kosovo should engage with for national security, and

an even larger share, roughly 89%, choose the United States. In terms of perceived threats, Kosovo's citizens focus on their immediate region. When asked to identify the greatest threat to their national security, an overwhelming majority of Kosovars (around 75%) name Serbia as the primary threat. By contrast, very few in Kosovo see other global powers as direct dangers to their nation's security, for example, almost no respondents consider Russia a major threat in this context.

### External Actors - Kosovo

A considerable segment of Kosovo's population is uneasy about the broader European security environment. Over one-third of Kosovars (roughly 37% in total) agree to some extent that another war could break out on the European continent in the foreseeable future. This concern, while relevant, is somewhat less widespread in Kosovo than in the most apprehensive countries of the region. Moreover, those in Kosovo who do anticipate a new conflict largely believe their own country could be drawn in: among respondents who fear a war in Europe, about 85% think that Kosovo itself might become involved in such a conflict. Most express this possibility

in cautious terms (“tend to agree” rather than absolute certainty), indicating concern about regional instability without a sense of fatalism.

Regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine, public opinion in Kosovo leans strongly toward a peaceful and lawful resolution. Nearly half of Kosovars (47%) say their country should support diplomatic efforts to end the war as soon as possible, making this the most widely favored position. At the same time, a substantial minority (around 26%) believe Kosovo should stand behind Ukraine until it achieves victory – one of the higher pro-Ukraine stances among the surveyed nations. By contrast, virtually none of the Kosovar respondents advocate siding with Russia in that conflict: only about 4% express the view that Kosovo should support Russia until it wins. This highlights an almost complete absence of public sympathy for the Russian side of the war.

Kosovars are relatively unconvinced about the rise of alternative global powers, and they remain firmly oriented toward the West. Opinions are divided on whether new “middle power” countries (such as Turkey, Iran, or the Gulf states) are emerging as



major world leaders – roughly one-third of Kosovars agree with that notion, while a similar share disagree, indicating no clear consensus. Crucially, this ambivalence about a changing world order has not translated into any desire to distance Kosovo from Western institutions. Few people in Kosovo favor loosening ties with the West: for instance, only 28% of respondents think their country should reduce its economic dependence on the European Union, whereas a strong majority oppose any reduction of EU ties. In general, Kosovars continue to support close integration with the EU and other Western partners, even as they acknowledge the growing influence of new actors on the global stage.

### Political Orientation – Kosovo

The survey's snapshot of Kosovo's domestic political orientation confirms the predominance of the ruling movement and a fragmented array of smaller parties. If parliamentary elections were held immediately, the reformist Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV) would remain the strongest political force, attracting roughly 23% of the vote – the highest single-party share recorded in the Kosovo sample. The traditional opposition parties follow at a distance. The center-right Partia Demokratike e

Kosovës (PDK) is the second choice with around 14% support, and the center-left Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK) is close behind at roughly 12%. Several smaller parties and minority representatives register only modest support. The largest among these minor groups is the Serb community's Lista Srpska (Serb List), which garners about 4% of respondents. The Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës (AAK) holds a smaller niche at roughly 2–3%. No other party or list approaches double digits in support.

## MONTENEGRO

### Information - Montenegro

Around half of Montenegrin respondents (51%) say they use online news portals for political information. Social media are also widely used, with 45% of Montenegrins reporting they get political news via platforms like Facebook, Instagram or Twitter. By contrast, other media forms retain a more modest audience with interesting exceptions such as 12% of the audience for traditional print media which is not the

case in other countries where this number usually falls below 5% (except Serbia with 11% getting information from print media).

The Montenegrin news sphere is distinctly bilingual. The population consumes news in both Montenegrin and Serbian to a large degree, reflecting the country's dual linguistic environment. Two-thirds of respondents (67%) report using the Montenegrin language for news, while nearly half (49%) also use Serbian. Other languages play a much smaller role, for example, English-language news content is consumed by about 7–8% of the public. In terms of media credibility, Montenegro shows a high level of skepticism. Nearly half the population has no trust in any political news source: about 43% of Montenegrin respondents answered “none” when asked to name a trustworthy information source. This is one of the highest media distrust levels recorded (comparable only to Bosnia and substantially above Albania's low 17% “none” rate). In other words, almost one in two Montenegrins cannot point to any media outlet they fully trust for political news.

Public satisfaction in Montenegro with the country's overall direction is low, albeit not as extreme as in the most disaffected nations of the region. On a five-point scale, Montenegrins' average satisfaction score is approximately 2.6, a middling value that indicates more negative than positive sentiment. About 39% of Montenegrin respondents describe themselves as mostly or completely dissatisfied with the national trajectory.

### Economy/Migration – Montenegro

Montenegrins also express a noteworthy stance while considering emigration. A share of the population is contemplating life abroad in the near future. Fully 26% of Montenegrin respondents say they are either actively making plans or seriously considering moving to another country within the next two years. This is one of the highest migration intention rates observed in the survey (comparable to North Macedonia's 28%). It implies that more than a quarter of Montenegro's people are seriously weighing emigration. Only about 64% flatly state they have no interest in leaving. The primary driver behind this prospective exodus is economic opportunity, as is the case across the studied countries. When asked the reasons for considering

emigration, the vast majority point to economic reasons (49%). Survey also asked those contemplating departure what changes might convince them to stay in Montenegro. The answers underscore that improvements at home, especially economic improvements, are key. The single most potent incentive to remain is better job opportunities and higher pay in Montenegro – an “offer” that resonates with a large majority. In fact, 64% of respondents (overall) who were inclined to migrate said that improved employment prospects would motivate them to stay. Improvements in public services also factor into retention. For example, 21% of Montenegrins with migration plans say that better healthcare in the country would encourage them to remain. Likewise, 32% cite improved educational opportunities (such as better schools or universities at home) as a motivation to stay. A big portion of respondents (25%) also said that less corruption would motivate their stay.

### EU and NATO - Montenegro

Montenegro exhibits a broad consensus in favor of European integration, with 74% respondents claiming they want Montenegro to join the EU. Correspondingly, only a small minority (roughly on the order of 10% of Montenegrins) express outright

opposition to EU membership. Among the few Montenegrins who do oppose joining the EU, there is no single alternative foreign policy vision that unites them. When EU-skeptical respondents were asked if the country has an alternative to EU integration, the two options that garnered most support were those favoring neutrality (39%) and those who simply stated they "don't know" (24%).

On the question of NATO, Montenegrin opinion is more divided. Montenegro is already a NATO member (having joined the Alliance in 2017), but public enthusiasm for NATO is more muted than for the EU. According to the survey, 52% of Montenegrins say they are in favor of the country's NATO membership. This just-above-half level indicates a basic majority endorsement, yet it is a much softer level of support compared to the near-unanimous NATO approval seen in Albania (99%) or the very high support in Kosovo (93%). Meanwhile, a considerable segment in Montenegro remains opposed to NATO: 33% of respondents oppose Montenegro being in the Alliance, and roughly 15% are undecided or declined to state a position. This makes Montenegro one of the more ambivalent NATO countries in the region – support outweighs opposition, but not by a wide margin. (For comparison, North

Macedonia shows 74% support vs 16% opposed, a far more one-sided consensus than Montenegro's split).

When considering security partnerships beyond NATO, Montenegrins tend to favor a Western alignment, albeit with some nuanced splits in preference. The European Union (and its member states) is clearly viewed as a desirable security partner for many. Across the region, about 50% of respondents name the EU as the partner their country should work more with (aside from NATO). The United States, another key Western ally, is also considered, but notably fewer Montenegrins emphasize the U.S. in this role. Only around 11% of Montenegrin respondents mention the United States as a partner Montenegro should engage more with on security matters. On the other hand, Russia retains a foothold in public opinion as an imagined security partner. Despite Montenegro's Western integrations, 17% of Montenegrins still say that Russia is a country with which Montenegro should cooperate more on national security. Additionally, a segment of citizens prefers no alliance at all: about 13% of Montenegrins would opt for a stance of neutrality/non-alignment in security affairs (wanting Montenegro to rely on *neither* East nor West).

## External Actors – Montenegro

When asked about the possibility of a new large-scale war breaking out on the European continent, Montenegrins were relatively split. A portion of the public agrees that such a war could happen, with 9% completely agreeing and 26% who tend to agree. Crucially, among those Montenegrins who do fear a new pan-European war, a strong majority believe that Montenegro itself might be pulled into the fray. Follow-up data reveals that nearly three-quarters of Montenegrin respondents who foresee a European war also agree that their own country could be involved in such a conflict. Specifically, 47% “tend to agree” and another 26% “completely agree” that Montenegro may be drawn in, if a new war erupts in Europe.

Montenegrins’ views on shifting global power dynamics reveal a mix of agreement and skepticism. For instance, opinions on whether emerging “middle powers” (countries like Turkey, Iran, or the Gulf states) are becoming new leaders outside the traditional Western order are split in Montenegro. 45% of Montenegrins agree to some extent that these middle powers are rising as new centers of power, yet 38% disagree with that notion.



One area where Montenegro stands out is its continued alignment with the West in economic relations. The public shows little desire to distance Montenegro from Western economic partners. When asked if Montenegro should reduce its economic dependence on various global actors, most Montenegrins reject reducing ties with the European Union. Only 25% of Montenegrin respondents think the country should decrease its economic reliance on the EU, a very low proportion, comparable to Albania's 23%.

Finally, Montenegrins' perceptions of threats to national security illustrate a blend of external and regional concerns. In an open-ended question asking who is the greatest threat to Montenegro's security, no single country looms overwhelmingly (unlike in Kosovo or Albania, where Serbia tops the list by a large margin). Russia is one of the more commonly cited threats for Montenegrins, about 13% name Russia as the greatest threat to Montenegro's national security.

### Political Orientation – Montenegro

The survey's snapshot of Montenegro's domestic political orientation reveals a highly fragmented party landscape, with no single party enjoying dominant support.

If parliamentary elections were hypothetically held at the time of the survey, results would likely be dispersed among several mid-sized parties. The once-hegemonic Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) – now led by Danijel Živković – is still in first place, but only barely. DPS polls at approximately 15.5% support. Right on its heels is the emergent “Europe Now” Movement (Pokret Evropa Sad) founded by Milojko Spajić, with about 13.5% support. Beyond these two leading parties, the field fragments into smaller factions mostly in the single digits. The largest of the rest is the New Serb Democracy (Nova srpska demokratija, a pro-Serb party led by Andrija Mandić), which garners around 6.5% support. Following closely is the ethnic minority-focused Bosniak Party (Stranka bošnjaka, led by Ervin Ibrahimović) at 5.3%. And rounding out the top five is Democratic Montenegro – commonly known as the *Democrats*, a party under Aleksa Bečić – with roughly 5.0% of the vote.

## NORTH MACEDONIA

### Information – North Macedonia

North Macedonia’s media environment shows a mix of traditional and digital sources. National television remains one of the leading source of political

information. Roughly 58% of North Macedonian respondents cite national TV as their first source for political news. Online media play an important role as well: many citizens turn to internet portals and especially social media for political updates. About 57% of North Macedonia's public uses social media platforms to get news on politics. Interestingly, word-of-mouth is a frequently cited source among North Macedonian respondents, (25%) say they discuss politics with friends or family as an information source.

North Macedonia's news sphere is notably multilingual. Virtually all respondents follow news in the Macedonian language (the primary state language) – on the order of 95% usage – but a substantial segment also consumes news in other languages. In particular, 42% of North Macedonians report that they get news in Serbian, reflecting historical and cultural ties that make Serbian a common secondary language. A notable minority also access some news in English: about 23% of respondents say they use English-language sources. In terms of media trust, the public coalesces around a few major outlets. One national TV channel, Sitel, is identified as the single most trustworthy news source by 17% of respondents,

dominating the trust landscape in North Macedonia. At the same time, a considerable share of people express broad distrust in the media. Approximately one-quarter of North Macedonians could not name any news source they consider trustworthy, indicating a notable level of media skepticism (though this is still less fatal than the nearly 45% “no trust” rate seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Public satisfaction in North Macedonia regarding the country’s overall direction is a little higher than in most other surveyed states. On a five-point scale, the average satisfaction score is about 2.7 – one of the highest means in the region (close behind Albania and Moldova at 2.8). Like everywhere among examined countries, dissatisfied citizens far outnumber satisfied ones. No more than roughly a quarter of North Macedonia’s people describe themselves as even “mostly satisfied,” and virtually none are completely satisfied (similarly, only a small fraction – around 10% – in North Macedonia chose the most extreme “completely satisfied” option).

### Economy and Migration – North Macedonia

One area of concern is the strong pressure to emigrate. North Macedonia has one of the highest proportions of people contemplating life abroad. 7% of respondents

say they already have concrete plans or arrangements to move to another country in the next two years, and an additional 21% are considering emigration (though without firm plans). Together, this means 28% of North Macedonians are seriously thinking about leaving, the largest migration-intent share among all nine countries surveyed. Conversely, just under three-quarters are not planning to leave in the near term. The motivations behind this prospective exodus are overwhelmingly economic. When asked why they would move abroad, 73% of North Macedonian respondents who intend to emigrate include economic reasons – such as employment opportunities or better income – among their motives. This mirrors a near-universal pattern in the studied region, but North Macedonia's level is notably high. Other common factors also resonate. Over one-third (about 34%) of these respondents cite seeking a “better future for my children” as a reason to leave. Additionally, frustration with domestic corruption and nepotism looms large: 37% mention the lack of meritocracy (i.e. having to rely on connections to succeed) as a push factor for emigration, one of the highest rates recorded (only Bosnia and Herzegovina is slightly higher at 38%). On the flip side, the survey also asked those

considering emigration what might convince them to stay in their home country. North Macedonians were clear that improvements in the domestic economy would be the most decisive incentive to remain. Better job opportunities and higher salaries top the list by far, a dominant response across all countries (about 64% of respondents overall chose this option). In other words, the primary formula to stem emigration from North Macedonia is economic: if people see the prospect of good employment and income at home, many fewer would seek their future abroad. By contrast, other potential motivators lag behind. Issues like improved healthcare or support for young families are mentioned by some (for instance, roughly 23% cite better healthcare as a reason to stay), but these are far eclipsed by the paramount importance of jobs and wages.

### EU and NATO – North Macedonia

North Macedonia exhibits strong public consensus in favor of Euro-Atlantic integration, albeit not quite as uniformly as in Albania or Kosovo. Support for joining the European Union is high, with 76% of North Macedonian respondents saying they are in favor of EU membership. This three-quarters majority firmly underscores the

country's pro-EU orientation. While backing is robust, it is a bit less unanimous than the 94% seen in Albania, suggesting North Macedonia has a small but noticeable skeptical minority. Indeed, the data indicate that a slightly larger share of North Macedonia's public expresses either opposition or ambivalence toward EU accession compared to the near-total consensus in Albania. Those North Macedonians who do oppose EU membership (15%) were asked about their preferred alternative path. The clear answer was neutrality. Among EU-skeptic respondents in North Macedonia, 54% favor the idea that the country should pursue a neutral, non-aligned foreign policy instead of joining the

Public commitment to the NATO alliance is similarly positive. North Macedonia is already a NATO member, and 74% of respondents express support for the country's NATO membership. Only 16% oppose being part of NATO, with the remaining 10% or so undecided or not responding. About 62% of North Macedonians name the EU or its members as a desired security partner aside from NATO. This high figure suggests that the EU is seen not just as an economic benefactor but as a key security ally as well. The United States is the next most popular choice: 37% of respondents

mention the U.S. as a partner of choice for national security. Additionally, North Macedonia stands out in its support for regional cooperation. 42% of respondents favor partnering with neighboring countries and regional initiatives for security. – a notable share that reflects an interest in Balkan regional alliances or collaboration. Other actors are mentioned much less often. For instance, Turkey is named by about 14% of North Macedonians as a security partner, while China is cited by roughly 10%.

### External Actors – North Macedonia

The attitudes of North Macedonians toward international security and external powers are measured, with concerns focused more on regional disputes than on global superpowers. When asked if they fear another war in Europe, 44% of North Macedonia's respondents at least "tend to agree" that a new war could break out in Europe (including those who "completely agree"). This level of concern is roughly in line with the survey's overall average, indicating that nearly half of the populace acknowledges the possibility of wider conflict, but it falls below the majority alarm recorded in Albania (over 53% there). Notably, North Macedonia also has a large segment of respondents who struggle to pinpoint specific threats to their own



national security. In an open-ended question about the greatest threat to North Macedonia's security, the most common reaction was uncertainty, fully 39% of respondents answered "Don't know," the highest such rate in any surveyed country. Among those who did name a threat, the pattern is striking: the top perceived threat is not a global power like Russia or the U.S., but a neighboring country. 24% of North Macedonians identified Bulgaria as the greatest threat to their national security. By contrast, Russia is rarely seen as an existential threat in North Macedonia, only 2% of respondents name Russia as their country's chief threat.

Despite some ambivalence and divided threat perceptions, North Macedonia's overall geopolitical orientation remains Western-leaning. The public does not show appetite for distancing the country from Euro-Atlantic structures. For example, few citizens favor loosening ties with the European Union in the economic realm. Only 29% of North Macedonians agree that their country should reduce its economic dependence on the EU, whereas roughly 61% oppose reducing reliance on European markets and investors.

## Political Orientation – North Macedonia

The survey's snapshot of North Macedonia's domestic political orientation shows a landscape dominated by the two traditional rival parties, with only limited space for smaller alternatives. If parliamentary elections were held today, the VMRO-DPMNE would emerge as the strongest single party. 23.8% of respondents chose VMRO-DPMNE, putting it comfortably in first place. This level of support is more than double that of its main competitor, the center-left SDSM (Social Democratic Union, the lead party in the current government), which is backed by only 10.5% of respondents. The wide gap suggests an advantage for the opposition VMRO-DPMNE at the moment. North Macedonia's politics also reflect the country's ethnic demographics: among ethnic Albanian voters, the largest party is the DUI (Democratic Union for Integration). DUI secures about 7.1% of overall respondent support, a solid showing that makes it the third-largest political force nationally. Another Albanian political alliance – listed as the *VLEN* coalition in the survey – has a smaller but notable following of 3.3%. Meanwhile, the recently ascendant left-wing party Levica ("The

Left”) is polling at 3.8%, reflecting some appeal beyond the traditional parties but still a modest share.

## **SERBIA**

### **Information - Serbia**

Serbian citizens rely on a mix of information sources, with online media playing a leading role. Over half (51%) of respondents in Serbia use internet news portals as one of their sources for political developments. Social media platforms are similarly prevalent, used by 41% of Serbians to get political news. Television remains relevant (national TV is frequently cited, around 43%, though at lower levels than in some neighboring countries), and traditional channels like word-of-mouth (22%) and print newspapers (11%) still have a modest readership in Serbia.

Language-wise, Serbia is near-unanimously monolingual in its news consumption. Virtually all respondents (99%) get their news in the Serbian language. A noteworthy minority, about 21%, also use English-language news sources. When it comes to trust in media, television outlets dominate the landscape. One or two major TV channels are regarded as the most trustworthy sources, notably the public

broadcaster RTS1 and the private channel N1, each named by roughly 13% of Serbian respondents as their single most trusted news source. At the same time, a large share of the public expresses outright media distrust: roughly one-quarter of Serbians report having no source they consider trustworthy for political news (in Serbia this “none” response is on the order of 27% of respondents).

Public sentiment about the country's direction is predominantly negative. Serbia's average satisfaction rating is around 2.6 out of 5, part of a mid-low cluster of countries and below a neutral “3” score. Nearly half of Serbian respondents (approximately 47%) describe themselves as dissatisfied with how things are going nationally. By contrast, only a small minority express any degree of satisfaction, consistent with the trend that most countries have at most about 20% or fewer of citizens feeling satisfied. These figures underscore a prevailing pessimism about domestic conditions. Indeed, intense discontent is common: about 25% of Serbians say they are *completely* dissatisfied. Regarding the biggest challenges on the horizon, corruption stands out as the top concern. 37% of Serbian respondents name corruption among the biggest issues facing Serbia in the next five years.

## Economy and Migration - Serbia

Serbia exhibits relatively low levels of emigration intent, suggesting a more settled population than in some neighboring states. When asked about personal plans to move abroad, only **14%** of Serbian respondents indicate they are considering emigrating in the next two years (with about 4% actively making plans and another 10% “thinking about it” without concrete arrangements). This combined percentage of prospective leavers is among the lowest in the survey. By comparison, countries like Albania or Georgia showed nearly 17–19% considering emigration, highlighting Serbia’s more rooted outlook. Indeed, a full **85%** of Serbians say they have no intention to move abroad in the near term. Such a high stay-rate gives Serbia one of the strongest levels of perceived domestic stability across the region.

Among the minority who *are* contemplating leaving, economic motives dominate their reasoning. More than half of would-be emigrants across all countries cite economic factors (jobs, income) as their primary driver, and Serbia is no exception (62%). 23% of Serbians intending to move include corruption among their reasons – the second-highest rate after Bosnia and Herzegovina. 30% also state “a better

future for my children". On the flip side, the survey also asked these potential emigrants what might motivate them to stay in Serbia instead. Unsurprisingly, improvements in economic opportunities top the list. Better job opportunities (54%) are the most frequently cited motivators to remain in the country.

### EU and NATO - Serbia

Serbia is an outlier in its attitudes toward European integration, with the public split, and in fact leaning negative, on the question of EU membership. Across the nine countries surveyed, support for joining the European Union is generally high. Serbia is the clear exception. Only 40% of Serbian respondents say they are in favor of Serbia becoming an EU member. A larger share – 49%, explicitly oppose EU membership for Serbia, and the remaining 11% are undecided or declined to answer. This makes Serbia the only country in the survey where supporters of EU accession are a minority position.

For those Serbian respondents who *oppose* joining the EU, the survey probed what alternative foreign policy orientation they envision for the country. The most preferred alternative in Serbia is neutrality, not aligning with any major bloc. About

51% of Serbian EU-skeptics (those against EU membership) believe that Serbia has a viable alternative in maintaining neutrality internationally. In other words, a majority of Serbians who don't want the EU still do *not* advocate picking another alliance; instead, they favor non-alignment. The second option is pursuing partnerships outside the EU. Only 30% of anti-EU Serbians think the country should seek closer cooperation with non-EU powers as its alternative path.

If EU integration divides the Serbian public, NATO integration largely unites it, in opposition. Serbia shows the most intense opposition to NATO membership of any surveyed country. According to the data, a mere 9% of Serbian respondents are in favor of their country joining NATO. Conversely, an overwhelming 85% are opposed to Serbia joining NATO. (The remaining few percent are unsure or did not respond.)

### External Actors - Serbia

When asked openly which country represents the greatest threat to Serbia's national security, very few Serbian respondents pointed to the familiar adversaries cited elsewhere in Europe. Russia, for instance, is named by only about 3% of Serbians as the top national security threat. This is an extremely low figure (in Ukraine, by

contrast, 92% cite Russia as the primary threat amid the war). Instead, a portion of Serbians see threats emanating from the West. The United States is identified as the greatest threat by 12% of respondents in Serbia. This is one of the highest rates of U.S.-as-threat perception among surveyed countries (only in Bosnia is it comparable at 10%). Regional rivalries also figure into Serbian threat perceptions. Ongoing historical tensions mean some neighbors are seen as hostile. Notably, Albania is considered the top threat by 9% of Serbians. This reflects the fraught relations related to Kosovo and regional Albanian-Serb dynamics – indeed, many Albanians conversely view Serbia as a threat in their surveys. Additionally, Croatia is named by 6% of Serbian respondents as the greatest threat.

In line with these views, Serbia's preferences for security partnerships tilt away from Euro-Atlantic actors and toward alternative allies. The survey asked whom (besides NATO) Serbia should cooperate with more on national security. The results underscore Serbia's distinct strategic leanings. The European Union, which is the most frequently preferred partner across countries is relatively low in Serbian priorities. Only 21% of Serbian respondents include the EU or EU countries among



their preferred security partners (the lowest desired expression of partnership for the EU across examined countries). The United States is even less popular: just 8% of Serbians mention the U.S. as a partner for national security. Instead, Russia is the standout choice in Serbia. Fully 35% of Serbian respondents name Russia as a country Serbia should engage with more on security matters. This makes Russia the top single preferred partner for Serbians, surpassing any Western country. Another major component of Serbian strategy is a focus on the immediate region. A considerable 32% of Serbians favor greater regional cooperation, i.e. partnering with neighboring countries. Meanwhile, China emerges as an important prospective partner in Serbian eyes. 26% of Serbian respondents include China among preferred security partners.

On questions of foreign policy orientation and global conflicts, Serbian public opinion leans toward neutrality and pragmatism, consistent with earlier findings. Regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine, Serbians predominantly favor a neutral or mediating stance rather than taking sides. The most popular position (from a set of options presented) is for Serbia to support diplomatic efforts to end the war, 44% of

Serbian respondents believe Serbia should focus on diplomacy to help resolve the Ukraine conflict. The next most popular stance is for Serbia to remain neutral in the war, chosen by 38% of Serbians. 2% say Serbia should back Ukraine until it wins the war. Conversely, a non-negligible segment of 10%, believe Serbia should support Russia until it wins. That 10% pro-Russia stance is among the highest among the studied countries (Montenegro also 10%).

In line with this outlook, Serbians also reacted to the policies of international figures like former U.S. President Donald Trump. The survey asked whether people agree with Trump's approach to the Ukraine war. In Serbia, a majority disagrees with Trump's stance. 53% of Serbian respondents say they do not agree with the Trump policy on the war, whereas only 18% agree with it.

### Political Orientation - Serbia

In a simulated poll of party preferences, an independent protest initiative, the "Studenti u blokadi" (Students in Blockade) list, emerged as the single most supported option in Serbia. This student movement garners 25.5% support, which

remarkably exceeds the support for the long-ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) of President Aleksandar Vučić. The SNS records 22.2% support in the survey, placing it second behind the students' list. Meanwhile, Serbia's traditional opposition parties appear weak in public support. The main opposition grouping – the *"Biramo borbu"* (We Choose Struggle) coalition led by the Democratic Party and allied groups – is backed by a mere 1.8% of respondents. Other longstanding parties have similarly marginal numbers: the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), which has been a key political player for decades, draws only 1.2% support, and the NADA alliance also has 1.2%.

## UKRAINE

### Information - Ukraine

Ukraine's information landscape is highly digital-centric. Traditional broadcast media play a smaller role compared to other countries: only about 30% of Ukrainians report watching national TV for political news (among the lowest rates among examined countries). By contrast, messaging apps have an exceptionally large reach 45% of Ukrainians use services like Telegram, Viber, or WhatsApp to follow political developments. This figure is far above any other surveyed country and reflects

Ukraine's unique wartime information environment, where rapid updates via digital channels are relevant. Social networks and internet news sites are also widely used in Ukraine's media diet (for context, around 50% of respondents region-wide get news from social media, and 36% use online news portals).

The language of news in Ukraine is largely uniform. Roughly 97% of Ukrainians consume news in the Ukrainian language, the official national tongue. However, a minority is bilingual in media use: about 29% of Ukrainians report using Russian-language sources as well, a legacy of historical and cultural ties. A smaller segment (around 10%) follows some news in English, reflecting limited use of international media. Regarding media trust, Ukraine stands out for its high level of public skepticism. Notably, 9% of Ukrainians cite Telegram channels as their most trusted news source – a unique case not seen in other countries. Such data underscores both the reliance on fast digital information and the challenge of low institutional trust in Ukraine's information sphere.

Public sentiment about the country's direction in Ukraine is extremely pessimistic. Ukraine's average satisfaction rating is only about 2.4 on a 5-point scale, tied for the lowest among the nine countries surveyed. This low mean reflects the hardships of war and crisis. In practice, only around 12% of Ukrainians are mostly or completely satisfied with how things are going nationally, a strikingly small fraction indicating positive sentiment. By contrast, a vast majority express discontent: approximately 47% of Ukrainians describe themselves as dissatisfied (either "mostly" or "completely") with the country's trajectory. The intensity of this discontent is also notable. About 26% of the public – over one in four Ukrainians – say they are *"completely dissatisfied"* with the situation.

### Economy/Migration – Ukraine

Despite these difficulties, most Ukrainians are not looking to emigrate in the immediate future. The survey finds that just 4% of Ukrainians have concrete plans to move abroad, and another 12% are seriously considering it, about 16% in total with any intent to leave. This is one of the lowest migration-intention rates among the surveyed countries. In other words, roughly 84% of Ukrainians are not actively

planning or contemplating emigration in the next two years. Security fears have overtaken economics as the top driver for would-be emigrants from Ukraine. In fact, Ukraine is the only surveyed country where the number one reason to move abroad is not jobs or income: about 43% of Ukrainians who plan or contemplate leaving cite “*security*” (essentially, the dangers of the ongoing war) among their reasons. Still, economic factors as well, 42% mention economic motives like employment or better pay, making this the second-most common category. At the same time, Ukrainians were asked what changes might persuade those considering emigration to stay in their home country. The answers here powerfully reflect the war context. The single most commonly mentioned retention factor is ending the war itself. “*The end of the conflict*” was chosen by about 40% of Ukrainians with emigration intentions as something that would motivate them to remain.

### EU and NATO - Ukraine

Ukrainians demonstrate a strongly pro-European orientation. Support for joining the European Union is very high: approximately 84% of Ukrainian respondents say they are *in favor* of EU membership. Only around 12% are against joining the EU, and the

remainder are undecided or did not respond. This overwhelming pro-EU majority is one of the highest in the region (behind only Albania and Kosovo) and is likely reinforced by the current war context, Ukrainians see their future aligned with Europe. There is little organized opposition to the European path; however, the survey did probe those few who oppose EU accession about what alternative they envision. Among that small minority of EU-skeptical Ukrainians, neutrality is a more popular idea than any specific new alliance. (Regionally, about 51% of all EU-skeptics favor a path of non-alignment for their country). In Ukraine, very few EU opponents advocate pivoting to another bloc: only 11% of Ukraine's EU-skeptical respondents say their country has a viable alternative partnership outside the EU. Notably, a sizable portion of Ukrainian skeptics (about 21% of them) did not specify any clear alternative at all, many simply answered that there is "no alternative" to EU integration or gave idiosyncratic answers (e.g. naming individual Western countries like Poland or Germany).

Public commitment to the NATO alliance is also present in Ukraine. 80% of Ukrainians express support for their country's membership in NATO. Only about 15%

are opposed to NATO membership, with roughly 5% undecided or not answering. The European Union and its member states are frequently mentioned as the next important security partners for Ukraine (63%), indicating that deepening ties with the EU is not just about economics or politics, but also about security cooperation. Additionally, the United States is a widely desired partner: 21% of Ukrainians name the U.S. as a country their military and defense should engage more with (besides NATO itself), interestingly 22% also name the UK as a desired partner. Very few Ukrainians see value in looking regionally or to non-Western powers for security. For instance, only 3% cite greater partnership with regional neighbors or initiatives in Eastern Europe. Cooperation with Turkey or other Middle Eastern powers is also only a niche preference (around 6% mention Turkey). Similarly, only 7% of Ukrainians list China as a desired security partner, a relatively low figure that underscores limited enthusiasm for alignment with China. And essentially zero Ukrainian respondents suggest closer security ties with Russia – unsurprising given that Russia is currently seen as an aggressor. (In fact, in a separate question, 92% of Ukrainians identified



Russia as a threat to their national security, and by extension, almost no one views Russia as a potential partner right now.)

### External Actors - Ukraine

Given the ongoing conflict, Ukrainians' views of external actors are dominated by concerns about Russia and war. In an open-ended question on national security threats, an overwhelming 92% of Ukrainians named Russia as the greatest threat to their country's security. This near-consensus is by far the most dramatic single-country finding in the survey – virtually all Ukrainians perceive Russia as the primary danger to their national peace. No other potential threat even registers in comparison. By contrast, virtually *no one* in Ukraine sees Western countries as a threat: for example, only 2% of Ukrainians mentioned the United States as a security threat.

Ukrainians are also markedly concerned about wider conflict spilling beyond their borders. When asked if they fear *another war* could break out in Europe (generally), a majority of Ukrainians say yes – 41% “tend to agree” and 14% “completely agree” that a new European war is a real possibility. This combined 55% level of concern is

one of the higher figures in the region (only a couple of countries, like Albania, register similar or higher fear levels). Still, about 41% of Ukrainians do not believe a broader European war will erupt (30% tend to disagree, 11% completely disagree), showing that a segment remains hopeful or at least unconvinced of such a dire scenario. Those Ukrainians who *do* anticipate a new war tend to think their own country would be on the front lines. Among respondents who agreed that a new European war could occur, nearly all worry that Ukraine would be involved in it. Specifically, about 77% of these Ukrainians believe their country *may be drawn into* such a conflict, including 43% who tend to agree and 34% who completely agree that Ukraine could be directly involved.

As the country under attack, Ukraine's public also has clear views on what it expects from international partners. Ukrainians overwhelmingly call for active support from other countries to help Ukraine prevail and recover. When asked about their expectations of others regarding the war, military assistance tops the list: about 67% of Ukrainian respondents include continued military support (weapons, equipment, training) among their expectations from foreign partners. The next most common

ask is financial aid, roughly 47% mention economic support for Ukraine. These two forms of assistance (military and economic) far outpace any other category. Diplomatic backing is also valued but by a smaller segment (around 12% cite diplomatic support as one of their expectations), and humanitarian aid (such as help with refugees, food, medical aid) is mentioned by about 9% of Ukrainians. Additionally, 7% emphasize the need for greater international pressure on Russia (e.g. tougher sanctions, isolation of Russia).

Finally, Ukrainians' perceptions of broader geopolitical shifts and global powers reflect their current predicament and alliances. Unlike some other countries in the survey, Ukrainians are skeptical about the rise of "alternative" global leaders outside the West, especially when it comes to Russia's role. When asked if Russia is emerging as a new leader of countries outside the Western world, Ukrainians responded with the strongest rejection: 62% *completely disagree* with that statement (the highest outright rejection among all countries), and only around 10% express any agreement. In short, virtually no one in Ukraine views Russia as a leading power in a positive or aspirational sense, rather, Russia is seen as an aggressor, not a leader.

Views on China are somewhat more ambivalent. A slim majority of Ukrainians (56% in total) do agree that China is emerging as a new global leader beyond the West. This suggests Ukrainians recognize China's growing influence internationally.

Meanwhile, on the question of whether “middle powers” (like Turkey, Iran, or the UAE) are becoming new centers of global power, Ukrainians are relatively unconvinced. Only about 34% of Ukrainians agree that these middle-tier countries are emerging as important leaders, while a clear majority (56%) disagree with that idea.

### Political Orientation - Ukraine

The survey's snapshot of Ukrainian domestic politics reveals a fragmented arena, with no single party commanding overwhelming support. If parliamentary elections were held today, the Servant of the People party, the ruling party led by President Volodymyr Zelensky, would emerge as the largest party, but with only about 16.1% of the vote. The main pro-Western opposition party, European Solidarity (led by former President Petro Poroshenko), would secure roughly 7.9%, placing it in second position. No other party reaches even the mid-single-digits. A hypothetical new

movement associated with General Valeriy Zaluzhny (the wartime Commander-in-Chief) garners an estimated 3.6% support in the poll, indicating some public interest in new leadership but still a small share. Meanwhile, several of Ukraine's older political parties register only minimal backing. For example, "Fatherland" (Batkivshchyna) – the party of former Yulia Tymoshenko, is at about 1.7% support, and the "Svoboda" party (Oleh Tyahnybok) stands around 1.0%.

## MOLDOVA

### Information - Moldova

Moldova's media landscape is characterized by a heavy reliance on social media and a lower dependence on traditional television for political news. Only about 37% of Moldovans report watching national TV for political information, one of the lowest rates among surveyed countries. In contrast, social media usage is greater: 59% of respondents use platforms like Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, or YouTube to get political news. Internet news portals play a noticeably smaller role in Moldova than elsewhere (only 20% use online portals), underscoring that the online information sphere is dominated more by social networks than by news websites.

Linguistically, the Moldovan news environment is distinctly bilingual. An overwhelming majority of the population follows news in the state language (Romanian/Moldovan), about 87% use it regularly. At the same time, Russian is nearly as prevalent: roughly 78% of Moldovans consume political news in Russian. This almost equal reliance on two languages reflects Moldova's dual linguistic context, where most citizens navigate both Romanian- and Russian-language media. By comparison, very few people use English or other languages for news; only around 8% of Moldovans report using any English-language news sources. In terms of trust in information, Moldovans exhibit a fairly high level of media skepticism. About a quarter of respondents (22%) could not name any news source they trust – effectively saying “none” of the media are trustworthy. Additionally, 20% answered “Don't know” when asked to identify a trustworthy source, indicating considerable uncertainty or ambivalence. No single outlet commands majority trust in Moldova; unlike some neighboring countries that rally around a couple of major TV stations, Moldovans did not coalesce strongly around particular sources in the survey results.

The most trusted media sources were PRO TV and Moldova 1 TV channels, both garnering around 9% of respondents choices.

Public sentiment in Moldova about the country's trajectory is slightly less negative than in many other surveyed nations, yet still predominantly pessimistic. Moldova has one of the highest average satisfaction scores in the region, roughly 2.8 on a five-point scale (where 5 means completely satisfied), indicating that it is "least dissatisfied" in comparative terms, tied with Albania. About 33% of respondents describe themselves as mostly or completely satisfied with the country's direction. This one-third satisfied is actually the largest such share among the nine countries (making Moldova the most "optimistic" case), but it remains a clear minority. By contrast, roughly 38% of Moldovans voice some degree of dissatisfaction (either mostly or completely dissatisfied) with domestic conditions. Notably, the intensity of positive sentiment, while low, is higher in Moldova than elsewhere: about 8% of Moldovans say they are "*completely satisfied*", the highest rate of strong satisfaction recorded in the survey.

### Economy and Migration - Moldova

One area where Moldova stands out is in its low level of emigration intent while compared to other countries results. In numeric terms, roughly 14% of Moldovan respondents (144 out of 1.011 surveyed) say they are actively planning or seriously contemplating emigrating within the next two years. By comparison, several other countries, such as Albania or Georgia, see nearly 17–19% considering emigration, so Moldova's figure is relatively modest. Correspondingly, an overwhelming majority (around 85% or more) of Moldovans indicate no intention to leave their country in the near term. Among the handful who are thinking of emigrating, the motives are overwhelmingly economic, as is the pattern across the studied countries. Economic reasons stand out as the most frequently cited issue that motivates mobility outside of Moldova, with 72% of respondents opting for this reason. Other than this, 22% say they want better future for their children and 15% seek better education opportunities.



## EU and NATO – Moldova

Moldovan public opinion is broadly supportive of European integration, though not as unanimously as is the case in some other countries. 69% of Moldovan respondents say they are in favor of their country joining the European Union. This solid pro-EU majority indicates that EU membership is a widely shared aspiration in Moldova. However, it is paired with a notable minority of skeptics: about 25% are opposed to joining the EU. (The remaining respondents are undecided or did not answer). When the survey probed people who do not want EU membership about possible alternatives, the most common answer was non-alignment. Nearly 58% of EU-skeptical Moldovans believe the country should pursue a path of neutrality rather than join the EU. In other words, the typical opponent of EU accession in Moldova doesn't necessarily advocate pivoting to another power or bloc, but instead favors staying unaligned.

On the question of NATO, Moldova is sharply divided. Only 42% of Moldovans say they would favor joining NATO, while 46% are against it (the remaining 12% are unsure or did not respond). This nearly even split makes Moldova one of the most

ambivalent cases in the survey on NATO question. By comparison, every other country surveyed either has a clear majority for or against NATO, whereas Moldova's opinion is truly polarized on the issue. It is notable that Moldova's NATO skepticism is far milder than Serbia's (where 85% oppose NATO), yet unlike Albania, Kosovo or Ukraine (where majorities favor NATO), Moldovans do not reach a consensus. Consistent with this cautious outlook, Moldovans are also measured in how they view security partnerships beyond NATO. When asked with whom their country should cooperate more on defense and security (aside from NATO itself), European partners featured prominently in people's responses. The European Union and its member states (34%) are frequently mentioned as Moldova's preferred security partners, indicating that even outside a NATO context, deeper ties with Western Europe are seen as beneficial. Additionally, 18% of the respondents claimed regional cooperation as desirable and 16% said that Russia stands as a potential security related cooperant.

## External Actors – Moldova

The Russian war in Ukraine looms large in Moldovans' perceptions of external threats and security. When asked in an open-ended manner to name the greatest threat to Moldova's national security, almost half (47%) of Moldovan respondents answered "Russia", with other options receiving less than 5% (Ukraine 4%, USA 3%, Europe 3%).

Beyond identifying threats, the survey gauged the public's anxiety about conflict spilling over. Roughly half of Moldovans fear that a new war could erupt in Europe in the near future (30% tend to agree and 24% completely agree). This general worry is coupled with an acute concern that Moldova could be drawn into such a conflict if it occurs. Among Moldovans who believe a broader European war is possible, a large share are convinced their own country would become involved. Strikingly, 47% of Moldovan respondents who anticipate a new European war "completely agree", while 35% tend to agree that Moldova may be pulled in, one of the highest levels of certainty about national involvement recorded. This figure suggests that nearly half of all Moldovans (not just half of the war-fearing subgroup) are fully persuaded that

any wider war would include Moldova. It highlights a pervasive sense of vulnerability. (For comparison, in most other countries the proportion completely agreeing their country would be involved is much lower, for instance 20% in Serbia, 23% in Georgia, making Moldova's 47% a standout in terms of apprehension).

Regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine, Moldova's public favors a stance of caution and non-involvement, with a tilt toward supporting Ukraine diplomatically. The survey presented respondents with several options for what Moldova's position should be in the Russia-Ukraine war. The most popular choice in Moldova was for the country to remain neutral. A 43% plurality of Moldovans believe Moldova should stay neutral in the war. This neutralist sentiment is stronger in Moldova than in any other surveyed country, it reflects the delicate position Moldova is in. The next most supported stance is overtly pro-Ukraine: about 26% of Moldovans say the country should support Ukraine until it wins the war. Meanwhile, 25% favor a more reserved approach, they think Moldova should support diplomatic efforts to end the war as soon as possible. 3% of respondents in Moldova chose "support Russia until it wins".

Moldovans' views on broader geopolitical dynamics show a mix of recognition and ambivalence. Despite largely viewing Russia as a threat, many Moldovans also acknowledge Russia's global role. When asked whether "Russia is emerging as a new leader of countries outside the West," about 46% of Moldovans agreed to some extent (either "tend to agree" or "completely agree"). At the same time, 24% completely disagreed with that notion. On a similar question about China, the sentiment is more decisively affirmative: 58% of Moldovans agree that China is emerging as a new leading power outside the Western world. However, Moldovans are more hesitant when considering the rise of secondary regional powers. Regarding whether "middle powers" like Turkey, Iran, or the UAE are becoming new centers of power, opinions are evenly divided, roughly 40% of Moldovans agree and 39% disagree, with the rest unsure.

### Political Orientation - Moldova

The domestic political arena in Moldova is currently dominated by the pro-European ruling party, with the opposition divided into several small factions. The survey's "if elections were held today" question reveals that the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS)

– the party of President Maia Sandu, holds a commanding lead. PAS is supported by about 35.6% of Moldovan respondents, far outpacing any other single party. This level of support positions PAS as by far the strongest political force in the country at the moment. In stark contrast, the traditional pro-Russian opposition has dwindled in public backing. The main opposition force, the Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), is at only 7.3% support. No other party reaches even 5% in the survey. The data show a handful of minor players each garnering only marginal support. A newly formed electoral bloc called “Alternativa” is the third-most cited preference, at 4.1%. Following that, “Our Party” (Partidul Nostru) registers around 2.9%, and the Communist Party (PCRM, the old communist faction) comes in at approximately 2.3%.

## GEORGIA

### Information – Georgia

In terms of the information environment, Georgia displays a shift toward digital media. Two-thirds of Georgian respondents (66%) use social media platforms for political news – the highest share among all surveyed countries. By comparison, traditional television reaches a smaller yet still big audience: about 43% report watching national TV for political information. Reliance on internet news portals is much lower in Georgia (only 14% use web portals for political news), and messaging apps are scarcely used (5%) as news sources. This indicates that social networks have overtaken TV as the leading information channel, while other media types play marginal roles. Language of news consumption reflects Georgia's demographics: 99% of people consume news in the Georgian language. Nevertheless, a substantial segment also uses Russian-language sources (approximately 33% of Georgians follow some news in Russian), and about 23% use English-language news at times.

Media trust is a challenge in Georgia. A portion of the public exhibits distrust or uncertainty toward news outlets. Roughly one-quarter of Georgian respondents did

not name any source they consider trustworthy (27%) for political information, suggesting that about one in four trusts no media outlet at all. An equally large share are unsure, 25% answered “Don’t know” when asked to identify a trusted news source. Taken together, about half of Georgians either express no trust in any media or cannot pinpoint a reliable source, indicating widespread skepticism. This is one of the higher media distrust levels in the region (for comparison, only 17% in Albania responded with “no source”) and points to a fractured information environment. The single most trusted media source that was named is Imedi television, with 17% of respondents opting for this choice.

Georgia’s public remains generally pessimistic about the country’s trajectory, with overall satisfaction levels among the lower-middle of surveyed states. On a five-point scale of national satisfaction, Georgia’s mean score is roughly 2.6 (where 5 means “completely satisfied”). In practice, a clear majority of Georgians are dissatisfied with how things are going domestically, and only a minority express any optimism. In line with regional patterns, no more than about one-fifth of Georgia’s population is mostly or completely satisfied with the country’s direction. By contrast, outright



negativity is common, about 26% of Georgians say they are “completely dissatisfied” with current conditions, one of the highest rates of intense discontent recorded (comparable to Ukraine).

### Economy and Migration – Georgia

Georgia’s survey results on migration intent show a populace that is somewhat rooted, yet with notable emigration pressures. In total, 17% of Georgian respondents are actively planning or seriously considering moving abroad in the next two years. Conversely, a strong majority about 81%, indicate no intention to leave their country in the near future. These figures place Georgia around the middle of the pack regionally. Its 17% emigration-consideration rate is higher than in states like Serbia or Moldova (where roughly 14% contemplate leaving), but lower than the peak levels among some countries (North Macedonia’s rate reaches 28%, the highest in the survey). In short, roughly one in six Georgians is weighing the option of emigration, while five in six are staying for now.

Economic motives are by far the dominant driver for those Georgians who do consider leaving. Among respondents planning or pondering emigration, 76% cite economic reasons, such as the pursuit of better job opportunities or higher salaries, as a motivation in their decision. For instance, relatively few prospective emigrants (only 5%) mention “a better future for my children” as a reason to move. Better education opportunities also garner a relevant amount of 14% respondents’ choices as a migration motive. When asked about what would motivate them to stay 51% chose better job opportunities / higher salaries.

### EU and NATO – Georgia

Public opinion in Georgia is strongly pro-European. A majority of Georgians, 78%, say they favor their country joining the European Union. This level of support indicates a broad consensus in favor of EU integration. While not nearly unanimous (Georgia’s support is lower than the 94% seen in Albania or Kosovo), it nonetheless confirms that EU membership is a widely shared aspiration in Georgian society. 13% of Georgians oppose EU accession, and about 9% remain undecided or did not respond.

Among the minority who do not want EU membership, most prefer non-alignment over any alternative alliance. When these EU-skeptical respondents were asked about other foreign policy paths, an overwhelming 75% of them said Georgia should pursue a neutral course (i.e. neither EU nor another bloc). In other words, neutrality is by far the dominant “alternative” vision among Georgian EU opponents. Very few of Georgia’s EU skeptics favor partnering with rival powers, in fact, only 5% of anti-EU respondents in Georgia would seek cooperation with non-EU countries as an alternative orientation. On the question of NATO membership, Georgian public opinion also shows a clear majority in favor, albeit with a more notable opposition than on the EU issue. According to the survey, 65% of Georgians support joining NATO. This aligns with Georgia’s long-standing Euro-Atlantic orientation and security concerns. However, unlike in some neighboring countries where support for NATO is nearly unanimous, in Georgia there is a sizable dissenting segment: 23% are against NATO membership, and a further 12% are undecided or did not state a position. Thus, while two-thirds favor the NATO path, roughly one in three Georgians either oppose it or have reservations.

## External Actors – Georgia

Faced with the ongoing war in Ukraine, the single largest share of respondents (36%) believe Georgia should support diplomatic efforts to end the war as soon as possible. Nearly as many, 35%, think Georgia should remain strictly neutral in the conflict. Taken together, about 71% favor either neutrality or an active diplomatic role to help stop the fighting, indicating a broad desire to avoid direct involvement. A smaller but noteworthy faction sides firmly with Kyiv: 22% of Georgians say the country should support Ukraine until it wins the war. Virtually no one in Georgia openly favors the opposite side – fewer than 1% of respondents would want to support Russia to victory. In terms of perceived threats on the world stage, Russia dominates Georgians' threat perceptions. When asked to name the greatest threat to Georgia's national security, a majority (56% of respondents) identified Russia. Georgians hold mixed views on the shifting global power balance involving major and emerging powers. Regarding Russia's global role, Georgian opinion is divided and somewhat skeptical. The survey presented the statement "Russia is emerging as a new leader of countries outside the West". Only about 25% of Georgians express agreement

with that idea to any extent, whereas a larger share, over 34%, completely disagree with it. In contrast, perceptions of China are more receptive. When asked a similar question about China (“China is emerging as a new leading power outside the Western world”), 43% of Georgians agreed that China is on the rise as a global leader. Fewer Georgians flatly reject China’s rise; however, uncertainty is notable, about 24% did not express an opinion on China’s growing role, one of the higher non-response rates for this question.

### Political Orientation – Georgia

The survey’s “if an election were held today” question reveals a political landscape in Georgia, in which the ruling party maintains a lead amid a splintered opposition field. Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia (the incumbent governing party) holds the largest single share of recorded support, but at only 19.8% of respondents. That opposition coalition is a distant second, with 5.4% support. No other group approaches double digits. Several smaller parties or coalitions cluster just below that: for example, the “Coalition for Change” (an alliance of parties like Akhali, Girchi, and Droa) registers 4.3%. Another alliance, the “Coalition Strong Georgia”

(comprising Lelo, For People, For Justice), has about 3.6% support. Additionally, the party of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia (For Georgia) garners roughly 1.6%.

## METHODOLOGY

The Geo-Power-EU survey was designed to empirically assess public opinion on foreign policy and geopolitical issues across multiple countries. The research aimed to understand how citizens in nine nations of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia) and the Eastern Partnership region (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) perceive the influence and roles of major international actors (the European Union, United States, Russia, China, and Turkey) in their country's affairs. By capturing attitudes towards these global powers and related foreign policy questions, the study provides insights into public beliefs, concerns, and preferences regarding international alignments and national direction. This overview of purpose guided the methodological choices, ensuring the survey would yield reliable and comparable data on these perceptions across all target countries.

The survey utilized a **structured questionnaire** that was developed in English and then translated into the official language of each participating country (with careful back-translation to ensure accuracy and consistency). The final instrument consisted

of approximately 40 questions in total, including 5 introductory questions, about 30 core substantive questions, and 5 demographic questions at the end (the full questionnaire is available in the Annex 4). The questionnaire was designed as a unified tool for all countries, meaning that respondents answered the same set of questions adapted to their local language (including Russian in Moldova and Ukraine, Romanian, as well in Moldova, and Albanian in Kosovo). In Bosnia and Herzegovina the questionnaire was presented in one (Bosnian) of the three official languages (excluding Croatian and Serbian). Additionally, some questions were context adjusted (e.g. political parties and media sources) for each country. The content covered multiple thematic areas reflecting the study's objectives. Respondents were first asked about their sources of information and media habits, as well as general satisfaction with their country's current conditions, to set context. Subsequent sections probed economic outlook and migration intentions, recognizing that socio-economic factors might influence foreign policy views. The survey then included questions on international integrations – notably attitudes toward European Union membership and NATO – to gauge support for Western



alliances. A major portion of the instrument focused on perceptions of external actors: participants rated or described their trust in and feelings toward the EU, USA, Russia, China, and Turkey, including whether these actors are seen as partners or threats to national security. The questionnaire also captured political orientation and preferences (for example, views on possible policy directions or alignments) along with standard demographics (age, gender, education, region, and urban/rural residence). The final question asked which concrete parties would respondents support in the case of democratic elections, the figures that were garnered are a snapshot and not intended as pre-election polling. On average, interviews lasted about 15–20 minutes, reflecting the questionnaire's length and complexity.

### The method

A quantitative Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) approach was employed for data collection between 2<sup>nd</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> June, 2025. All interviews were conducted by telephone using trained interviewers who followed a standardized script on a computer interface. The CATI system ensured that question wording, order, and skip patterns were presented consistently, while interviewers recorded

responses directly into the database. Using telephone interviews allowed the research team to reach respondents across different regions, including both urban and rural areas, and to achieve high respondent coverage in a relatively short fieldwork period. Both landline and mobile phone numbers were used (a dual-frame sampling approach) so that households without landlines and those with only mobile phones were included.

### Sampling

In each country, the survey employed a **probability-based sampling** design to achieve a nationally representative sample of the adult population (aged 18 and above). A stratified multistage sampling approach was used, where the population was stratified by key demographics and geography before random selection. Specifically, the sample was structured to reflect major sociodemographic factors: gender, age group, region (e.g. provinces or statistical regions), and settlement type (urban versus rural) and ethnicity. The **effective margin of error** for each national sample of 1,000 interviews is  $\pm 3.0$  percentage points at the 95 % confidence level.

Within each stratum, telephone numbers were generated or selected at random. Important thing to note is that the respondents from occupied territory of Ukraine have been excluded from quota calculations and are not included in the general population sampling. The reason for this is technical limitations that made the inclusion of this population impossible. The study implemented a dual-frame random-digit dialing technique encompassing both fixed landline and mobile phone numbers. For landline samples, numbers were randomly generated within known residential telephone prefixes across different regions, ensuring broad geographic coverage. For mobile samples, random generation within mobile number blocks ensured inclusion of respondents who use only cell phones. This dual-frame approach improves coverage of the target population and helps avoid biases that might arise if only landlines or only mobiles were used.

To select individual respondents, a within-household randomization was applied for landline calls: if a landline was answered, interviewers would ask to speak with a randomly selected adult (for example, the adult in the household who had the most recent birthday) to avoid interviewing only the person who answered the phone. For

mobile calls, the person answering was considered the respondent. Each national sample had a target of approximately  $N = 1.000$  completed interviews, with the exception of Moldova which holds a slightly larger sample of 1.011 respondents. Across the nine countries, the total sample size reached 9.011 respondents. Quotas and continuous monitoring were used during fieldwork to ensure that the achieved sample in each country closely matched known population distributions.

Each call was monitored through call-back verification and internal consistency checks. A minimum of 10% of the completed questionnaires are checked by phone. This type of back-check was aimed at making sure that correct target person was selected and interviewed, the interview was long enough to include all questions, data is consistent (re-asking several questions from the questionnaire) and respondent data (e.g. age and gender) is accurate.

### **Data Protection and Research Ethics**

Each respondent was assured of anonymity and confidentiality, and the study was conducted in full compliance with GDPR and relevant national legislation.

Respondents were informed about the purpose of the research, how their data will be used, and that confidentiality will be maintained. Respondents gave informed consent to participate, with the freedom to withdraw at any time. Participation was entirely voluntary, and respondents could refuse to answer questions or terminate the interview without any negative consequences.

Annex 1:

Countries	Institutes	Number of Interviews	Fieldwork Dates	
Albania	New Policy Group	1000	06.06.2025	26.06.2025
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Smart Plus	1000	02.06.2025	30.06.2025
Kosovo	UBO Consulting	1000	02.06.2025	20.06.2025
Montenegro	Damar Agencija	1000	02.06.2025	14.06.2025

Countries	Institutes	Number of Interviews	Fieldwork Dates	
North Macedonia	Indago	1000	04.06.2025	25.06.2025
Serbia	Smart Plus	1000	02.06.2025	30.06.2025
Georgia	IPM Market Intelligence	1000	02.06.2025	23.06.2025
Moldova	InfoSapiens	1011	02.06.2025	09.06.2025
Ukraine	InfoSapiens	1000	02.06.2025	30.06.2025

## Annex 2: Response Rates

	Country	AL	BIH	KO	MON	NM	SRB	MA	UKR	GA
A	Completed interview	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1011	1000	1000
B	Refusal by person who answered	615	2858	1784	591	554	2644	4539	29550	1569
C	Refused by selected respondent	212	213	0	454	152	173	166	237	359
D	Interrupted interview	133	203	12	91	88	191	351	116	61



E	No answer after 3 attempts	2785	5596	2859	1591	2880	5171	5299	3536	2987
F	Respondent is absent for a long period of time	266	155	123	364	318	182	1825	304	1091
G	Dialled contact is not a residential contact	125	67	0	454	212	168	11	861	239
H	<b>Total</b>	<b>5136</b>	<b>10092</b>	<b>5778</b>	<b>4545</b>	<b>5204</b>	<b>9529</b>	<b>13202</b>	<b>3560 4</b>	<b>7306</b>
	Response rate = A/H*100	<b>19.5%</b>	<b>9.9%</b>	<b>17.3 %</b>	<b>22.0%</b>	<b>19.2 %</b>	<b>10.5 %</b>	<b>7.7%</b>	<b>2.8%</b>	<b>13.7%</b>
	Refusal rate = SUM (B, C, D)/H*100	<b>18.7%</b>	<b>32.4%</b>	<b>31.1 %</b>	<b>25.0%</b>	<b>15.3 %</b>	<b>31.6 %</b>	<b>38.3%</b>	<b>84.0%</b>	<b>27.2%</b>

## Annex 3: Questionnaire

### Master Questionnaire v4.0

#### GEO POWER EU SURVEY

*<Basic survey information>*

*Length of interview:*

*Start fieldwork:*

*End fieldwork:*

#### I. SAMPLE VARIABLES

*- Age*

*- Gender*

*- Region*

#### II. QUOTA CHECK BASED ON SAMPLE VARIABLES

*<Description of the quota based on sample information>*

*Total net n=1000*

*National representative sample 18+*

#### III. INTRODUCTION

Good morning/afternoon/evening. My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I work for [NAME OF THE COMPANY], **(If applicable)** which is a part of a regional consortium led by Newton Research and Indago. We are conducting a survey commissioned by the academic research project - GEO-POWER-EU. The main objective is to contribute to an analysis of the perceptions of the EU and its competitors \_\_\_\_\_ in its Eastern Neighbourhood and in the Western Balkans. We are conducting a survey for the GEO-POWER-EU project to understand how people in your country view current social, political, and economic issues.

Your participation is entirely voluntary, your answers are confidential, and no personal data will be shared.

..."The data controller for this study is Newton Research Europe and Indago. All responses are collected exclusively for academic research purposes and handled in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Participation is voluntary, all answers are confidential, and no personal identifiers will be stored or shared. Data is stored securely and used solely in aggregated form."

☐ TO BE ADAPTED FOR EACH COUNTRY

#### IV. SCREENER

Base: all respondents

## S01 [S] Country

*(INT. PLEASE MARK COUNTRY WHERE THE INTERVIEW IS BEING CONDUCTED)*

1. Albania
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. Kosovo
4. Montenegro
5. North Macedonia
6. Serbia
7. Ukraine
8. Moldova
9. Georgia

Base: all respondents

## S02 [S]Region (example)

*SCRIPTER: ADD SPECIFIC REGIONS FOR EACH COUNTRY example - MK:*

1. Vardar
2. East
3. Southwest
4. Southeast

5. Pelagonia
6. Polog
7. Northeast
8. Skopje

Base: all respondents

**S03 [S] What is your place of living?**

INT: USE THE NATIONAL CENSUS CLASSIFICATION IF AVAILABLE. IF UNCERTAIN, ASK RESPONDENT HOW THEY WOULD CLASSIFY THEIR AREA

*INT. READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

1. Urban
2. Rural

Base: all respondents

**S04 [O] What is your age?**

\_\_\_\_\_

*99) Prefer not to say (DO NOT READ) >> GO TO S04A*

Base: respondents who choose not to tell exact age

S04a [S] I am going to read age groups and would like you to tell me in which age group do you belong.

INT: READ THE CATEGORIES

1. 18 - 24
2. 25 - 34
3. 35 - 44
4. 45 - 54
5. 55 - 64
6. 65+

Base: all respondents

S05 [S]

**Gender:**

*INT. DO NOT READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

1. Female
2. Male
3. Other
4. Prefer not to answer

## V. MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE

### CHAPTER A. INFORMATION

Base: all respondents

**Q1 [M]. How do you inform yourself of political developments in your country?**

*MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE (UP TO THREE)*

*SCRIPT: FIRST MENTION + OTHER*

- 1) National TV channels
- 2) Regional TV channels
- 3) Local TV channels
- 4) Foreign TV/media channels (e.g. BBC, CNN, Russia Today)
- 5) Printed press
- 6) Internet portals
- 7) Social media (FB, Instagram, TikTok, Threads, X, YouTube)
- 8) Messaging apps (Signal, Telegram, Viber, Whatsapp)
- 9) Talks with friends and family
- 10) National Radio stations
- 11) Regional Radio stations
- 12) Local Radio stations
- 13) Other, what\_\_\_\_\_

98) I am not informed # DO NOT READ

99) Don't know # DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents except codes 98 and 99 on Q1

**Q2. In which language do you watch/read/listen to news?**

*MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE (UP TO THREE)*

*SCRIPT: FIRST MENTION + OTHER*

- 1) Albanian
- 2) Bosnian
- 3) Croatian
- 4) Georgian
- 5) English
- 6) Macedonian
- 7) Montenegrin
- 8) Moldovan/Romanian
- 9) Russian
- 10) Serbian
- 11) Turkish
- 12) Ukrainian
- 13) Other, what \_\_\_\_\_
- 98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents except codes 98 and 99 on Q1

**Q3 [O] Which specific media or source of information do you consider most trustworthy for political news?**

INT: PLEASE WRITE DOWN NAME OF SPECIFIC TV/RADIO/NEWSPAPER/INTERNET PORTAL THAT RESPONDENT MENTIONS



---

97) None

98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ

99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents

**Q4 [S]. How satisfied are you with the way things are going in [COUNTRY]?**

*INT: READ THE ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

- 1) I'm completely dissatisfied
- 2) I'm mostly unsatisfied
- 3) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- 4) I'm mostly satisfied
- 5) I'm completely satisfied

98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ

99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents

**Q5 [S per row] How good or bad, in your view, is the status of the following listed values in [COUNTRY]?**

*INT: READ EACH STATEMENT. SINGLE ANSWER PER ROW*

SCRIPT: ROTATE STATEMENTS

	1) very bad	2) Mostly bad	3) Neutr al	4) Mostly good	5) Very good	98) Refuse to answer [DON'T READ]	99) Don't know [DON'T READ]
democracy	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
governance and rule of law	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
human rights	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
economic welfare of citizens	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
employment	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
social equality	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
Security	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
freedom of speech	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

	1) very bad	2) Mostly bad	3) Neutr al	4) Mostly good	5) Very good	98) Refuse to answer [DON'T READ]	99) Don't know [DON'T READ]

Base: all respondents

**Q7 [S] How do you see the future of [COUNTRY] in general?**

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

- 1) *it will be* better than now
- 2) it will be the same as now
- 3) it will be worse than now
- 99) Don't know/Refuse to answer – DO NOT READ!

Base: all respondents

**Q8 [M] According to your opinion, what do you think will be the biggest issues facing [COUNTRY] in the next five years?**

*INT: DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS! PLEASE MARK ONE OF THE ANSWERS ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER OR WRITE DOWN ANSWERS WHICH ARE NOT MENTIONED BELOW!*

*MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE (UP TO THREE)*

*SCRIPT: FIRST MENTION + OTHER*

- 1) corruption
- 2) unemployment
- 3) skilled workforce leaving the country
- 4) crime
- 5) quality of public services (education, healthcare)
- 6) immigration
- 7) inequalities
- 8) climate change and pollution
- 9) demographic decline
- 10) weakening of traditional values
- 11) weakening of democracy
- 12) political instability or conflict in your country or region
- 13) automation and transformation of work
- 14) disinformation and fake news
- 15) Other, what \_\_\_\_\_
- 98) I don't answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

## CHAPTER B: ECONOMY/MIGRATION

Base: all respondents

**Q9 [S] Are you considering moving abroad in the next 2 years?**

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

- 1) Yes, and I have concrete plans or arrangements
- 2) Yes, but I don't have any concrete plans or arrangements yet
- 3) No
- 98) No answer DO NOT READ
- 99) I don't know DO NOT READ

Base: respondents with codes 1 or 2 on Q9

**Q10 [M] What are the main reasons for considering moving abroad?**

*INT: DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS! PLEASE MARK ONE OF THE ANSWERS ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER OR WRITE DOWN ANSWERS WHICH ARE NOT MENTIONED BELOW!*

*MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE (UP TO THREE)*

*SCRIPT: FIRST MENTION + OTHER*

- 1) Economic reasons (e.g. employment, income)
- 2) Better education opportunities
- 3) Better healthcare
- 4) Environmental concerns (e.g. pollution, climate)
- 5) Corruption

- 6) Lack of respect of my rights in the country
- 7) Lack of opportunities to succeed based on merit (nepotism)
- 8) Better future for my children
- 9) Political instability
- 10) Family reunification
- 11) Simply fed up
- 12) Other, what\_\_\_\_\_
- 98) I don't answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: respondents with codes 1 or 2 on Q9

**Q11 [M] What would motivate you to stay in the country?**

*INT: DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS! PLEASE MARK ONE OF THE ANSWERS ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER OR WRITE DOWN ANSWERS WHICH ARE NOT MENTIONED BELOW!*

*MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE (UP TO THREE)*

*SCRIPT: FIRST MENTION + OTHER*

- 1) Better job opportunities/Higher salaries
- 2) Better education opportunities
- 3) Better healthcare
- 4) Cleaner environment

- 5) Political stability
- 6) Less corruption
- 7) Respect of rights
- 8) Functioning institutions
- 9) Support for young families (e.g. childcare, housing)
- 10) Opportunity to work remotely for foreign companies
- 11) Functional public services
- 99) Other, what \_\_\_\_\_

## CHAPTER C: THE EU and NATO

Base: all respondents

**Q12 [S] Are you in favor of our country joining the European Union?**

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 98) I don't answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: respondents WITH CODE 2 TO Q12

**Q14 [S] In terms of its foreign orientation, do you believe that [COUNTRY] has an alternative to joining the EU?**

1) Yes – cooperation with non-EU countries

2) Yes - pursuing neutrality

3) Other, what \_\_\_\_\_

98) I don't answer DO NOT READ

99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents

**Q15 [O] Which country do you regard as the greatest threat to [COUNTRY'S] national security?**

OPEN END

\_\_\_\_\_

98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ

99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents



**Q16 [S] Are you in favor of your country's membership in NATO?**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 98) I don't answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents

**Q17 [S] Other than NATO, with which partner should [COUNTRY] engage more for its national security?**

*INT: DO NOT READ THE ANSWERS! PLEASE MARK ONE OF THE ANSWERS ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER OR WRITE DOWN ANSWERS WHICH ARE NOT MENTIONED BELOW!*

*MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE (UP TO THREE)*

*SCRIPT: FIRST MENTION + OTHER*

- 1) EU and its members
- 2) United Kingdom/Great Britain
- 3) Russia
- 4) China
- 5) United States
- 6) Turkey
- 7) Regional Cooperation (between neighbouring countries)

8) Full neutrality and Non-Alignment/Self reliant - EXCLUSION

9) Through international organisations (e.g. OSCE)

10) Other, what\_\_\_\_\_

98) I don't answer DO NOT READ

99) Don't know DO NOT READ

## CHAPTER D: EXTERNAL ACTORS

Base: all respondents

**Q18 [S per row] Do you believe that the following countries represent a threat to peace and security in Europe?**

*INT: READ EACH STATEMENT. SINGLE ANSWER PER ROW*

*SCRIPT: ROTATE*

		Yes	No	DK/N A
	China	1	2	9
	Russia	1	2	9
	USA	1	2	9
	Turkey	1	2	9

Base: all respondents

**Q19 [S per row] To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements**

*INT: READ EACH STATEMENT. SINGLE ANSWER PER ROW*

		Complet ely Disagree (1)	Tend to disagr ee (2)	Ten d to agre e (3)	Comple tely agree (4)	DK/N A
1 )	Are you afraid that another war can break out in Europe	1	2	3	4	9
2 )	FOLLOW UP (IF YES): Are you afraid that our country may be involved in such a war	1	2	3	4	9

Base: all respondents

**Q20 [S per row] To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the state of the world?**

*INT: READ EACH STATEMENT. SINGLE ANSWER PER ROW*

SCRIPT: ROTATE STATEMENTS

		Complet ely Disagree (1)	Tend to disagr ee (2)	Ten d to agre e (3)	Comple tely agree (4)	DK/N A
3)	We are entering an era of »my country first« and everyone is looking out for themselves	1	2	3	4	9
4)	Russia is emerging as a new leader of the countries outside the West.	1	2	3	4	9
5)	China is emerging as a new leader of the countries outside the West	1	2	3	4	9
7)	Middle powers (such as Turkey, Iran and UAE) are emerging as new centres of power	1	2	3	4	9

Base: all respondents

**Q21 [S] To which actor/country do you feel closer regarding values and ideas?**

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

*SCRIPT: ROTATE STATEMENTS*

- 1) The United States of America
- 2) The European Union
- 3) Russia
- 4) China
- 5) Turkey
- 6) None of the above / I do not feel close to any particular country
- 7) Other, what \_\_\_\_\_
- 98) I don't answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents

**Q22 [S] According to you, our country should collaborate more with...?**

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

*SCRIPT: ROTATE STATEMENTS*

- 1) The United States of America
- 2) The European Union

- 3) Russia
- 4) China
- 5) Turkey
- 6) None of the above
- 7) Other, what \_\_\_\_\_
- 98) I don't answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents

**Q25 [S per row] Should our country reduce its economic dependence on the following actors?**

*INT: READ EACH STATEMENT. SINGLE ANSWER PER ROW. SCRIPT: ROTATE*

		Yes	No	DK/NA
	USA	1	2	9
	EU	1	2	9
	Russia	1	2	9
	China	1	2	9
	Turkey	1	2	9

Base: all respondents

**Q26 [S] How would you evaluate the impact of the Trump administration's policies on [COUNTRY]?**

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

*SCRIPT: ROTATE*

- 1) Mostly positive
- 2) Mostly negative
- 3) Neither DO NOT READ
- 98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents – ALL COUNTRIES EXCEPT UKRAINE

**Q27 [S] What position should your [COUNTRY] take in the war in Ukraine?**

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

- 1) My country should support Ukraine until it wins the war.
- 2) My country should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine
- 3) My country should support diplomatic efforts to end the war.
- 4) My country should support Russia until it wins the war
- 98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents – ALL COUNTRIES EXCEPT UKRAINE

**Q27a [S] Do you agree with Trump's policy toward the war in Ukraine?**

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know/Refuse to answer – DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents – ALL COUNTRIES EXCEPT UKRAINE

**Q28 [S] How does the continuation of war in Ukraine affect the security situation in your [COUNTRY]?**

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

- 1) Completely negative
- 2) Mostly negative
- 3) Neither negative nor positive
- 4) Mostly positive
- 5) Completely positive
- 6) Don't know/Refuse to answer – DO NOT READ!

Base: all respondents –UKRAINE

**Q29. What are your expectations from other countries regarding the war?**

*MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE (UP TO THREE)*



*SCRIPT: FIRST MENTION + OTHER*

1. Economic support
2. Military support
3. Humanitarian support
4. Diplomatic support
5. Neutrality

## CHAPTER E: Elections/Political Orientation

**Q30 [S]** Please imagine that parliamentary elections are happening next Sunday, which party or coalition would you vote for?

*SCRIPTER: ADD SPECIFIC POLITICAL PARTIES/COALITION FOR EACH COUNTRY example -*

*MK:*

- 1) SDSM
- 2) VMRO-DPMNE
- 3) DUI
- 4) VLEN
- 5) Levica
- 6) Aliance for Albanians
- 7) ZNAM
- 8) Other, what\_\_\_\_\_
- 97) I would not vote / Would abstain
- 98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ

99) Don't know DO NOT READ

## DEMOGRAPHICS

Base: all respondents

### D1 [S] What is your highest level of education?

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

- 1) No education / incomplete primary school
- 2) Primary education
- 3) High school (vocational or high school)
- 4) College / university
- 5) Master's degree / Doctorate

98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ

99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents

### D2 [S] What is your current working status?

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

- 1) Employed in the private sector
- 2) Employed in the public sector
- 3) Self-employed (including business owners)

- 4) Unemployed
- 5) Student
- 6) Retired
- 7) Unpaid work in the household
- 8) Not looking for work
- 98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents

### D3 [S] What is your marital status?

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

- 1) Married
- 2) I live with a partner
- 3) Divorced
- 4) Single
- 5) Widow/er
- 98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ
- 99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents

**D4 [S] What is your ethnicity?**

*INT: DON'T READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

*SCRIPTER: ADD SPECIFIC ETHNICITIES FOR EACH COUNTRY example - MK:*

Macedonian

Albanian

Turkish

Roma

Serbian

Vlach

Another, which? [O] \_\_\_\_\_

98) I don't want to answer DO NOT READ

99) Don't know DO NOT READ

Base: all respondents

**D5 [S] How many people, including yourself, live in your household?**

*INT: READ ANSWERS! SINGLE ANSWER*

1. 1

2. 2

- 3. 3
- 4. 4
- 5. 5
- 6. 6
- 7. 7
- 8. 8
- 9. 9
- 10. 10
- 11. More than 10
- 12. Refuses to answer - DO NOT READ!

**END**

Do you agree to be re-contacted for a possible control of quality of my work as an interviewer?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

Thank you for your participation.